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The present thesis takes its original impetus from the
author's conviction that the German philosophy of the
"Goethezeit" represents a peak of metaphysical insight
and achievement comparable with the original flowering
of European philosophical thought in the age of Plato and
Aristotle. Until recently, it was fashionable to regard
Kant and Hegel as the two 'giants' of this second flow¬
ering and to consign other philosophers, such as Fichte
and Schelling, to the r8le of supporting figures. However,
in recent years, the pioneer efforts of such scholars as
Walter Schulz, plus the interest shown by modern philoso¬
phers such as Martin Heidegger, have drawn attention to
depths in the philosophy of Schelling which had been ig¬
nored by the leading exponents of Idealist philosophy,
due to their sympathy for the ideas of Kant and/or Hegel.
In addition, again due partly to the insights of Heideg¬
ger, there has developed a realisation among ever wid¬
ening circles that Friedrich Holderlin was also one of
these 'giants' of metaphysics. His strictly philosophical
works are limited in number and in length. However, his
contribution cannot be measured in terms of quantity: I
would maintain, and have tried to show in the present
work, that it was his original insight and inspiration
which formed the basis for all of Schelling's work as of
the late 1790's. In the process, I have followed Holder¬
lin 's thought back to what I see as its roots: the ideas
of the Presocratics, early Plato and Kant's third "Kritik'.'
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CHAPTER ONE : "PINDAR"
It might seem at first puzzling that the philosophi¬
cally minded Holderlin should have such a profound inter¬
est in the Greek podt Pindar's Songs in praise of various
athletes at the ancient games of his day. However, his
interest in and enthusiasm for Pindar's work cannot be
denied or ignored. Not only did he translate some of Pin¬
dar's Odes and other fragments, but Pindar's style can be
seen to have influenced the tone, general atmosphere and
strophic structure of the longer poems Holderlin composed
in the latter part of his active career, although this
influence may have been partly mediated through the neo-
Pindaric odes of Goethe, Klopstock and Schiller. Our ana¬
lysis in this chapter will be confined to Holderlin's di¬
rect interest in and pronouncements on Pindar's work and
to an attempt to elucidate the philosophical basis for
this interest.
The subject matter of Pindar's work, the celebration
of the achievements and qualities of the various winners
of the games, does not at first sight appear to be of the
sort that might excite the philosophical interest of IIol-
derlin, as opposed to his purely aesthetic concerns as a
poet. However, if we look closely at Holderlin's Pindar
Fragments, small sections translated with comments ap¬
pended - BeiBner thinks in 1803, some three years after
the main body of Holderlin's Pindar translations - we
find that Holderlin's interest would indeed appear to be
largely philosophical.
Firstly, there is the reference to Centaurs in general,
and Cheiron (or "Chiron" in Holderlin's transliteration)
in particular. Holderlin elects to translate the fol¬
lowing section of Jason's speech in Pythian IV (ll.
102 ff.)5 -
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£vKO o-u ^ £ Afe-CTod-uCj feVt onJ C, oi?fe £p|4v
OTJT1 G-KOC, Gsy"T' pcCa&Xo-V K'^C'VCLcr^ tOV IK ©jd-^-k'
O'JK^^ ip^ocX oCV -u^Tpc>S ftcCcrcXt-uo^V^'K.
Holderlin's second version runs as follows:-
ich glaube, die Lehre
Chirons zu haben. Aus der Grotte namlich komm' ich
Bei Charilcli und Philyra, wo des
Centauren Madchen mich ernahret,
Die heiligen; zwanzig Jahre aber hab '
Ich zugebracht und nicht ein Werk
Noch Wort, ein schmutziges, jenen
Gesagt, und bin gekommen nach Ilaus, ^
Die Herrschaft wiederzubringen meines Yaters,
[Gr.St.A. 5,p.28l7|
Holderlin has translated the Greek quite accurately,
although "haben" seems a strange translation for ol.ct£utz,
the Future Infinitive of ^epwj . "I claim that I shall
present/bring forth proof of/for" would bring out the
I x. >i
force of <pt, 0iCgCF more fully and adequately.
As regards the intellectual content of the passage,
Holderlin offers the following interpretation and com¬
ments :
Fahigkeit der einsamen Schule fur die Welt. Das
Unschuldige des reinen Wissens als die Seele der
Klugheit. Denn Ivlugheit ist die Kunst, unter ver—
schiedenen Umstanden getreu zu bleiben, das Wissen
die Kunst, bei positiven Irrttimern im Verstande
sicher zu sein. Ist intensiv der Verstand geiibt,
so erhalt er seine Kraft auch im Zerstreuten;
sofern er an der eigenen geschliffenen Scharfe das
Fremde leicht erkennt, deswegen nicht leicht irre
wird in ungewissen Situationen.
[Gr.St.A. 5. P.28lj
This, then, is Holderlin's definition of "die Lehre
des Chirons", Pindar's 'b ^(fcipwVo^. He would seem
to be describing a state of heightened consciousness
which makes one "fahig... fur die Welt". This is not
simple "Lebensweisheit" which is intended to teach one
how to succeed in earthly affairs and avoid making "faux
pas" which might have an adverse effect on one's standing
in the world. Holderlin speaks of "das Unschuldige des
reinen Wissens": ... OVTfc £=P Yo*y C'Df &-T£_cC, &-'y"T P
KOiCrvV ... This Steaches one how to
avoid being put to shame (t.VfjJfe'aofAeCi. = "I feel shame") by-
saying or doing something disgraceful. This might be con¬
nected with the concepts of "shame societies" and "guilt
societies" much discussed by modern anthropologists - E.R.
Dodds has shown how relevant these concepts are to an¬
cient Greek society in his stimulating work "the Greeks
and the Irrational". The general distinction can be de¬
fined briefly in the following terms: a "shame society"
is one (such as Homeric Greece) where a man's actions
are guided not by any abstract moral code, nor by the
inner voice of conscience, but by the consideration how
these actions will affect the man's standing in the world
and the respect in which he is held by his peers. The op¬
eration of this code is seen in an extreme form in the
episode of the death of Ajax, who commits suicide when he
is not awarded the dead Achilles' armour, which he felt
he deserved as the greatest surviving Greek warrior. Xf
we follow the details of this case, we may perhaps attain
some degree of enlightenment as regards Holderlin's atti¬
tude towards and theory regarding this general theme.
The earliest source for the story of Ajax's suicide is
Homer's "Odyssey", Book XI, 11.5^1-567. Here Odysseus
meets the shade of Ajax in the Underworld. Even at this
stage, Ajax is not reconciled:
Ot'Vj S AleC-VTOC, WVLCLSPCO




Only the soul of Telamonian Ajax.
Remained aloof, embittered by the victory...
The victory concerned is, of course, Odysseus' vic¬
tory over him in the matter of Achilles' armour. Odysseus
feels to some extent responsible for the matter, and re¬
grets having received and accepted the armour:
to £, "5^ VI KdV To LtO c)
f yjcp 2.-T-&K d-VTCo-r ^.t*. Koer
Ao^-V©', ®S |uu*v e^iSoC, ; 5 ep^d TfeV^kT©
T uo *V i.WuO'V* (\oLV oC uO"K JA-feT <f- p.V p.O 'V 06 ->^ A G l lOV cL ,
(11. 548-51).
In translation this runs;
Would that I had not won such a prize!
For on their account the earth possesses such a
head (man),
Ajax, who as regards both appearance and works
had become superior
To the other Greeks excepting the blameless son
of Peleus.
Odysseus then addresses Ajax's shade directly, urging
him to be reconciled and speak to him. His flattery is
cleverly applied, as one might expect with Odysseus;
ToCoC, yJL p TT hS p po 5 00 3i Goo" cr£ic OL
i cr or 1 A'X"<- 0C, T^^X-yj i Jc c> aCo
£©o<L <£ 0 L p. OL o <5 c cC-^O-'u: £• ^ ^
(11. 556-58).
This translates;
For such a bulwark was lost to them [j=the GreeksJ;
the Greeks mourn your death
Just as they do that of Achilles son of Peleus
Without ceasing;...
Ajax preserves a dignified silence, and retires.
This scene is a prime example of the early Greek pre¬
occupation with the twin concepts of ('honour') and
o6lc>u>£ (' shame ') . Ajax has been put to shame, his honour
blemished. This he can never forgive. His actual worth as
a warrior and as a man remain, in real terms, precisely
the same as they were before the armour incident. He him¬
self has not said or done anything to affect this either
way. However, the esteem in which he is held by others,
by his society, is the overriding factor. When he sees
this apparently reduced, he has no resources of his own
upon which to fall back.
We can turn now to Pindar's handling of and comments
on the matter. These appear in Nemean VII, 11.20-30;
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\tyo-r 0 6nJ crrr fc© C, *7 iXccQ<A.'y for i-Si; eft^
Y^-vto-O C'0^^perr'
ev<.c\ il^evc'^^i oi froToC-rod Tt M-oo'Vsc-v'S.
v v ' • 1 ' ^ ^ \ s w
Cr6fA-'>-c*K 6Tt G-CrTl ft Crc>^><oC o> £ KA£frT£-l U*L.|9 -
f/ ^yoio-ot ^-vOoiC,'tu|)lor %%i<Lr/^u
-^TOp O^lXo^ O <ttXcTo-ro$ .€■ I yJXp ^
£ k\X©&lot-V K^r- ©tfJUv YoXwQ&.r
t ^ .» A><-«*' ^ r s t «"*• ^
o KoCpTfepo^ At«t^ £*\toA^G ^LoC <pj)fc-vvo-v
Xfct>pe>-r £tcf>o C,' ©y Kpi.Tt ctot^ 'Ay«.Xto$ *.T£p
J-JY © tO h \ G~y oC S et fX-ot. P"fo< KPK' O1^ I
"» -V , L > <>\ ' "7 t K
f-^Yoi'jai. tcop e-oo-oz-v ^vt^fc voot? Ae<Pt>potc "RopcfrO<L
•Rpoc, IXo-v l?o\<-*v.In translation:
I hope/expect/believe that
Odysseus received more fame than he had suffering,
through the sweet lays of Homer;
Since in the falsehoods and winged artifices
There lies something solemn/holy/ma.iestic; the skill
beguiles, leading astray with fables;
blind indeed is
The heart of the greatest mass of men.For if it were
the case
That they could see the truth, then never, angered
by the matter of the armour,
Would the strong/valiant Ajax have thrust through
his breast
The smooth/polished sword;he, the strongest in
battle but for Achilles,
Whom, to get back his wife for golden-haired
Menelaus, in fast ships
The guidance of the straight-blowing Zephyr conveyed
To the city of Ilus.
Thus, Pindar would seem to reproach Homer for glori¬
fying Odysseus, whom he blames for the death of Ajax. We
can conclude that he had a low opinion of Odysseus and
felt that he did not deserve the armour. Ajax was correct
in thinking that he should have received it.
Pindar's low opinion of the crafty Odysseus is shared
by Holderlin. In his first short essay "Uber jvchill", he
describes Odysseus as "ein Sack voll Scheidemtinze, wo man
lange zu zahlen hat, mit dem Gold ist man viel balder fer-
tig" . |(ir.St ,A.4/l, p.22^kj. The "Gold" is, of course,
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Achilles, whom Holderlin sees as Homer's noblest character
It is an interesting point that, whereas most commenta¬
tors, including Pindar, tend to connect the two heroes
Achilles and Ajax closely with one another, seeing Ajax
as being, if" not quite as great as Achilles, very nearly
so, Holderlin on the other hand seems not to respect him
greatly at all. In the second essay "ijber Achill" he de¬
scribes him as "den blindtobenden Ajax" [Gr.St .A.4/1 , p.224^j,
although it has to be pointed out that he mentions Ajax
in a more approving tone in the poem "Mnemosyne":
Here, the poet does seem to rank Ajax somewhere near
Achilles, although the latter is uniquely "mein Achilles'.'
Why this comparative lack of respect for Ajax when
Achilles is praised so highly? Why does Holderlin apparw
ently disagree with Pindar in his estimate of the hero?
There is no way of telling with certainty, as Holderlin
did not clarify the point in specific terms. However, one
possible explanation might lie in the very different man¬
ner in which the two heroes faced and reacted to similar
adverse circumstances. Both Achilles and Ajax were pre¬
sented with situations which involved a diminution of
their honour or public esteem - a loss of face. Whereas
Achilles retires into dignified seclusion, retaining un¬
impaired his awareness of his own worth, Ajax resorts to
the extreme measure of self-destruction, being unable or
unwilling to live with the shame. Ajax' action might be
regarded as a good example of the shortcomings of the
V'VJ'Siol ('foolish men') described by Pindar in Py thianj' ni r
Am Feigenbaum ist mein
Achilles mir gestorben,
Und Ajax liegt
An den Grotten der Pqd
11.80-3:
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'clW hyuQot, Td-. K«dV. rpei^ ct'v re s
In translation:
If you, Hieron, know how to perceive/understand/
know the true/right/just summit/acme, you know
what our ancestors learned:
'For one piece of good luck the immortal gods ap¬
portion to us mortals a pair of misfortunes.'
Now, these things foolish men cannot bear with
decency,
But the noble/virtuous can do so, by turning the
fair part outwards.
One would have thought that Pindar would see Ajax as
one of the V^lUol , as Holderlin evidently did. However,
it is clear from Nemean VII, 11.20-30, that he did not do
so. If one wished to express Holderlin's view of Ajax in
the terminology of twentieth-century anthropology, one
would describe him as an example of a man conditioned by
and accepting the ethos of a 'shame society'.
If we turn now from Ajax to Achilles, we find a dif¬
ferent ethos, a different attitude towards suffering^ in¬
justice, loss of face. Achilles' independence and self-
assurance mark him out as a forerunner of a new type of
ethical order, the 'guilt society': in the representa¬
tives of this new society or moral code, ethical conduct
and its criteria are internalised and the individual's
personal conscience or independently acquired moral code
is the ultimate arbiter, not the general consensus of
opinion in his society or among his peers. Achilles' con¬
science is clear, so he does not succumb to any feeling
of shame or inadequacy when faced with an insult to his
honour. He reacts with extreme sensitivity to this insult,
but only out of pride - not, as in the case of Ajax, be¬
cause his self-esteem and moral being are entirely depen¬
dent upon what others think of him. His state of mind
might be taken as an example of the "Fahigkeit fur die
Welt" mentioned above by Holderlm. That Achilles showed
signs of this "Fahigkeit" while Ajax did not would be of
particular interest to Holderlin in view of the manner in
which Achilles was reputed to have been educated. Pindar
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relates the story in Neraean. Ill, 11.53-63:
ot-Ov T<jL X«:C p uj-v \iOiru)
'Xicror1 feX61/ K«^c ^6'r6,/ 'Acr«^,itiov/
TX'V c£«cp fa-<A Kuot' Sieh/^fc fA-ech<CKO y&ifoC 'vo^o'v'
"vvy^ $ e-itcre- cXc6-oT LC,
|0^pec»s Vovo-v <r£ ol^^e-pT^To-v t
ofT (-TocXV st.i-', fc-v <*cp [A.t"vot.o-<. QtJ^-O-V-
C'C^poC D«cX^ocr^i-Cj cCy&QA.W>' pifi°£uo*t. t c, ^
VTM3 Tpu>Votv} SoptKT^-Gov ^.XAX.v AvKLlOV T£ "Kp€>crp.ev<n k:»U
kAfiZsruiV Te, K^l \$fo}>S,
f\lQ<.o<s:ecre-i ^ecpec^ , fev <f»pcLo-t ^cD'/o-urw^ o-^ai
fA"*| KOtp^VoC, olco-w
fl^cXcT' OtKol^ (A. <£-y^j CJ rH^Xc-VC>C o ficiu_->007^
<* \ '
This translates: p-OAoL ,
The sage Cheiron reared Jason
Under a stony roof, and then Asclepius,
Whom he taught the soft-handed/soothing usage/cus-
tom(-s) of the apothecaries;
Moreover/another time he arranged the marriage of
the bright-bosomed
Daughter of Nereus, and her most mighty child
He reared/cherished, in all things fitting promoting/
exalting his soul/heart/spirit/courage/mind/wilJ;
So that, when sent by the maritime forces/blasts of
the winds
Towards Troy, he might stand his ground against the
spear-clashing war-cry (-cries) of the Lykians
and the Phrygians
And the Dardanians, and, having joined battle with
the spear-bearing
Ethiopians, might fix/set in his heart/mind/reason
(the idea) that their leader should not again
Go back home — he, Memnon, the mighty/raging/violent
cousin of Helenos.
Nereus' "bright-bosomed" daughter is, of course, The¬
tis, her Y0f0$ <|>fe(>To6T©5>( "most mighty child") the great
Achilles. He, as well as Jason, was brought up by /UeVp-£jfod
X eC p to-K ( literally "deep-counselling Cheiron").
Cheiron's methods tire alluded to briefly: he would seem
to have provided instruction in specific technical
skills, such as pharmacy (line 55)» but the main benefit
he seems to have bestowed on his pupils (at least, on
Achilles) is described in the phrase in line 56:
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•> •> ' ✓v f\ ^ N' c •
... fe'V °cp pife'voc.O'L "RdLCTL C7a; p-or ot-v^tor
•> £/•
Pindar's use of the verb in this context is
interesting, in that its basic meaning is "to increase/
make grow". Hence, by implication, Cheiron's purpose is
to add to or nurture a quality or capacity which is al¬
ready present in the pupil, from birth. One can compare
this with our modern English term "educate", with its
origimxl Latin meaning "to lead out". In both cases, the
word implies a process of nurturing an in-born capacity
or talent, rather than imposing anything from without. In
the present context, the capacity or element which is to
, > > ^
be increased or nurtured "in all things fitting" (
OLcri c ) is the pupil's Quja-OC,. This is one of a
group of very important semantically related terms in
Greek — terms which are often difficult to distinguish
one from the other. These terms are: b 0u^«.oC, , ~\
and •*] -fifty1 • We shall have to take
care to differentiate as clearly as possible between
and in our chapter on Empedokles. Within the
present context, the following brief summary will have to
suffice ^:-
a)b used frequently with emotional connotations:
'heart', 'courage', 'wrath', 'desire'. Perhaps most
aptly and succinctly described as 'the dynamic life
force and its various manifestations'.
b) /Sj frequently used in the plural, with singu¬
lar meaning. The distinction between <^p<vjT/' and
e^os is perhaps best brought out in the set
phrase K«cTV_ <^>p£-rdL K»U QvfA.0% which is often
glossed 'mente animoque ' . Although, like ©vju.cC,, it
is often used to apply to emotions, one feels jus¬
tified in putting forward the generalisation that ^
t in its figurative sense (it also has a
biological meaning), connotes something more cere¬
bral: 'mind', 'understanding', 'reason', 'con¬
sciousness'. In Homer, fe'V'CC, (in the Plural) is
used to refer to 'life', which is seen as juxta¬
posed to our third term:
c)"J : frequently used by Homer to refer to the
'souls' of the departed. Its nearest Latin equi¬
valent (if we accept the analogy: = animus;
= mens) would be ' anima' . In Homer, the
is the element in the human being which escapes
(through the mouth) at the moment of death, when
it is separated from the In Attic Greek,
came to have a slightly different meaning,
more akin to the Christian concept of the immortal
soul, the container of all the noblest attributes
of man. In Homer, the latter meaning is more li¬
able to be encompassed by e> ©vjixoC,. The immortal
part of man was a far poorer thing for Homer than
it was to become for the Christian.
If we turn back to Pindar, we find that we can con¬
clude that the poet saw Cheiron's basic task not as a
sharpening of the intellect of his pupils, but rather as
a nurturing and extension of a more instinctive or uncon¬
scious element in their make-up. The myriad possible
translations of OojutoC, indicated above demonstrate the ul¬
timately non-intellectual nature of "die Lehre Chirons".
The great teacher is concerned with the spirit rather
than the mind. He promotes a type of "Klugheit", in Hol-
derlin's terminology, but this "Klugheit" is not the sly
cunning or intellectual brilliance of an Odysseus, but
rather the deeper wisdom and adherence to noble moral
principles of an Achilles. It is due to having been
taught the principles of "die Klugheit" and "das Wissen"
that Achilles, "dieses 'enfant g£t&' der Natur", is able
to act with self-assurance in "ungewisse Situationen". It
is not simply in his reaction to Agamemnon's boorishness
that we see this: it will be remembered that Achilles was
given the choice whether to live gloriously and die young
or live in quiet obscurity and have a long life.
When Holderlin talks of "das Unschuldige des reinen
Wissens", this might be taken as added support for the
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idea that the great advantage, in Holderlin's eyes, that
Cheiron's pupils enjoyed over less fortunate mortals lay
in the fact that through his teaching they had been
raised beyond the ethos of the shame society to the level
of consciousness of the guilt society, where the indivi¬
dual (ideally) has a firm grasp of the principles of
moral conduct and is ruled only by these principles and
by his conscience. The concept of "Schuld" per se has no
place in the shame society. Such and such an action does
not make one guilty. It merely calls down upon one the
disapproval or ridicule of society: one has come up
against a taboo, set up artificially by that society,
with no basis in theology or philosophy. The greatest
Greek heroes — Achilles, Oedipus — are men who have
within themselves the capacity to differentiate between
good and evil. They accept and recognise a moral respon¬
sibility which overrides conventional rules of behaviour
and self-interest - they set the standards for their own
behaviour higher than any outsider - or any god! — would
set them for them. Long before Sokrates or Plato made
their misgivings known concerning the a-moral behaviour
of the gods of Greek mythology, the great warrior Achil¬
les had set himself and proudly maintained standards of
behaviour which would put Zeus himself to shame.
It is this level of consciousness which is referred to
by Sokrates in the following passage from the central
section of Plato's "Apology":
\t^r >i 7 " „ „ . r? j ■> > rw /
oC-y O-U-V €: <- Ti OI TLC, t- LT O V K oCLCT^ -V V>] f
K.p cA-r TototTor cievj^ot, G'uiLT'vj^fe-Lcr^ 4C,
0-b Kir^ytvfei^ 'V-UVL i-T*0 Sg. TovTul Zp-y
\o\o-V /<OTL "Ov v<e<_\Co£ d>
-v, oTooJ -TC KoCl crM-LKpo-v
* L V / 7 ^ ' \ V "> "> 7 ~ s ' ~
C><pfeA© ^ fcO'Tl.'V ^ cL. X A o*V K £ p,OVpy OrK0lt£"l'V
OTd-X -tfp^TT'vj ,'troTGpO'X StkoCloC X!j Tt:p<JcTT&L/
KpLu vL -v-S p O c, ^.j/ocGo-U K«iKOV, af>dLv\oi. VX p
oCV Tub Ife cr(o feufe-v Tob-v ccoi
fe-v Tpcuol ^ ^\<>L £




But perhaps someone will say: 'Is it not a
matter for shame/a disgrace, Sokrates;to have pur¬
sued a course of action whereby you run the risk
now of losing your life?' I would reply to him with
the just statement that 'You do not speak well, man/
my friend/sir, if you mean/ suppose that it is proper
for a man who is of any worth at all to take into
account any considerations of life or death, rather
than paying regard to one thing alone: that, when¬
ever he acts, he acts in a just rather than an un¬
just manner, that he performs the works of a good
man rather than those of a bad man. For, by your
account, those demigods who died at Troy, both
Thetis' son and the others, would be worthless/ of
no account...1
Sokrates goes on to cite the example of Achilles *
being warned of the fatal consequences for himself if he
avenges his friend Patroklus' death by killing Hektor.
Achilles, like Sokrates himself, was able to face death
with equanimity, in the knowledge that he had lived his
life according to the highest principles — the principles
taught by his tutor Cheiron.
Once again, in this passage from Plato, we have Achil-
les brought forward as the perfect example of an |p
a man who acts according to his conscience and
moral principles rather than self-interest or the opinion
of others. This ideal was kept alive after Plato by the
Stoic philosophers, with their idea of virtue as the
"summum bonum":
Quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans
conficitur persona sapientis!qui, cum ratio docuerit
quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, semper sit
necesse est beatus vereque omnia ista nomina possi—
deat quae irrideri ab imperitis solent.
[cicero, De Finibus, III, 75j\
In English:
How dignified/serious indeed, how magnificent,
how resolute/firm/constant is the character of the
sage/philosopher/wise man represented [scilicet:
by the Stoics]! Since their philosophical system
taught that what whatever was honourable/proper/
virtuous was the only good, he must necessarily al¬
ways be happy and truly possess all those names/
titles which are usually laughed at by the ignorant.
- 17 -
Cicero's account of the Stoic philosophy, although not
uncritical, is generally admiring in its tone. The motto
•quod honestum est, id est solum bonum* is Cicero's
translation of the first Stoic Paradox, as it is known:
OTl ^0*yoV To KcAoV i-^oLDoV, 'Honestus' is Cicero's Latin
translation for KcAoC, in its moral sense of 'virtuous'.
The 'nomina' which the ignorant find so comical is a re¬
ference to the Stoics' habit of referring to the wise man
as a king, a dictator, a free man, etc.. It is true, as
Cicero suggests, that the Stoics - or some Stoics - car¬
ried their ideals to absurd lengths at times, Cicero, in
'Pro Murena', 61—4, particularly criticises M, Porcius
Cato, a convinced Stoic, for a lack of generosity and a
hardness of character, which he puts down to the Stoic
doctrine, and for an adherence to abstract principles
which cannot be applied to real situations. These were
the inherent dangers in this strand of Greek thought, a
strand which was opposed dialectically by the Epicurean
school, which was more interested in man's other facul¬
ties, those neglected by the Stoics: the senses and the
passions.
The older Greek ideal of the Homeric hero, in parti¬
cular Achilles, differs from the Stoic ideal in being
less exclusively rational in outlook - it would be diffi¬
cult to apply Cicero's criticisms of Cato to Achilles.
Although he was obstinate in the defence of his own
rights and dignity, he evidently valued his personal
friendship with Patroklus more highly than these consi¬
derations, or even than his own life. It must also be
remembered that the cause of his break with Agamemnon
was a woman. Altogether, Achilles was a more human figure
than, for example, Cato.
However, these differences can be exaggerated, and the
orthodox Stoic philosophical position was not genuinely
rationalist in the sense that one might describe Plato's
later works as being rationalist. For example, the Stoics
had a lively interest in what we might term the Teiresias
- 18 -
element of divinely inspired prophecy^ Adolf Bonhoffer
stresses this characteristic in his study "die Ethik des
Stoikers Epictet", in which he describes Epictetus' posi¬
tion in the following terms:
Epictet zeigt sich nun auch hierin wieder als
echter und gerechter Stoiker: er ist von der Exis-
tenz der Wahrsagekunst vollig uberzeugt, und es
fallt ihm nicht ein, irgend eine der iiblichen
Arten der Mantilc zu bezweifeln. _
Cp.^-3
Thus, we find that the Cheironic creed is a permanent
and central element in the ancient world from Homer,
2+
through Pindar and Plato to the Stoics, In this we find
the basis for Holderlin's preoccupation in his later
poetry with the mythological figure of Cheiron, This
mythical figure was the originator of Pindar's c> lS cxLO" K cd)s i d
XfcupwdDC; - "Chirons Lehre", the basis for all moral con¬
duct, freeing its adherents from the unsatisfactory de¬
pendence on the opinions of others which obtained in the
shame society. If Holderlin wishes art to be the new re¬
ligion or replacement for religion, the ethical element
in it is of great importance, "Chirons Lehre" gives him
the basis for his moral code, comparable with and an an¬
cestor of the "summum bonum" of the Stoics, This code is
the key to all moral conduct and personal peace of mind:
a man need not worry even if the whole world disapproves
of his actions, if he knows and is sure of the moral
principles which guide them.
But, ethics apart, the philosophical element in Pin¬
dar's poetry was, for Holderlin, of great interest and
profundity. He would, in my view, have had no compunction
about agreeing with C.M. Bowra's statement in the Intro¬
duction to his volume of Pindar translations:
So far as the actual Games were concerned,
Pindar seems to have been not very interested in
their details; what concerned him was the signifi¬
cance of success in his scheme of things. For him
victory in the Games raised questions of mystical
and metaphysical importance.P
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It is to these metaphysical questions that we now turn
our attention.
As we can see from, for example, Plato's "Theaitetos",
Epistemology was a subject much discussed and greatly in
dispute among the Greek philosophers. Among other the¬
ories on the subject discussed in Plato's work, Prota¬
goras * famous denial of the very existence of Truth re¬
ceives attention:
In English: ^
For he says that man is the measure of all things:
both of things that are, that they are, and of things
that are not, that they are not.
Like Plato, Holderlin was in complete disagreement with
this theory. He was a firm believer in the Truth. The
following passage from Olympian II, translated by Holder-
lin in 1800, shows clearly that Pindar held similar views:
Hoiaenin translates:
Viele mir unter dem Arme schnelle Pfeile
Innen im Kocher
Tonend beisammen sind; durchaus
Aber das Ausleger
Bedarf. Weis ist, wer vieles
WeiB von Natur.
Die Gelernten aber tiberflieBend
Von Allberedsamkeit, Raben gleich
Unniitzes zu schreien
Zu Jupiters gottlichem Voe-el.
Holderlin's translation is fairly free here: <p oo "VoC*VToC
crOyGTOiaiV means "sounding to the quick at apprehending",
(152a).
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he mistranslates 4^ TU,V- "for the crowd/the masses".
This, then, is Pindar's view of the epistemological
problem, at least with regard to the profoundest metaphy¬
sical truths. There are a few men who are wise and know a
lot <j>v2f "von Natur", These would be the inspired poets,
the Cheiron or Teiresias figures. There are also some
o-oveTot, who understand what these poets say, and are fit
C f V
to be , "Ausleger", of the truth(-s) revealed by
\ \
the poets, to mediate between them and To -ft jl-v , "the
masses". The j^-ctGoyr^» "die Gelernten", try to enthrone
cleverness and learning where only divinely revealed
truth belongs, and are to be pitied.
Thus, Pindar believes in the Truth, and claims to have
special access to it in his capacity as a divinely in¬
spired poet. There remains the question as to the precise
nature of this Truth which Pindar claims to have access
to and to be revealing to the o-VVCtot. The great Greek
scholar Hermann Frankel has valuable suggestions to make
in this respect in the sections on Pindar in his book
"Dichtung und Philosophie des Friihen Griechentums"6 , in
which he claims:
"Durchweg ist Pindars Denken auf Werte ausgerichtetV
(P. 5393
I understand him to mean by this that certain symbols
in Pindar's Odes (the gods in particular) represent some¬
thing higher than ordinary life, an object for all man's
strivings and aspirations — in fact, to KoL.\cy} "das Ab¬
solute". As Frankel puts it:
Die Werte der pindarischen Welt verkorpern sich
unter anderm in den Gestalten der Gotter im Himmel;
in uns Menschen dagegen ist Wert und Unwert, Himm-
lisches und Irdisches, seltsam gemischt.
["ibidem
Again:
Das Wollen hochstrebender Menschen gleicht dem
der Gotter; aber das Dasein und Vollbringen ist
bei den Gottern fest, gewiB und frei, bei den Men¬
schen unsicher und von launischen Zufallen abhangig,
die irgend ein Tag oder eine Nacht herauffiihren
kann.
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This could well be a description of the plot of "Oedi¬
pus Tyrannos": Oedipus was a "hochstrebender Mensch" who
came up against the "launische Zufalle" of fate. Holder-
lin's ideas concerning Oedipus are dealt with in another
chapter of this thesis. It is enough here to remember the
fact that Holderlin, unlike Hegel, stresses the r&le of
the prophet Teiresias, who is privy to knowledge of
things, through divine revelation, that are obscure to
the intellectual Oedipus. We can compare this with Pin¬
dar's description of Oedipus' fate in Olympian II:
pooc\ S olWoCV
T& KLflU Kcvwy &C, S-Vdpstc,
tr < n M 1 <■' s
Ovfw^e / loop ; of T& TToCTp v>o LO-V
TujTO-V- ev<hpcyoC *RoTpu?-v; trv'Z
X1 KcCt^ TC^Vi'VTpoO'R'<C;\c>v &\X<a5 ^ p or U?
eg ovuep €KTGIVq, AS,CV fA-opcpLoC, <I/L©C
cvrotrTo jiferoc, j OO-VC
Ifck-X-ocC (^oLToy T£ X GdO-fcy,
Ido LCTol O oCjfet t pivy\)^
G It G <j) "V £ Ot Or"W'V ocXoc^CVlc/ '
This translates: (11. 33-4-2).
Eluten aber anderswoher andere
Mit Hoffnungen und rait
Miihn sind liber Manner gekomraen.
So aber Eiigung, welcher das vaterliche
Von diesen zugehort, das wohlgesinnete Los,
Mit gottgesendetem Reichtum
Han auch irgend ein Leid bringt,
Das wieder sich wandelt,. zu anderer Zeit,
Seitdem getotet hat den Laios der verhangnisvolle
Sohn,
Zusammentreffend., und jenes in Pytho geheiligte
Urwort vollendet.,
Zuschauend aber die schnelle Erinnys
Hat ihm getotet mit Wechsel-
Mord ein kriegerisch G'eschlecht...
L&r.iIt..A. >, pb .46-4-7 rj
Pindar, then, like Holderlin, sees Oedipus' fate as
justified, or at least unavoidable, having been decreed
by fate. Oedipus is not a bad man — more an unlucky one.
It is interesting that the adjective Pindar uses to de^-
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scribe him is |HCpt.jU_©^, the poetical form of jJLoptri ,
"appointed by fate, doomed, destined, foredoomed" — the
< /
adjective from © , "fate", which itself xs a synonym
for AfoTpd , whose activities are stressed in this very pas¬
sage. Both these nouns are connected with the verb
jx€ip©p.<iL» "to receive as one's portion or due, to have
or obtain one's share of a thing". This verb contains a
strong nuance or overtone of "appropriateness" - Fate (or
the gods) know; what it is doing, or is even acting in a
just fashion, when it decrees that Oedipus shall go
through these severe trials. Pindar was a man of reli¬
gious sensibilities, and it would not have occurred to
him to shake his fist at the heavens after the manner of
Byron's Manfred.
This, then, is the crucial difference, for Pindar,
between men and the gods: men, no matter how much they
may aspire to the condition of the gods, are always sub¬
ject to, and may be humbled by the vagaries of Fate. At
first sight, this would appear to be an essentially tra¬
gic vision of the human condition: we mortals are left
striving to achieve what by our very nature we cannot
achieve. But this can hardly be the whole truth regarding
Pindar's world view. Ivhen^reads his Odes, one feels im¬
mediately that their tone is celebratory, not melancholy.
There may be no way in which humanity can secure perma¬
nently for i.tself the ideal stasis of the gods, but there
are still moments, however fleeting, of splendour, joy
and a sense of achievement, when a "hochstrebender Menscli"
can attain godlike bliss on a temporary basis:
&TC0C|uk€rpe>i- Tl ©>€. TlC> , Tc o> ov p
OtoUY SLCXCTC) oTO C, € \©
A ctjA-tipO-K fGy/oS e-CrT'.-X- ilkS pCo-V KoM. fe L \ ^
This translates: (Pythian VIII, 95-97)•
Tagwesen. Mas aber ist einer?- was aber ist einer
nicht?
Der Schatten Traum, sind Menschen.. Aber wenn der
Glanz,
Der gottgegebene, kommt,
Leuchtend Licht ist bei den Mannern
Und liebliches Leben„ _.
QGrvSt-A,5, p.-1017}
Pindar admits the precarious nature of human existence
— man xs but a •CTKtd.Cj o?oCp , "the dream of a shadow", but
(d.\\ ) whenever an cdl^oL S(.ocrc>oT©^, " a heaven-sent
gleam", arrives, the situation and man himself are trans¬
figured. A XdCjLCtipo-y "a radiant light", descends on
man, and also a 0^ otuCoV , "a gentle period/life".
This is the saving grace of human existence. C.M. B'owra
describes the matter in the following terms:
Pindar's guiding and central theme is the part
of experience in which human beings are exalted or
illumined by a divine force, and this he commonly
compares with light. At such times the consciousness
is marvellously enhanced, and a man's whole being
has a new spaciousness and confidence. For Pindar
this was the end and the justification of life...
Through song men attain immortality... What Pindar
conveys in song is precisely the enhancement of
consciousness which his athletes enjoy in the moment
of triumph... For much of their time men lead a
shadowy and unsubstantial existence, but when the
gods send a divine brightness all is well with them. ^
It is this brightness that Pindar seeks to convey. . .-
Thus, Pindar saw it as his r3le as a poet to call down
this state of grace, the equivalent of the in
Sophoklean tragedy. The temporary nature of this state,
and the fact that it is <Si©oc>©TO^ - in other words, it
cannot be forced to appear by human will - puts it on
exactly the same basis as the Holderlinian/Schellingian
"Ekstase" or vision of the Absolute. Thus, Pindar's views
on the poet's mission can be taken as identical with
those of Holderlin:
"Was bleibet aber, stiften die Uichter". _
0r.St.A.2/1,p.189J
If we now look more closely at Frankel's idea, men¬
tioned above, of Pindar's poetry being concerned with
"Werte", we shall see that Pindar is in thxs sense a
philosophical Idealist, a precursor of Plato. A good ex¬
ample is the following passage from Olympian I:
f\picrT0'y' '■o'bTop ;o "Se. /%P'l-'0"0S




6 \<Scrott cb l \ cy "V] ton ;
' f\) » \ /» /-J^KG9 kAlcV 0-KC?tC€rL
i-\\o ^pC-XT^oT^po-v^ <Lv ^fevroy cto-TpoV
<> ,n, , ^.ip-^KfS s.1 -Lieepc-5^3 U^-gti-LC, «L\W„C ^pr&po-K ^SioofA-e-v
Cll. 1-7).
In translation:
Most excellent is water, and gold is a blazing
fire,
So that it is conspicuous at night far more than
lordly wealth;
If to speak/sing of prizes
You wish, dear/my own heart,
Do not look for
Another star shining by day through the lonely ether
that will be more warming than the sun,
And do not let us speak of a £place ofj assembly
greater than Olympia;...
Pindar is concerned here with symbols for excellence:
water, gold, the sun, the Olympic Games. These symbols
represent what Plato later called To : the Beautiful,
the Good, the Absolute. The fact that the philosopher
Plato used the aesthetic term -po K.oC-Vo'V to represent the
Absolute is perhaps significant. Certainly, for Pindar,
the perception of the Absolute is the primary function of
the poet. His poetry is largely in praise of the Absolute,
or of excellence, wherever the poet finds it, and most
frequently in great men and their actions. The objects of
his praise gain immortality through his work.
Another good example is provided by the last few lines
of the short Ode, Olympian III, which Pindar wrote for
Theron of Acragas on the occasion of his victory in the
year 476 B.C. - the same victory celebrated in Olympian
II, which Holderlin translated:
fcl o> ipiO-Tfe-iSfeL -vSujp ; KT&i'VvOV
tv f ® S oOT I ci "V <9^poO'K <£. p oClO" l *V
erf r / iKoiTwr
Hp^KAeo^ crrA2<y.To ttop^LO S'ecrTi
Ooj>oi C, or
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) f f j/ ^ ^ ?t
KoC<&~o cp ct. C, » ©a) "yiy c) itoC^oa
ClI. ^2-1+5K
In English:
If water is excellent/best, and of Pall] posses¬
sions gold the most valuable,
Then Theron, arriving by his virtues at the furthest/
outermost border/edge, grasps/reaches
From home/from his own means the Pillars of Herakles,
What lies beyond that is inaccessible to/
inviolable by the wise
And the unwise. I shall not pursue it: I would be
acting in vain.
Here, the same symbols for excellence appear, also the
man striving to achieve this standard, in an abstract
sense. Significantly enough, this is followed by a remin¬
der of the limitations (eo^criot) to this striving, symbo¬
lised by the pillars of Herakles. Beyond this border-line
no mere mortal may venture. This eo^Ved-Tle'-is also a promi¬
nent theme in the work of Sophokles and Holderlin, as we
shall see.
Thus, we can conclude, in general terms, that Pindar's
poetry involved a separating and a celebrating of the
best, a celebration of the a^'x-^Aot > the sublime moment of
"Ekstase" when the meaning of life is revealed. This
celebration of fo Ko£.\o')/ is also an encouragement of the
audience to contemplate, recognise and strive after the
same. This encouragement partly involves a promise of
immortality:
fO feerfopoi KdU, AvKiov S.atpTC-vjSo-v eC-xQpuJllUJT cbatJTiC
> «? •> ' ' V < ~ r t \ '
feC, e-irfciAjV K6A<!6c)evyu)r/ TfeKTcrveC, OLoC crod)0L
cLppA_©o~oLKo^-er, (cL S'JLperoL
S \ / C*\ / e~ . cLO L*S aC L ^
• IfdiPpou ^ S Q. TT p cfe^ oLCrQ * €:v |W-otp
This translates: (Pythian III, 11. 112-15)*
'Nestor and Lykian Sarpedon, famed among men,
From murmuring/noisy/clear-toned words/epic poetry,
which wise/skilled craftsmen
Fitted together, we know. Virtue in famous songs/
legends
Comes into being for a long time. For few is this
easily done.
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Thus, poetry confers on virtue (</. c/L^£T<£ = Attic ^
ipeT'Vi) lasting fame, but it is only the 6lite few ("K^upoc)
Q
who find it easy to deserve the poet's praise? Like the
actions of great men, poetry invokes or induces the dL^\ai»
Poetry, however, has the additional advantage of perma¬
nence .
This, then, is in no sense a pessimistic philosophy:
the best - the Absolute - is there to be aimed at and
attained, even if it is reached by very few due to the
difficulty involved. In the words of Spiinoza: "omnia
9
praeclara tarn difficilxa quam rara sunt". "All excep¬
tional things are as difficult as they are rare."
Pindar's claims for poetry are perhaps less ambitious
within the context of Greek society than Holderlin's
similar claims in modern Germany. Firstly, there was a
far more widely held belief, reflected in the work of
Plato, for example, in the "divine madness" of poets.
Secondly, Pindar's works were not simply published in
book form for the perusal of intellectuals and aesthetes.
His Odes were intended primarily for public performance
accompanied by music. J.B. Bury gives a good description
of the process:
...the exposition of his hymns devolved upon the
poet himself. It must not be forgotten that Pindar
did not compose like a modern lyrist, who writes
with regard only to the sense and sound of the words.
He might rather be compared to the ideal composer
of operas, who should be at once a poet and a musi¬
cian, and a master of orchestric effects. In
building up his elaborate odes at Thebes, he had to
combine, under the guidance of a sovran rhythm, the
words, the music, and the motions of the dance. His
fabric of song arose, like the Theban walls them¬
selves, stone by vocal stone, to the sound of lyres
and flutes; and the verses, as he set them, vibrated
to the fall of dancers' feet. And this harmony of
the Arts, which was wrought out in his imagination,
was to be realised under his direction. ^0
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Thus, it would be easy for the poet to turn such a
performance of one of his works into an intoxicating,
semi-religious occasion. It might be difficult for the
audience to follow the intricacies of the subject matter
and intellectual content, but a general mood of "Erhebung"
could easily be produced by the sheer musicality of the
performance. Pindar was particularly well known in the
ancient world for his ability to produce such effects,
as is shown by the following passage from Horace:
In English:
Like a stream running down a mountain, having
Been swelled by the rains beyond its known banks,
Seethes/rages and rushes along, with his deep mouth
Immeasurable/boundless Pindar;...
The rushing fervour of Pindar's verse is far more dif¬
ficult for us to appreciate today, of course, but to his
Greek contemporaries at a performance stage-managed by
the poet himself one can imagine that the effect might
be overwhelming. The nearest equivalents to these per¬
formances in the history of European art are the tragic
festivals at Athens, which were religious rites, and
Richard Wagner's music drama performances at Bayreuth
which, as we know from Nietzsche, were largely modelled
on the Athenian festival. Indeed, in modern times, it is
perhaps Wagner who has come nearest to emulating Pindar's
achievement and fulfilling all the aims that Pindar and
the Athenian tragedians had in mind. Anyone who has at¬
tended a performance of, let us say, Wagner's "Tristan"
with an open mind will know the feeling of elevation and
elation which such a work is capable of producing when
performed properly, and will have some idea of the reac¬
tion of contemporary Greek audiences to performances of
Pindar's works. In addition to the emotional effect of
the musical performance, Pindar's and Wagner's works
Monte decurrens velut amnis, imbres
Quern super notas aluere ripas,
Fervet, immensusque ruit profundo
Pindarus •
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provide intellectual themes to enthral the inind. This
synthesis is a good example of what Holderlin and Schil¬
ling claimed that art was capable of achieving: taking
the audience to the Absolute in an "Elcstase", by preoc¬
cupying and appealing to all man's faculties simulta¬
neously: the senses, the emotions, the intellect.
What Pindar, Sophokles and Wagner achieved with con¬
siderable success in their respective ages and societies,
Holderlin perhaps failed to achieve, comparatively
speaking, largely as a result, X would maintain, of the
unsuitability of his work for public performance (with
the possible exception of the two Sophokles translations
and the - uncompleted — Empedokles play). In our modern
age, the great musicians like Beethoven and Wagner and
the great dramatists like Shakespeare have a distinct
advantage over the lyric poet in this respect. Lyric
poetry is largely confined to the written page (at least,
outside Russia), and thereby loses some of the capacity
for intoxication inherent in an art form which is suit¬
able for public performance.
It is perhaps significant that the young Hegel showed
some interest in this very problem, in his early frag¬
ments "Uber einige charakteristische Unterschiede der
alten Dichter fvon den neuerenj" and "tjber einige Vor—
teile, welche uns die Lektiire der alten klassischen
griechischen und romischen Schriftsteller gewahrt" Q^oth
1788]. He begins the first essay with the statement: "In
unsern Zeiten hat der Dichter keinen so ausgebreiteten
1 1
Wirkungskreis mehr." This may be true if we define
"Dichter" narrowly as a lyric poet, but the literary
artist in general had not yet been isolated - or isolated
himself — as completely as he is — or has — in the twen¬
tieth century. After all, Hegel was writing in the cen¬
tury of Goethe and Robert Burns - both of whom, let it
be noted, wrote lyric poetry which gained widest popu¬
larity when set to music. However, Goethe wrote other
works which gained a widespread acclaim and readership,
in every way comparable with those of the Greek writers,
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except possibly in one respect: the religious awe which
greeted the productions of Homer, Pindar, Aeschylus and
Sophokles was no longer accorded to works of art, for
good or ill.
If we look, now, at Holderlin's long poems of his last
few active years, from 1800 onwards, we can perceive a
distinct Pindaric influence in the structure and style of
those works, quite apart from any ethical, metaphysical
or mythological influence. For example, the rushing but
dignified musical sonority of Pindar's Odes is very
typical of Holderlin's later work - music with a purpose,
an intended effect. In another chapter of this thesis, I
shall go into the musicality and dialectical construction
of "der Rhein" in some detail, stressing the relationship
and correspondence to Plato's Si ot\e KTlvCvf There, we
shall see how the dialectics of "ProgreB" and "Kegrefl" is
intended to culminate in an €KO~TotO'i() of profound meta¬
physical significance. In the context of the present
chapter, we can note the Pindaric element in this dia¬
lectical process. The strophxc structure is Pindar's
original version of the Platonic/Holderlinian dialectics,
if only in that the stanzas proceed by opposites: dia¬
lectical opposites within the triad (strophe/antistrophe
->epode) and also the dialectics of the triads themselves
balancing each other.
12
Frankel , again, has pointed to the influence of Hera-
kleitos on Pindar: he sees the basis for certain prominent
Pindaric symbols (water,fire,gold,etc.) as being certain
aspects of Herakleitean thought. Quite apart from these
symbols, however, it must be remembered that one of
Herakleitos' most important ideas is the necessity of
Strife, ie. the dialectics:
Sc. Tor -CCo\& txo*v~ cot'ToC ^oiver
K0L1 6rp<-'v' • Y iTS o troL-r-Tob K06T epi-V
1 ^ (Fragment 80).
It is necessary 'to know that war is common and
right is strife, and that all things happen by strife
and necessity.
/ \ A v s ' A
TT0 A C; |XO *3 ICdL-VT^-TA 'itoCT'n p L f y
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£01^ GL c>ei^£
Tov C, £e ^cvG^liroTJ^ y To-vS So-uAov^
4tcoc -Vj<r £ TOV^ o>£ feX ev © £ po-o C, .1i+ (Fr. 53).
¥ar is the father of all and king of all, and
some he has shown/presented as gods and others as
men, some he has made slaves, others free men.
v^Ll'V > ^ /
K^-t Hp^CKAGiTcC £"tCi Tt TuJ TCCr"ViO'oC'VTL
©IN )' . )• \ *> #N ^ ^ \ * t
\J0 C ^PLS T£ t^fevdV KoO. ^C'K©pLo'u:uJ-V ^TJCAOLTO' p-il ,cr ^ r *NC\A* ^ LA5 'IV. \XJ r <ju Cx C>/\ o I o 0~0
yip SAWA UpfA-ovt^ ^ orfc^ O^eoc, K(u p><*:peo$ o-uSe.
/p^ rJ>j. ivfeo ©-VJXGO^ VC<XO otppt'Vp^ OC'VTcUDV ovTwr.1 ^
Qristotle, "Eth.Eudem.",Book VII, 1 235/25^
Herakleitos rebukes the author of the line 'Would
that strife might be destroyed from among both
gods and men': for there would be no musical scale
unless high and low existed, nor living creatures
without female and male, which are opposites.
The author Herakleitos rebukes is Homer, the line con¬
cerned being from "Iliad", Book XVIII, line 107. Plato
was not the first Greek to criticise Homer on philosoph¬
ical grounds.
It is easy to see how Pindar's Odes may be based on
this Herakleitean principle: the strophic/triadic system
in form, and certain sequences of action in the content.
Frankel^, once more, in his invaluable study, points
out the latter phenomenon in Nemean VI:
Im archaischen Pendelschlag des Gedankens von
Gegensatz zu Gegensatz werden Mensch und Gott
aus ihrer Verwandtschaft und Verschiedenheit ver-
standen..,. Das Schema ist dies: 'Mensch und Gott
sind verwandt - und doch durchaus verschieden —
aber manchmal wird der Mensch gottahnlich - und
doch ist er hilflos jedem Vechsel ausgesetzt'.
This is precisely the same procedure as Holderlin
followed in "der Rhein" - dialectics of form and content.
It is therefore of some considerable interest that Hol¬
derlin, in his comments on one of the 1803 Pindar frag¬
ments, mentions this very element in Pindar's thought:
Der Mensch, als Erkennendes, mufl auch verschie-
dene Welten unterscheiden, weil Erkepntnis nur
durch Entgegensetzung moglich ist. j Gr.St.A. 5 » P • 285,1
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Thus, to conclude: Holderlin took a tremendous amount
from Pindar in all aspects of his work, particularly dur¬
ing his last six years of poetic activity. The tone and
form of his odes, the celebratory character of the subject
matter (Holderlin, too, has his heroes to praise) - all
these are decidedly Pindaric, although it is a legitimate
subject for debate how much this was a direct influence,
and how much simply a coincidental similarity of outlook
and vision. It also seems clear that Holderlin absorbed
certain elements of Herakleitan thought through Pindar,
although, as we shall see, this may equally well have come
to him through Sophokles - and, of course, Plato. In add¬
ition, he would have been familiar with the sections on
Herakleitos in the standard philosophical textbooks of the
17
day, such as Brucker's Historia critica philosophiae.
Bven if all these elements were not taken directly from
Pindar by Holderlin - and we must remember, for example,
that Goethe and Klopstock wrote Pindaric odes which Holder-
lin would have read - it is most certain that he recognised
in the Theban bard a kindred spirit, and that the life's
work of each of them was directed on the same path towards
the same goal, even if Holderlin's journey along this path
ended more tragically.
CHAPTER TWO: "SOPHOKLES"
Twentieth-century scholarship has had much to say
about Sophokles, the discussion centering mainly around
the topics : (.«£., suffering, joy and the
relationship between the human and the divine. It will be
of interest, therefore, within the context of the present
chapter, to examine these themes closely with particular
reference to Holderlin's understanding of Sophokles. In
doing so, I shall refer to certain works of Sophokles
scholarship which I have personally found most illumi¬
nating. However, this is not an appropriate setting for
a detailed and comprehensive survey of twentieth-century
Sophokles scholarship] even if there were adequate space
for such a project, and even if I felt myself to be com¬
petent to undertake the task. To conclude the chapter,
I shall undertake a comparison of and contrast between
the respective views of Holderlin and Hegel on the
Sophokles question.
It will be convenient to take the first two themes,
" great-souledness " ) and <,£.( the tragic
"flaw"), as one subject: quite apart from the fact that
they are both Aristotelian concepts, they are also
closely related in their significance for the theory of
tragedy.
2
The basic Aristotelian view is that the tragic hero
comes to a bad end through some inherent flaw in his
character. Possible examples that a supporter of this
theory might bring forward would include the excessive
pride of Oedipus and the hesitancy of Hamlet. There has
been much scepticism among prominent modern scholars as
to the adequacy of Aristotle's theory of the
both in relation to ancient Greek tragedy and to more
3
recent works. If we examine the particular case of the
hero of Sophokles1 play "Oedipus Tyrannos", we find a
man who is obviously exceptionally intelligent — he can
solve the Sphinx's riddle when no-one else has been able
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to. He is righteous: he kills Laius only out of righteous
anger, not knowing who he is. He is more eager than anyone
else to find his predecessor's murderer (not knowing, of
course, that he himself is the culprit) and to lift the
curse on the city. All in all, we must concur with the
Priest's description of him when he adresses him in line
, et*46 as: _
^ n. •"* . ■*
CO j^p OfWV oLplCTT
"der Menschen Bester!" in Holderlin's translation
[Gr.St.A.5,P.12y.
The crux of the problem, as far as any excessive pride?
on Oedipus' part is concerned, lies in the section known
as Oedipus' Curse. In Holderlin's translation, it runs
as follows:
Urn dieses Mannes willen
Fluch ich (wer er auch sei im Lande hier,
Von dem die Kraft und Thronen ich verwalte),
Nicht laden soil man, noch ansprechen ihn,
Zu gottlichen Gellibden nicht, und nicht
Ihn nehmen zu den Opfern, noch die Hande waschen,
Soil iiberall vom Haus ihn treiben, denn es ist
Ein Schandfleck solcher uns. Es zeiget dies
Der Gotterspruch, der Pythische, mir deutlich.
So bin ich nun mit diesem Damon und
Dem toten Mann ein Waffenbruder worden.
Ich wtinsche, ders getan, sei einer nur
Verborgen, seis mit mehreren, er soli
Abniitzen schlimm ein schlimm unschicklich Leben;
Wunsch auch, wenn der von meinem eignen Haus
Ein TischgenoB ist und ich weifi darum,
Zu lejajen, was ich diesem hier geflucht.
[^Oed.Tyr.",11.236-251;Gr.St.A.5,PP.132-3J
Here we have Oedipus at his best, and perhaps also at
his worst (if we are to accept Aristotle's theory). His
determination to find the murderer, to relieve the misery
of the people under his charge, in short: to do what is
right and just - this is all to his credit. On the other
hand, one has to note the pride and (ultimately ungrounded)
self-assurance of a man ( a mere mortal, after all) who
can pronounce such a curse on another human being without
a second thought, never dreaming that this curse might
fall on his own head. Oedipus' self-assurance and con¬
sciousness of his own superiority is reminiscent of
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Empedokles in Holderlin's play: Oedipus, like Empedokles,
-i-s actually superior in many ways to other mortals;
Oedipus, like Empedokles, is broken when he comes up
against a limit, a barrier, something which is beyond all
his mortal wisdom and superiority, Oedipus is .justly proud
in that he is better than other men. In this sense, he
is not excessively proud, in the sense of being arrogant
— he simply has a true and realistic awareness of his
own worth. His ultimate downfall is not, in fact, the
result of his pride or arrogance, but of the limited na¬
ture of his knowledge. This is the one respect in which
Teiresias is his superior. As Walter Kaufmann puts it:
Sophocles' Oedipus emerges as a magnificent,
consistent, and fascinating character who is not
taken over from the myths of the past but fash¬
ioned by the poet's genius.
^e "magnificence" lies in his his
"great-souledness": his remorseless search for the Truth,
his righteousness, his .justified pride. We must be careful
not to accuse him of "hubris", at least in the Greek
sense of the word: it is generally agreed among modern
Greek scholars that the Greek noun and the verb
in the Attic usage, refer to acts rather than
states of mind; Oedipus' "vj^piCj, if any, consisted of the
killing of his father and the marrying of his mother.
This is the cause of his subsequent shame and disgrace,
simply and purely — not any internal character defect
such as excessive pride. Holderlin himself translates
the Greek term«v|^ptC) by the German word "Frechheit" ,
as, for example, in line 873 of "Oedipus Tyrannos", where
he translates ASf^piC, COe-i Tvpot'Vr'oVas "Frechheit
pflanzt Tyrannen", The English equivalent of "Frechheit"
would be something like "insolence", which implies an ac¬
tion of some description: one can only be insolent to
someone, and an 'insolent person' is necessarily someone
who habitually commits this act of insolence. Holderlin
avoids the use of any German noun denoting simply a state
of mind, such as "Eitelkeit", which he might easily have
used.
The "consistency" which Kaufmann refers to in his
description of Oedipus' character in the play lies in
the fact that he takes the consequences of his own prin¬
ciples and his own actions — he is completely honest in
his actions and in his reactions. At no stage can he be
said to perform a 'volte-face' or to say or do anything
inconsistent with his general high-minded character.
The "fascination" lies in the universality and pro¬
fundity of the statement Sophokles is making through
this character in his play: a statement about the ulti¬
mate limits of the human condition. Oedipus may have had
a but only perhaps in the sense that he was,
after all, only human. If the ultimate moral of Sopho¬
kles' play is merely that the human condition is a flaw,
then we cannot hold him in high regard as a writer, one
might object. However, the obsession with searching for
an Aristotelian "flaw" in tragic heroes, I would suggest,
is a distraction and an obstacle preventing us from at¬
taining a true understanding of the intellectual and
philosophical depths of Sophokles' thought. Walter Kauf¬
mann makes a reasonable point in this respect:
*,.perhaps under the indirect influence of
Aristotle's 'Poetics', Shakespeare gave some of
his heroes what one could construe as tragic flaws.
Sophokles h^d the good fortune of living before
Aris totle.'
Holderlin did not, of course, share this good fortune,
but his thought is, I would maintain, so completely under
the imprint of Platonist and Presolcratic philosophy that
he totally sharesSophokles' outlook in this respect. The
really central preoccupation of both writers is, as I
hope to show, the borderline between the human and the
divine. One might call this borderline, in Platonist
terminology, To KolXoV , since the latter performs, in
Plato's system, a mediating function between God and
man: To K-otVoV was put there by God to show men the way
towards the Absolute or towards union with Himself. For
Plato, true reality is a transcendent, spiritual realm
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not accessible to the senses. The Forms are true reality,
not the physical objects we see around us. Likewise,
for Sophokles, the great problem is how man, to all
external appearances a mere physical, material object
among other objects, can relate to the gods, who live in
the spiritual realm and who ultimately control man's des¬
tiny. That this spiritual realm exists is something
Sophokles, like Plato, never doubted (at least in their
works). Sophokles, in particular^was obsessed with this
problem, especially in the earlier part of his career.
This could be one reason why Aristotle failed to under¬
stand Sophoklean tragedy: Oedipus' "zornige Neugier"
would have little meaning for a careful, methodical, en¬
cyclopaedic mentality such as Aristotle's.
However, before we examine the significance of this
'borderline' more closely, let us first discuss the
topics of suffering and j oy in Sophoklean tragedy.
Holderlin's epigram "Sophokles" is well known:
Viele versuchten umsonst, das Freudigste freudig
zu sagen,
Hier spricht endlich es mir, hier in der Trauer
sich aus.
[Gr.St.A. 1/1 .p. 3057]
This seems at first sight a strange proposition.
Luckily, a more philosophical statement of it is given
by Holderlin in his "Anmerkungen zum Oedipus":
—In der auBersten Grenze des Leidens bestehet
namlich nichts mehr, als die Bedingungen der Zeit
oder des Raums. In dieser vergiBt sich der Mensch,
weil er ganz im Moment ist; der Gott, weil er
nichts als Zeit ist; und beides ist untreu, die Zeit,
weil sie in solchem Momente sich kategorisch wendet,
und Anfang und Ende sich in ihr schlechterdings
nicht reimen laBt, der Mensch, weil er in diesem
Momente der kategorischen Umkehr folgen muB, hier-
mit im Folgenden schlechterdings nicht dem Anfang-
lichen gleichen kann. So stehet Hamon in der Anti-




The identification here of the god with time might be
seen as supporting Heidegger's Herakleitan interpretation
of Holderlin. However, time is equated with the god -
not with God in the Judaeo-Christian or theist sense. The
particular god might be seen as fate, which develops in
time, or as Apollo, who is Oedipus' specific opponent with-
}»
in the context of the play. At the culminating or lct-
i_£, fate ceases to develop - it has arrived, been fully
revealed. At such a moment, there is a break in time: both
past and future disappear from view as the full revelation
occurs. This meeting with the truth is also a turning-
point for the hero - his search is at an end, he knows what
he wanted to know.
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Thus, the culminating point of a Sophoklean tragedy,
the point of greatest suffering, what Holderlin calls
g
elsewhere the "caesura", is also a moment of joy. At the
moment of "caesura", the great, proud hero is cut off
from his fellow—men, alone with his torment. His pain is
real, and extreme, but at the same time he retains his
pride, his d , because he has no sense of or
cause for guilt in any profound sense, since, in "Oedipus
Tyrannos" for example, his actions were the result merely
of ignorance. He is guilty in the sense that he has com¬
mitted crimes X and Y, and this guilt, such as it is,
must be expiated; the tragedy and suffering are made even
greater by the knowledge that Oedipus was really great,
with no "flaw", and yet he still came to this horrific
end. His torment and shame are truly extreme.
And yet, as Wolfgang Schadewaldt points out:
...kein sophokleisches Stuck entlaflt den Zu-
schauer mit bechnicktem Herzen, im BewuBtsein un-
geloster Qual.
Schadewaldt's explanation of this is that the hero's
suffering, although extreme, is in no way sordid (unlike,
for example^ the suffering of a character in a play by
Euripides, whose view of the human condition was alto¬
gether more cynical than that of Sophokles), but is in
fact noble, in the sense that it is basically undeserved.
There is no way in which Oedipus could have avoided com¬
mitting the crimes he was guilty of - he was simply the
victim of blind fate and ignorance. One remembers the
adjective Pindar uses to describe him: jia.opt^ .
Schadewaldt's conclusion is closely comparable with
Holderlin1s:
Das Leid aber machfc , daB der Mensch ganz bei
sich, in sich gegrlindet, daB er ernsthaft ist. Er
ist is^diesem Ernste dann auch wahr, und darum
schon.
In fact, Holderlin goes even further than this,
claiming that the moment of "caesura" sees a joining of
the human and the divine:
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Die Darstellung des Tragischen beruht vorziiglich
darauf, daB das Ungeheure, wie der Gott und Mensch
sich paart, und grenzenlos die Naturmacht und des
Menschen Innerstes im Zorn Eins wind, dadurch sich
begreift, daB das grenzemlose Eineswerden durch
grenzenloses Scheiden sich reinigt.
jGr.St.A.5,p.20l7]
Holderlin saw the moment of "caesura" in tragedy as
being of profound metaphysical significance, involving
the joining of the human and the divine, which is, in
effect, the attainment of the Absolute, The dialectical
process of the reaching of this goal, the action and dia¬
logue of the play - "Alles ist Rede gegen Rede, die sich
gegenseitig aufhebt" j*Gr,St.A,5»P«201jj ** culminates in
this moment of revelation, the "caesura":
Der tragische Transport ist namlich eigentlich
leer, und der ungebundenste,
Dadurch wird in der rhythmischen Aufeinanderfolge
der Vorstellungen, worin der Transport sich dar-
stellt, das, was man im SilbenmaBe Zasur heiBt, das
reine Wort, die gegenrhythmische Unterbrechung not-
wendig, urn namlich dem reiBenden Wechsel der Vor-
stellungen, auf seine ti Summum, so zu begegnen, daB
alsdann nicht mehr der Wechsel der ^orstellung,
sondern die Vorstellung selber erscheint.
r&r,st,A,5»p.i9
Perhaps, for Sophokles and Holderlin, the ultimate
revelation of tragedy was, indeed, simply that the human
condition is^ a flaw, in the sense that man is, after all,
merely mortal. No matter how great an individual may be,
whether he be an Oedipus or an Empedokles, a Sophokles
or a Holderlin, he is nevertheless still subject to the
restrictions of the human condition 'per se', to the
workings of fate and "das Damonische". A human being,
by his very nature, is an agent, in the original latin
meaning of the word, and his actions do not always have
predictable effects, even with the purest and noblest of
intentions.
In this sense, and with these considerations in mind,
Oedipus represents something similar to what Ilolderlin
symbolises, in his later odes, in the "Aufklarer" figures,
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Herakles and Prometheus. The parallel becomes clearer and
more convincing when we consider the fact that Oedipus,
like these other heroes, has performed a necessary and
beneficial liberating function, in destroying the Sphinx.
The situation which ensues is the common one, familiar to
students of Holderlin's work, of a people alienated from
Nature by the originally liberating function of the hero.
The crisis can only be overcome by the agency of Teire-
sias, the vessel of divine revelation who alone can free
the people of Thebes from this state of alienation. His
crucial importance is stressed Holderlin in his "Anmer-
kungen zum Oedipus":
In beiden Stiicken in 'Antigone' a^d 'Oedipus
Tyrannos Qj machen die Zasur die Reden des Teiresias
aus .
Er tritt ein in den Gang des Schicksals, als
Aufseher iiber die Naturmacht, die tragisch, den
Menschen seiner Lebenssphare, dem Mittelpunkte
seines innern Lebens in eine andere Welt entrtickt
und in die exzentrisghe Sphare der Toten reiBt.
fGr.St.A.5,p.197J
Teiresias' significance, then, is founded on his un¬
derstanding of "die Naturmacht" and its workings. This
power tears man out of his "Lebenssphare" into another
world, the sphere of the dead. At first sight, this would
seem to be an entirely negative occurrence. However, as
we have seen, Holderlin saw the "caesura" as being a mo¬
ment of revelation. How this works is made clear by
Schadewaldt in the following passage:
Das Leid des sophokleischen Menschen hat nicht
bloB eine nur mittelbare Bedeutung als Durchgang,
Stufe. Es ist endgiiltig, ist Vernichtung. Aber eben
als absolutes Leid ist es sozusagen der menschliche
Ort,wo die hohen Gesinnungen und das heiflt: das
wahre Sein des Menschen zum Vorschein lcommen. Ich
konnte auch sagen: hier im Leiden entscheidet
Mensch sich ganz zu dem, was Ewiges an ihm ist.
This is far more than just an admission that Oedipus,
as an individual, acts nobly when afflicted by the
workings of fate. His noble reaction is based on deep,
universally valid principles. He recognises that these
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principles are eternal and inescapable, and acts accord¬
ingly. He also, in doing so, recognises the primacy of
the divine law over the personal advantage or even sur¬
vival of any human being, no matter how great.
Furthermore, other men (the audience, in dramatic
terms; the people of Thebes, in terms of the plot of the
play) learn from Oedipus' fate, and from his realisation
They become convinced, if only temporarily, of the exis¬
tence of this other sphere, and of the immutable valid¬
ity of its laws. In this way, the audience experiences
>!
the c<T(£, , the Sopholclean equivalent of" Pindar's
. This moment, I would maintain, is ultimately
equivalent, both in the reality of the performance of
Sophoklean tragedy and in Holderlin's theoretical system
to the identity of the conscious and the unconscious (in
Jungian terminology), or the synthesis of To \o-y
and "das Damonische", of Christ and Dionysos (in more
Holderlinian terms) - a state of affairs which Holderlin
regarded as his life's task to achieve (consistently) in
works of art. Sophokles was, in this respect, a model
for him.
In "Oedipus Tyrannos", for example, the 'hero' Oedipu
who relies entirely on his own intellect and the con¬
sciousness of his own superiority as a human being, has
in the end to bow before the divinely-inspired knowledge
of Teiresias. Oedipus' intellect, which has been shown
to be the keenest in Greece by his solving of the Sphinx
riddle, is able only after a series of painful stages to
understand fully the import of Teiresias' revelations.
By the 'Holderlinian' interpretation of Sophokles'
"Oedipus Tyrannos", the answering of the Sphinx's riddle
takes on a Promethean significance - it is the "Ur-Tei—
lung". Oedipus in this play reaches and demonstrates the
limits of merely human intelligence and knowledge. The
nature of.Oedipus' ultimate error:is.described.in.the
following terms by Holderlin:
- 41 -
Die Verstandlichkeit des Ganzen beruhet vorziig-
lich darauf, daB man die Szene ins Auge faBt, wo
Oedipus den Orakelspruch zu unendlich deutet,
zum nefas versucht wird.
Namlich der Orakelspruch heiBt:
•Geboten hat uns Phobos klar, der Konig,
Man soil des Landes Schmach, auf diesem
Grund genahrt,
Verfolgen, nicht Unheilbares ernahren.'
Das konnte heiBen: Richtet, allgemein, ein streng
und rein Gericht, haltet gute biirgerliche Ordnung.
Oedipus aber spricht gleich darauf priesterlich:
1Durch welche Reinigung1, etc.
Und gehet ins besondere,
'Und welchem Mann bedeutet er dies Schicksal?'
Und bringet so die Gedanken des Kreon auf das
furchtbare Wort:
'Uns war, o Konig, Lajos vormals Herr
In diesem Land, eh du die Stadt gelenket.1
So wird der Orakelspruch und die nicht notwendig
darunter gehorige Geschichte von Lajos Tode
zusammengebracht. In der gleich darauf folgendari
Szene spricht aber, in zorniger Ahnung, der Geist
des Oedipus, alles wissend, das nefas eigentlich
aus, indem er das allgemeine Gebot argwohnisch
ins Besondere deutet, und auf einen Morder des
Lajos anwendet, und dann auch die Siinde als un—
endlich nimmt. __
Jckr .St. A.5 » P* 1 97J
Thus, for Holderlin, Oedipus' fault consists of a lack
of awareness of his limitations, or the limitations of
the human condition as such, unaided by divine inspira¬
tion. As King, he could (and should) have confined him¬
self to the activities appropriate to the position:
"Richtet, allgemein, ein streng und rein Gericht, haltet
gute blirgerliche Ordnung." He goes beyond this, however,
and his excessive zeal (which may or may not be con¬
nected with a character trait such as pride, but which
is, at any rate, not identical with any such trait) leads
to his own ultimate downfall. In this sense, his fate is
the result of what might be taken as a positive charac¬
teristic: his "great-souledness". A lesser man might have
let things rest, and lived ci contented, long life as King
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of Thebes. The words of Teiresias might have saved him if
he had heeded them:




"Ach! ach! wie schwer ist Wissen, wo es unniitz
Dem Wissenden." __
|Gr. S t.A.5 ?P.136J
If, however, Oedipus had followed the safe, prudent
course, the city would still have suffered under the
curse and, what was perhaps the decisive factor for a
man like Oedipus, he would have remained personally ig¬
norant of the cause of all this - an impossibility for
a man of his intense intellectual curiosity.
Holderlin continues:
Daher, im nachfolgenden Gesprache mit Tiresias,
die wunderbare zornige Neugier, weil das Wissen,
wenn es seine Schranke durchrissen hat, wie trunken
in seiner herrlichen harmonischen Form, die doch
bleiben kann, vorerst, sich selbst reizt, mehr zu
wissen, als es t^agen Oder fassen kann.
[Gr.St.A.5,p. 198.]
To put it in more abstract terms, in the context of
Holderlin's work as a whole: once the "Ur-Teilung" has
taken place, once man's intellect has been awakened and
his curiosity aroused, he can no longer remain content
in the original harmony with Nature - a harmony based
on passive ignorance and which his intellectual curi¬
osity has destroyed. He has to search without respite
until he has understood everything, no matter what the
consequences of this ultimate knowledge may be.
If we return now to Holderlin's philosophical defi¬
nition of the essence of Sophoklean tragedy - "daB das
Ungeheure, wie der Gott und Mensch sich paart, und gren-
zenlos die Natur macht und des Menschen Innerstes im
Zorn Eins wird, dadurch sich begreift, daB das grenzen-
lose Eineswerden durch grenzenloses Scheiden sich rei-
niget." [gt.St.A.5,p.201 7*] - we can trace in it clear
echoes of Presokratic philosophy, for example in the idea
ot the interpenetration of the one and the whole. This,
again, is pointed out by Hermann Frankel in the work al¬
ready mentioned in connection with Pindar. He sees a
profound affinity between the ideas in Sopholcles 1 plays
and the thought of Herakleitosj
Der Tragiker Sophokles war Heraklits Fortsetzer
und legitimer Erbe, Zwar hat er das dogmatische
Lehrgebaude des Philosophen nicht iibernommen, wohl
aber den Geist und den Willen. Heraklitisch ist die
Schroffheit der sophokleischen Tragodie, die keine
andre Losung des Konflikts kennt als die durch die
Katastrophe erzwungene Besinnung der Helden auf
die langste feststehende Notwendigkeit von Konflikt
und katastrophe. Heraklitisch ist der herbe Zorn
der sophokleischen Gestalten, die Harte des Schick-
sals und der Gotter, und am Ende des Spiels zersto-
render Gewalt^n das Wort: 'Nichts von diesem ist
nicht Zeus ' . ^
Thus, the common element that Frankel stresses is
chiefly that epitomised by, for example, the following
fragment of Herakleitos:
Tuj |u_€:V ITKotc Kcdt
c)LK*CLoL . U vQpwolCOL c><^ OC fX. GV VftGlA'n-
I </ Cv Q ' l5 '
oC o G c>iKot(.o£. (Fragment 102).
In English:
To a god on the one hand all things £areT] beau¬
tiful and good and just; men, on the other hand,
have supposed one set of things Qto b0 unjust,
another ^to bej just.
If we look more closely at Sophokles' themes, whilst
bearing in mind Holderlin's stress on the meeting of the
two principles, the human and the divine, we shall find
that there is a more extensive kinship between the two
Greek writers than even Frankel suggests. The following
piece of Herakleitos, for instance, could easily be taken
as the motto or 'fabula docet1 of "Oedipus Tyrannos":
SjGoC, IcrO
D&to-v Sfe . (Fragment 78).
In English:
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•For human disposition, on the one hand, does not
have true judgement; divine disposition , on the
other hand, does have 0it"j.
Thus, the contrast between human /vjGo^ and divine <vj&>$,
which is at the heart o±" the play and is the deciding
factor in the Oedipus/Teiresias conflict or rivalry, is
a Herakleitean theme.
The danger Oedipus exposes himself to in exercising
his intellectual thirst for knowledge is neatly described
by the following fragment:
" H V i o y^p VlC€-p oCV. JOL&rpoC*
b( K'Vj C. t-KlKOVpot
17 {Frag11ent 9U).
In English:
For the sun will not exceed his measures;if he
does, the Erinyes, Qvho are^J the ministers
of Justice, will find him out.
In this sense, Oedipus has "exceeded his measures",
and brought the Erinyes down upon himself. It must be
stressed, however, that this act of "exceeding" is just
that: an act. It is not a matter of an Aristotelian
"flaw" in his character, but rather of a flawed act on
his part.
A particularly interesting fragment for our purposes
is the following: \ }/ /
©•vjalaj fJ-oi'y&cr QOLL OV O |/oC p G
Co v fee Tdl . ' * (Fragment 35).
In English:
/
It is difficult to fight against [the] ; for
whatever it desires it buys at the cost of jja/thej soul,
The interpretation of this fragment depends largely
upon the interpretation of the word Gvjao^. It can, in
fact, have exactly the same meaning as which it is
here seen as sacrificing: "the soul" of a man, Latin
1anima'. However, it can also mean something nearer the
Latin 'animus' - "the heart" - and then, by extension,
any strong or violent emotion, such as "desire", "anger"
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or "courage". It is in this sense, I would suggest, that
it is to be understood here. The fragment would then bear
the meaning that a man will go to any lengths, and sacri¬
fice anything, when he is in the grip of an overwhelming
passion or obsession. Thus, Oedipus' is his in¬
satiable intellectual curiosity. Holderlin's use of the
German word "Zorn" to describe Oedipus suggests to me
that he was translating this Greek term, or using the
German word in a very similar manner. That Holderlin knew
and had a high opinion of the works of Ilerakleitos is
shown clearly in the passage of his novel "Hyperion"
where he discusses the essential prerequisites for phil¬
osophical thought:
Das groBe Wort, das fei/ oh<j>€rpO*>' €-lvfiO(das Eine
sich selber unterschiedne) des Heraklit, das konnte
nur ein Grieche finden, denn es ist das Wesen der
Schonheit, und ehe das gefunden war, gabs keine
Philosophie... 1 9
[Gr.St.A.3»P.8lJ
Also, of course, the famous motto of Holderlin's
rr \ <-»
circle of friends - the eix koCi 'G.J.'Y — is a thoroughly
Herakleitean idea:
» s . \ i f v , / 20
... tCoL'Vf uJ'X 6C 6VoC, ft?VT.
(from Fragment-10).
j^,..out of all things one and out of one all things
Thus, when Holderlin writes about Sophokles' play in
terms of "grenzenloses Eineswerden" and "grenzenloses
Scheiden", he is echoing the doctrine expressed in this
P1
fragment of Herakleitos, a doctrine of great importance
for Holderlin's work as a whole, in which again and again
we see parallels drawn between the events within and
characteristics of the soul of the poet and world history
the destiny of nations, etc.. In fact, any claim to im¬
port of a profound and universal nature that Holderlin's
work (or that of any other great artist, perhaps) might
have rests ultimately on this doctrine. It is not sur¬
prising, therefore, that he attempts to apply it to
Sophokles' tragedies.
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Xt is not difficult to understand how Holderlin might
have applied the Herakleitean (or Empedoklean) concept of
expansion and contraction to "Oedipus Tyrannos": Oedipus
himself acts in an "expanding" fashion in the first part
of the play, to such an extent that he might be said to
"exceed his measures", in Herakleitean terminology. The
last four lines of Holderlin's "Mnemosyne" express his
dilemma s
...Himmlische namlich sind
Unwillig, werrn einer nicht die Seele schonend sich
Zusammengenommen, aber er mufi doch; dem
Gleich fehlet die Trauer, _
jGr.St.A.2/1,p,198J
If he does not strive, he will never achieve, but,
in striving, he may (and in fact does) "exceed his mea¬
sures" ,
From the moment of the full realisation of the guilt
he has incurred, he acts in a "contracting" fashion:
Ju! Ju! das Ganze kommt genau heraus!
0 Licht! zum letztenmal seh ich dich nun!
Man sagt, ich sei gezeugt, wovon ich nicht
Gesollt, und wohne bei, wo ich nicht sollt, und da,
Wo ich es nicht gedurft, hab ich getotet,
pOed.Tyr. " ,11. 1 182-5; Gr .St.A. 5, P. 1 7971
The idea that "das Ganze kommt genau herausthat
life, the universe, fate are bound and characterised by
a fearful inevitability and logic, is a profoundly Hera¬
kleitean notion.
On his next appearance, Oedipus expresses the full
tragedy of his situation, and his realisation of the vul¬
nerability of his situation and of the human condition
as such:
Weh! Weh! Weh! Weh!
Ach ich Ungllicklicher! Wohin auf Erden
Werd ich getragen, ich Leidender?
Wo breitet sich urn und bringt mich die Stimme?
Io! Damon! wo reiBest du hin?
Q'Oed.Tyr.",11.1307-1 1 ; Gr.St.A.5,P.184 J
Here, we see no longer the all-conquering "Ich"
striving to comprehend and master all the secrets of the
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universe. Previously, Oedipus had been a Fichtean; his
outlook has now become more nearly Spinozan.
As we have seen, Holderlin saw Teiresias1 function as
being that he "den Menschen seiner Lebenssphare, dem
Mittelpunkte seines innern Lebens in eine andere Welt
entrlickt und in die exzentrische Sphare der Toten reiBt".
This is a good description of the £«crTe^cri.^ (literally
"standing out " - modern English "ecstasy"), which
was the ultimate aim of the Dionysian religious rites in
Greece, of which the performances at Athens of tragic
plays were prominent examples. This is also the process
described by Schadewaldt in the phrase: "hier im Leiden
entscheidet der Mensch sich ganz zu dem, was Ewiges an
22 >t
ihm ist". At this moment of 6 KO"T«=iO'iC)» which one can
equate with the "Zasur" (which Holderlin, as we have
seen, claimed took place in both "Oedipus Tyrannos" and
"Antigone" during speeches by Teiresias) and with "der
tragische Transport" which Holderlin mentions elsewhere,
the audience was given an "outside" view of the human
condition, a view which gave them an occasion for joy
because they could see the truth of Herakleites1 Frag¬
ment 102, quoted above - a truth expressed by Holderlin
in the letter to his brother dated 4th June 1799 in the
following terms:
so gehet das Grofite und Kleinste, das Beste
und Schlimmste der Menschen aus Finer W'urzel
hervor, und im Ganzen und GroBen ist alles gut
und jeder erftillt auf seine Art, der eine schoner,
der andre wilder seine Menschenbestimmung...
and, more simply, in "Patmos": "Alles ist gut".
[Gr.St.A.2/1 ,p. 1 b7~J
Thus, it is the task of the inspired priest/seer/
poet figure, be he Teiresias or Sophokles or Holderlin,
to help the rest of mankind to achieve this insight.
Only he can perform this function because, in terms of
Herakleitos1 Fragment 78 above, mere "human disposition"
unaided by divine inspiration does not have the capacity
to attain "true judgement" - something Oedipus finds out
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to his cost.
In his "Anmerkungen zum Oedipus", Holderlin, again,
stresses the rSle of "Zorn":
..,und der treue gewisse Geist ira zornigen
UnmaC leidet, das, zerstorungsfroh, der reiBenden
Zeit nur folgt. —.
(Gr.St.A.5,p.198j
...und grenzenlos die Naturmacht und des Menschen
Innerstes im Zorn Eins wird.-.
jGr.St.A.5,p.201j|
Indeed, Oedipus' attitude in the first part of the
play is a perfect example of the phenomenon described by
Herakleitos in Fragment 85 above. Oedipus' oC> comes
out well in lines 337-^6 of the play:
TIRESIAS; Den Zorn hast du getadelt mir. Den deinen,
Der beiwohnt, siehst du nicht, mich aber
schiltst du.
OEDIPUS : Wer sollte denn nicht solchem Worte ztirnen,
Mit welchem du entehrest diese Stadt?
TIRESIAS: Es kommet doch, geh ich auch weg mit
Schweigen.
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OEDIPUS : Mit nichten kommt es! sagen muBt dus mir!
TIRESIAS: Nicht weiter red ich. Zlirne, wenn du
willst,
Darob mit Zorn, der nur am wildsten ist.
OEDIPUS : 0 ja! ich werde nichts, wie auch der Zorn
sein mag,
Weglassen. was ich weiB,
fGr.St.A.5,P. I37T]
This is the "wunderbare zornige Neugier" of Holderlin's
"Anmerkungen".
As we have seen, the borderline between the divine
and the human is the paramount concern for both Sophokles
and Holderlin. Their ultimate conclusions on the subject
are in harmony with Herakleitos' Fragments 78 and 102
above. When the chorus in "Oedipus Tyrannos", lines 498-
511, expresses its scepticism concerning Teiresias' pro¬
nouncements, its members are at what one might term the
Kantian level of consciousness: they admit the possibility
of the existence of the thing in itself but are not
willing to concede that a mere human can have knowledge
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of it, although, if any mortal ±s_ capable of attaining
it, it would admittedly be someone like Teiresias:
Zeus aber und Apollon
Sind weis * und kennen die Sterblichen,
DaB aber unter Mannern
Ein Seher mehr ist geachtet, denn ich,
1st nicht ein wahres Urteil.
Mit Weisheit die Weisheit
Erwidre der Mann.
Nicht mocht ich aber jemals, eh ich sah
Ein gerades Wort, mich unter
Den Tadelnden zeigen! Denn offenbar
Kam liber ihn die gefliigelte Jungfrau,
Vormals, und weise erschien sie,
In der Priifung aber freundlich der Stadt.Darum
Nach meinem Sinne niemals
Wird er es btiBen,, das Schlimme,
J_Gr.St.A. 5, P. 1447]
Holderlin's translation of the last few lines seems
rather strange. He takes the "gefliigelte Jungfrau"
(= the Sphinx) to be the subject of oo <f>Q<yj ( "erschien"),
whereas it is most assuredly intended to be Oedipus
himself. A more accurate translation of what follows
"Vormals..." might be:
...and he was seen/appeared to be wise and
genuinely dear to the people; therefore in mv
estimation he will never be found guilty of Can£l
baseness/vice/dishonour.
Thus, Oedipus' proven civic virtues weigh more heavi
with the chorus, who represent the common people of
Thebes or "the man in the street", than the unproven
and possibly unprovable revelations of Teiresias.
The average person would be content to remain with
this position, which excludes the possibility of anyone
attaining to the true judgment or perfect knowledge of
the gods. It is Oedipus' "Zorn" which urges him on,
and, even though he does not want to accept Teiresias'
revelations for his own sake, this "Zorn" forces him to
investigate his claims thoroughly and honestly - in thi
way, his "Zorn" is a concomitant of his
He also completely and honestly accepts the results of
his search for the truth and the resx>onsibility for the
- 50 -
actions he committed unintentionally. There was no way-
out of his dilemma from the very beginning, even from the
day of his birth. He was predestined to do what he did,
and no preventive measures could possibly have changed
this in any way. The only freedom he had waa to keep
searching for the truth or not. This, for him, was no
choice — his |A. forced him onwards. In other
words: his situation was the result of necessity (the
term much used by the Greeks: ), while his gradual
awareness of the situation was the result of his exer¬
cising his personal freedom, to seek or not to seek.
Thus, in Sophokles, or at least in the Holderlinian
interpretation of Sophokles, the Truth is something
given, a revelation or an immutable necessity. The reali¬
sation of this Truth by an individual (Oedipus) or a
community (the chorus or, in a wider sense, the audience
of Sophokles' plays) is a moment of feK<r«rotcri£t a joining
of the human and the divine and a realisation of the
eternal truth: "Alles ist gut".
If we turn now to Hegel's ideas on the subject, we
find an entirely different emphasis. Hegel tries to put
forward Sophokles' plays (in particular the "Antigone")
as realisations of his own brand of dialectics. According
to this interpretation, each major character in a given
play is privy to a part of the truth, and the full reali¬
sation of the latter is achieved by the process of syn¬
thesis, which is a "Begriff" rather than an "Ekstase".
As early as his schooldays at the Stuttgart "Gymnasium','
Hegel was giving evidence of his enthusiastic interest
in Sophokles, by translating his work from the Greek. It
is well known that his favourite Sophokles play was the
"Antigone". Although the character that fascinated Hol-
derlin so much, Teiresias, appears in this play, it is
significant that Hegel concentrates his attention on
Antigone herself and Kreon, and on the principles which
he claimed they embodied.
Hegel expressed his conclusions regarding Sopholclean
tragedy in the following terms:
Das Faturn ist das Begrifflose, wo Gerechtigkeit
und Ungerechtigkeit in der Abstraktion verschwinden
in der Tragodie dagegen ist das Schicksal innerhalb
eines Kreises sittlicher Gerechtigkeit. Am erhaben-
sten finden wir das in den Tragodien des Sophokles.
das Schicksal der Individuen ist als etwas Unbe-
greifliches dargestellt, aber die Notwendigkeit ist
als die wahrhafte Gerechtigkeit erkannt.,.. Das
blinde Schicksal ist etwas Unbefriedigendes. In £
diesen Tragodien wird die Gerechtigkeit begriffen*
Thus far, Hegel is not too far from Holderlin's
theory of "tragic joy", with its joyous recognition of
ptVoL^K/Vf • However, he goes on:
:Die Heroerfc. . . . sind es, die sich iiber den sitt—
lichen Zustand erheben, die etwas Besonderes fur
sich ausftihren wollen, die eigentlimlich wollen und
handeln. Sie sind von den iibrigejq. durch eigenttim-
liches Wollen unterschieden... 2
Thus, for Hegel, Sophokles1 heroes are all Fichtean
Idealists, promoting the claims of the "Ich" through
action - action which ultimately challenges "den ruhigen
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Zustand des Waltens, der Hegierung des Gottes". The
separate claims of the individual "Ich"'s leads to fric¬
tion and antagonism between them, which Hegel sees as
the basis for the tragic situation:
...in weiterer Entwicklung tritt eine Entzweiung
ein, und die hohere, eigentlich interessante Ent¬
zweiung fur den Geist ist, daB es die sittlichen
Machte selbst sind, dia als Entzweite in Kollision
geratend erscheinen.
This is hardly compatible with the Holderlinian
interpretation of Sophokles, in which the conflict be¬
tween individuals exists, to be sure, but in one indivi¬
dual, Teiresias, the Truth is incorporated as an Absolut
rather than each individual incorporating part of the
Truth, or an aspect of it, as Hegel suggests. For this
reason, Hegel's solution to the Sophoklean "Entzweiung11
is not possible for Holderlin:
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Die Auflosung der Kollision ist, daB die sitt-
lichen Machte, die nach ihrer Einseitigkeit in
Kollision sind, sich der Einseitigkeit des selb—
standigen Geltens abtun; und die Erscheinung dieses
Abtuns der Einseitigkeit ist, daB die Xndividuen,
die sich. zur Verwirklichung der einen einzelnen
sittlichen Macht aufgeworfen haben, zugrunde gehen.
Hegel then gives an example of how he sees his theory-
working out in practice. The example he chooses is that
of his favourite play, "Antigone":
In dem fur mich absoluten Exempel der Tra-
godie, in der Antigone, kommt die Familienliebe,
das Heilige, Innere, der Empfindung Angehorige,
weshalb es auch das Gesetz der unteren Gotter
heiBt, mit dem Rechte des Staats in ivollision.
Kreon ist nicht ein Tyrann sondern vertritt etwas,
das ebenso eine sittliche Macht ist. Kreon hat
nicht unrecht; er behauptet, daB das Gesetz des
Staates, die Autoritat der Regierung gewahnt werden
muB und Strafe aus der Verletzung folgt.
it is easy to see why Hegel takes the "Antigone" as
his example. His theory would seem to have considerable
direct support in that play. For example, in the scene
between Antigone and the chorus, lines 780 to 882, we
have the following statements from the chorus:
Mitwohnend Lebenden nicht und nicht Gestorbnen.
Forttreibend bis zur Scheide der Klihnheit,
Bis auf die Hohe des Rechts,
Bist du, o Kind, wohl tiefgefalien,
Stirbst aber vaterlichen Kampf.
Zu ehren ist von Gottesfurcht
Etwas. Macht aber, wo es die gilt,
Die weichet nicht. Dich hat verderbt
Das zornige Selbsterlcennen. _
[Gr.St.A.5,PP.240-1J
Thus, according to the chorus, Antigone had come up
against "die Hohe des Rechts" ( - Hegel's
"Recht des Staats") in pursuing her "vaterlicher Kampf"
( 'iCcCTp ibo-V k.Q\oV - Hegel's "Familienliebe"), in the pro¬
cess ruining herself by her own "zorniges Selbsterkennen"
( »<.VTOyVcOTO^ . . . - approximating to Hegel's "eigen-
tiimliches Wollen"). Thus, Hegel would seem to be accepting
the chorus' interpretation of the action of the play 'in
toto', which seems at first sight rather strange, when
one considers the somewhat condescending tone of his
description of them: he characterises them as being
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"dem tragischen Schicksal entnommen^ , and claxms fur¬
ther that "er bleibt im ruhigen Gange der sittlichen
Ordnung, im gewohnlichen Lebenskreise beschrankt und
erregt nicht das Sittliche selbst zu einer feindlichen
32Macht gegen sich."
We have already seen from our discussion of "Oedipus
Tyrannos" that, in that play at least, the chorus is not
the voice of the author, nor is it privy to any secrets
unknown to the main protagonists: it does not know any
better than Oedipus whether or not Teiresias' prophecies
and pronouncements are to be believed. Why, then, must
we accept its statements and interpretations in the "Anti
gone" at face value, as expressing the moral of the tale
for the author? In "Oedipus Tyrannos", it is Teiresias'
statements throughout the play that are seen to be justi¬
fied in the last resort. It might therefore be apposite
at this point to look closely at his pronouncements in
the "Antigone". His views are expressed in the following
passage from his scene with ilreon, in lines 988 to 1090
of the play:
...Nach deinem Sinn erkrankt die Stadt.
Denn die Altare sind und Feuerstellen
Voll von dem FraB der Vogel und des Hunds,
Vom unschicklich gefallnen Sohn des Oedipus.
Und nicht raehr nehmen auf beim Opfer das Gebet
Von uns die Gotter, noch der Hiiften Flamme. . .
Denn alien Menschen ists gemein, zu fehlen.
Wenn aber einer fehlt, der Mann ist eben
Nicht ungescheut und nicht ein Ungliickselger,
Wenn er, gefallen in ein Ubel, heilen
Sich lasset und nicht unbeweglich bleibet.
Denn Eigendiinkel zeiget Grobheit an.
Weich du dem Toten und verfolge nicht
Den, der dahin ist. Welche Kraft ist das,
Zu toten Tote?
...Das bedenke nun, o Kind!
- -
Thus, we see Teiresias warning Kreon in the "Antigone"
in much the same terms as he wairned Oedipus in "Oedipus
Tyrannos" - it is Kreon who is at fault in the situation,
Teiresias claims, not Antigone. Thus, Teiresias is di¬
rectly at odds with Hegel in his interpretation of the
situation. The latter states clearly: "Kreon hat nicht
unrecht". Teiresias disagrees: "Nach deinem Sinn erkrankt
die Stadt". ^egel states clearly: "Kreon ist nicht ein
Tyrann". Teiresias disagrees: "Tyrannenart liebt schand-
lichen Gewinn", Hegel implies that Antigone and Kreon
are both guilty of "eigentumlich.es Wollen" in their dif¬
ferent ways; Teiresias accuses Kreon alone of "Eigen-
diinkel" .
This is not to say, however, that Sophokles _ or
Holderlin _ would see Kreon as being a morally bad char¬
acter, any more than they would see Oedipus as being 1 bad!
It simply means that, to them, Kreon and Oedipus are
wrong. They are wrong in different ways, of course:
Oedipus is wrong intellectually, Kreon is wrong poli¬
tically. Holderlin, in his "Anmerkungen zur Antigona",
expresses the matter thus:
Das Charakteristische dabei...ist...das, daB die
in solchem Schicksal begriffenen Personen, nicht,
wie im Oedipus, in Ideengestalt, als streitend um
die Wahrheit, stehen, und wie eines, das sich des
Verstandes wehret, auch nicht, wie eines, das sich
des Lebens oder Eigentums oder der Ehre wehret,
wie die Personen im Ajax, sondern daB sie als Per¬
sonen im engeren Sinne, als Standespersonen gegen-
einander stehen, d; - - - lisieren.
Further: "Die Vernunftform, die hier tragisch sich
bildet, ist politisch, und zwar republikanisch..."
In this sense, Holderlin goes some way towards the
Hegelian interpretation of this play. He agrees that
Kreon and Antigone are "Standespersonen". However, in
the last sentence quoted, Holderlin betrays his one-
blikanisch". Knowing Holderlin's political sympathies,
sided sympathy for Antigone. The play, for him, is 'irepu-
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this can only be taken as a term of praise. Antigone is
a heroine of the revolution against the tyranny of Kreon.
However, it must be admitted that, although he lacks
Oedipus' intellect, Kreon shares the latter's pA.
he ultimately accepts his guilt and his fate just as
readily and unswervingly:
0 mir! mir! das gehoret keinem andern
Der Menschen an. Mein ist die Schuld in diesem.
Xch habe dich getotet, ich.
[Gr.St.A.5,P.261J
Hegel is quite correct in pointing out that Antigone
and Kreon are originally and essentially moral equals.
Holderlin also stresses the arbitrariness of Kreon*s ul¬
timate fate:
>>
...so daB das eine vorziiglich dbrum wrlieret,




Die Gruppierung solcher Personen ist, wie in
der Antigona, mit einem Kampfspiele von Laufern
zu vergleichen, wo der, welcher zuerst schwer
Othem h-plt und sich am Gegner stoflt, verloren
hat. . . ^ _
[Gr.St.A.5,p.27lJ
But when Hegel states barely: "Kreon hat nicht un-
recht", he is making a categorical statement of a
sweeping nature which is not supported in all its im¬
plications by the action of the play. It is true that
Kreon supported the "Recht des Staats" just as Antigone
followed the principle of "Familienliebe", but he made
the mistake of ignoring until it was too late the uni¬
versal truth that divine law is superior to all others.
Antigone could just as easily have incurred the same
guilt by following the principle of "Familienliebe"
exclusively and fanatically. It just so happens that the
guilt falls on Kreon. Hegel, in fact, fails completely
to distinguish between the fates of Antigone and kreon,
He sees that they both come to a tragic end, but he
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fails to take into account the fact that it is only
Kreon who incurs guilt in the process, in relation to
the divine law.
Hegel shows his Promethean sympathies clearly in his
interpretation of Sophoklean tragedy. The original situa¬
tion before Kreon and Antigone assert themselves is un¬
satisfactory: "Das blinde Schicksal ist etw&s Unbefrie-
digendes," There is no hint of any "ursprtingliche Har-
monie"against which the two main protagonists might be
sinning. Their only ultimate fault is in their "Einsei-
tigkeit". Their ultimate personal fates are necessary
because a thesis and an antithesis have to be "aufge-
hoben" if a synthesis is to result:
Auf solche Weise ist der SchluB der Tragodie
die Versohnung, nicht die blinde Notwendiglceit,
sondern die verniinf tige, die Notwendigkeit, die
hier anfangt sich zu erfiillen. . . . Hier ist eine
riihrende Notwendigkeit, die aber vollkommen sitt-
lich ist; das erlitten Ungliick ist vollkommem
klar; hier ist nichts Blindes, BewuBtloses.
Thus, to Hegel, the fates of Antigone and Kreon were
necessary sacrifices in the progress of the World Spirit,
in man's process of self-liberation from "das blinde
Schicksal" or the unquestioned rule of the gods.
kungen zur Antigona", for example:
Der erhabene Spott, sofern heiliger Wahnsinn
hochste menschliche Erscheinung, und hier mehr
Seele als Sprache ist, iibertrifft alle ihre iibrigen
AuBerungen; und es ist auch notig, so im Superla¬
tive von der Schonheit zu sprechen, weil die Hal-
tung unter anderem auch auf dem Superlative von
menschlichem Geist und heroischer Virtuositat
beruht.
His fundamental disagreement with the Hegelian posi¬
tion becomes quite clear, however, in the next para¬
graph :
Holderlin also had a high regard for the
heroes, as he shows in the "Anmer—
Es ist ein groBer Behelf der geheimarbeitenden
Seele, daD sie auf dem hochsten Bewufltsein dem
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BewuBtsein ausweicht, und ehe sie wirklich der
gegenwartige Gott ergreift, mit kiihnem, oft sogar
blasphemischen Worte diesem begegnet, und so die
tieilige lebende Moglichkeit des Geistes erhalt,
[Gr.St.A.5,P.26^
The entire concept of "der gegenwartige Gott" as an
entity separate from and opposed (or opposite) to the
consciousness of the hero is alien to Hegel's thought,
as is the concept of blasphemy. In Holderlin's system,
the actions of Antigone and Kreon represent the necessary
"Ur-Teilung" from the "urspriingliche Harmonie", in the
same way as Oedipus' answering of the Sphinx's riddle in
"Oedipus Tyrannos", In the end, they both have to submit
to the divine law: in her last line in the play, Antigone
pays tribute to "Gottesfurcht"; Kreon's last lines are
also words of submission:
Fuhrt Schritt vor Schritt den eiteln Mann. Der ich
Dich, Kind, doch gerne nicht, getotet, sie auch,sie;
Ich Armer weiB nicht, wen ich ansehn soil,
Und nicht, wohin ich gehe.
Denn alles Schiefe hat
Hier in den Handen und hier mir auf das Haupt
Ein wiist Schicksa^ gehaufet.
jGr .St.A. 5 , P.262T]
Thus, to put their differences in concise terms: Hegel
chooses to ignore the Teiresian element in Sophoklean
tragedy (in much the same way as he ignores the rftle of
Cheiron in the Prometheus/Herakles myth comple^ ) - to
him, the divine only exists in order to be overcome and
superseded by the conscious will of man; to Holderlin,
man must ultimately always bow before the divine, no
matter how high a degree of consciousness he may attain.
It seems clear to the present writer that Holderlin's
interpretation of Sophoklean tragedy is in this respect
the correct one, and that Hegel was in fact twisting
Sophokles' intentions to suit his own Promethean sympa¬
thies .
Walter Kaufmann, in his discussion of Hegel's "theory
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of tragedy" , mentions the concept of "truly tragic
suffering" in Hegel, which can be defined as suffering
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brought about by the individual himself through the "Ein-
seitigkeit" of his position. Kaufmann makes the point
that "not all the suffering in Greek tragedy is 'truly
tragic' in Hegel's sense, and not all the protagonists
accept their guilt, as Oedipus does in the 'Tyrannos'
and as Hegel may have thought - mistakenly - Antigone
did. Deianeira does; but Electra and Philoctetes see
themselves as suffering innocently, and their^sufferings
are not 'truly tragic', according to Hegel." We have
already discussed the question of Antigone's supposed
guilt: Hegel is forced to ascribe guilt to her in order
to equate her situation with that of Kreon, but all she
can really be said to be guilty of is her "Einseitigkeit"
(a necessary concomitant of the human condition for
Sophokles and Holderlin, except for the divinely inspired
Teiresias figure) — it is only Kreon who sins against
the divine law. Similarly, Elektra is guilty of "Ein-
seitigkeit" in the play of the same name, but it is Aegis-
thus who has sinned against the divine law. Elektra is,
of course, a less attractive character than Antigone, but
their situations are closely comparable: they both repre¬
sent the principle of "Familienliebe".
The really important difference, then, between Hegel
and Holderlin on the question of Sophoklean tragedy lies
in this matter of the divine law and even of the divine
as such. To Hegel, it exists only as a blind tyranny and
superstition to be overcome by human will; to Holderlin,
it is the ultimate arbiter of human existence, before
which even the greatest of men have eventually to bow
in submission. The latter position, I would suggest, is
also that of Sophokles himself. In fact, one might say
that Sophokles, in religious terminology more familiar
to us, was dealing with the questionstEden, the fall,
original sin and redemption. The "Ur-Teilung" of the an¬
swering of the Sphinx's riddle can also be seen in terms
of Adam eating of the forbidden fruit. Subsequently he
(Oedipus or Adam) and the people of Thebes or mankind
have to fend for themselves, without divine assistance,
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about which (in the form of Teiresias' pronouncements)
they are in any case inclined to be sceptical. All this
is ended, however, when Oedipus (or Adam) and the Thebans
(or mankind) eventually realise that Teiresias is right,
and bow before the divine will as expressed by him. This
is not to say that Oedipus and the Thebans are back where
they started from or that it has all been for nothing:
they have made an immense gain in terms of consciousness
of the divine law which had previously been obscure to
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them. They have gone through the process described by
Schelling in his "Abhandlungen zur Erlauterung des Idea-
lismus der Wissenschaftslehre":
Die Geschichte des menschlichen Geistes...wird
nichts anderes seyn als die Geschichte der ver-
schiedenen Zustande, durch welche hindurch er all-
mahlich zur Anschauung seiner selbst, zum reinen
SelbstbewuBtseyn, gelangt. 39
It is true to say thcit Hegel had a superficially
similar theory regarding the development of human con¬
sciousness. However, as we have seen, the crucial dif¬
ference between his idea and that of Sophokles, Holderlin
and Schelling is in the different attitudes towards the




In the first two chapters, we have dealt with all the
pre-Sokratic Greeks who had an obvious influence on and
fascination for Holderlin: Homer (floruit^ c. 725 B.C.),
Herakleitos (fl. c. 490 B.C.), Pindar (fl. c. 480 B.C.),
Sophokles (f1.c. 455 B.C.). We have dealt with them all,
as I say, except one, and that one is possibly the most
important of them all: Empedokles. His 'floruit' can be
placed around 444 B.C., which makes him about ten years
younger than Sophokles and fifteen years older than Sokra-
tes. At least, this is the usual assumption, following
Apollodoros. John Burnet, however, suggests that he was
considerably older than that, adducing as an argument
Theophrastos' claim that Empedokles was born 'not long
after Anaxagoras1. This would put Empedokles' 'floruit'
about 460 B.C. or shortly after. If this theory is ac¬
cepted, it would mean that he was in his early twenties
when Pindar visited Sicily (476-5 B.C.), at the age of
46 or 42, depending on which birth date one accepts for
him. The two might even have met at Akragas, and the
Orphic and other philosophical elements in Pindar's
poetry would lead us to expect that meeting, if it took
place, to have been a fruitful one as far as intellectual
discussion is concerned, however much they may have dis¬
agreed about politics. Although one normally thinks of
Empedokles as being of a completely different, younger
generation than Pindar, the poet of the old, archaic
world which was fast breaking up, Empedokles may even
have died sooner than Pindar, who is said to have reached
the age of eighty, which puts his death in either 442 or
438 B.C..2
3
Uvo Holscher has shown convincingly that Holderlin
would have had access to most of what is available to us
today by way of Empedokles fragments, from such works
as the biography by Diogenes Laertius, the sixteenth cen¬
tury work "Poesis Philosophica" by Henricus Stephanus,
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the "Systeraa intellectuale huius mundi" by the Cambridge
theologian Ralph Cudworth (1680), from which Herder quotes
in his essay "Liebe und Selbstheit", and Jacob Brucker's
six-volume "historia critica philosophiae" (17^2). We can
therefore assume in the context of the present study that
Holderlin had the opportunity to grasp the basic ideas of
IL
the Empedoklean system.
A brief description of the system concerned might be
apposite at this point: Empedokles1 thought was contained
primarily in two "Lehrgedichte", one concerned with an
apparently materialistic description of Nature (
) » ^he °"ther with mystical ideas regarding rein¬
carnation and the salvation of the individual soul (ol
KcC0o*-(>f-COC ) « These two poems are in fact seen as being
completely incompatible by many modern scholars: the ma¬
terialism of TTfcjh. is thought to exclude any
possibility of the survival of the individual soul, which
survival is one of the main topics of 01 ^ We
shall return to this problem later.
In Empedokles1 materialist system there are four ele¬
ments: Fire, Air, Earth and Water. The history of the
universe is supposed to consist simply of the combining
and separating of these elements under the influence of
the two forces Love and Strife. The materialist character
of his ideas would seem to be confirmed by his defence
of trust in the senses. Unlike his predecessor Parmenides
(perhaps the one major influence on his thought), Empe¬
dokles advocated trusting them as guides to the Truth.
t
Like Parmenides before him, Empedokles posits an ori¬
ginal Sphere, but in his case this Sphere is not a seam¬
less unity, being composed already of the four elements,
held together by Love. In the course of time, Love and
Strife alternate in controlling the Sphere. That, briefly,
is the content of MI fep 1 <j>z)cr&LO ^ .
Kirk and Raven^ suggest a connection of a microcosm/
macrocosm nature between the materialism of that work and
the mysticism of 01 , positing a parallel be¬
tween (or the identity of) sexual love and "cosmic Love".
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The contents of <5t K.olQoC|5|1.01. itself they describe in
succinct terms as follows:
"The 'Purifications' is concerned with the fall of man
and with the practices necessary for his restoration/
This work posits an age of primal innocence, when
Kupris or Aphrodite rules alone, Strife being wholly ab¬
sent. There was then a "fall", and sin or Strife appeared
8
on the scene. The individual soul, through its various
reincarnations, must strive to purify itself from the
Strife element, whereupon it will return to the state of
bliss from whence it started. This is precisely the pro¬
cedure Holderlin described in the novel "Hyperion", with
the exception that he does not complicate matters by in¬
troducing reincarnation into the story - Hyperion's return
to a lost state of innocence takes place within a far
shorter time-span.
Now, I would suggest that the parallels between Empe-
dokles' thought and Holderlin's are becoming clear. The
following equations can be put in diagrammatic form thus:
a) original Sphere = "urspriingliche Mitte".
b) rule of Love = "Gipfel der Zeit".^
c) microcosm/macrocosm = KJLl TC0Li/
d) return of soul to original bliss = return to
"Ursprung".
e) kupris/Aphrodite = "Liebe als Metaprinzip der
Vereinigung".
These correspondences form the basis for the Empedokle^
Holderlin parallel or correspondence in philosophical
terms. One may point to other parallels, such as those
between the "urspriingliche Mitte" and the Judaeo-Chris-
tian Garden of Eden, "Liebe" as "Metaprinzip" and Plato's
"eros" and so on. That other thinkers, mainly represen¬
tatives of the Neo-Platonic tradition, held similar
views in the interim period between Empedokles and Hol¬
derlin is not to be denied. However, in the present con¬
text of an attempt to prove a correspondence between the
Greek and the German, it is largely irrelevant to refer
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to these other thinkers - they were preserving what Em-
pedokles had already put forward, or, even if they
thought of these theories independently and had never
read Empedokles, the ideas as such had as a matter of
fact been expressed first by him - a fact of which, as
Uvo Holscher shows, Holderlin would have been aware.Also,
Empedokles combined into one system the various elements
which subsequently, after the decline from the Greek
"Gipfel der Zeit',1 were present only in the works of dif¬
ferent thinkers who disagreed with one another: one ele¬
ment in Stoic thought, another in Epicurean thought,etc..
Apart from the parallels listed above, there are cer¬
tain other similarities of a less obvious nature between
the systems of Empedokles and Holderlin. These require
more lengthy discussion.
Firstly, there is the matter of reincarnation. It is
a central part of Empedokles1 system, or at least of ou
'K-iO&oL^fA.OL. » but not quite so obviously a part of Holder-
lin's system. However, we must not forget the poem, or
fragment of a poem (or is it even prose?), "Palingenesis
Mit der Sonne sehn ich mich oft vom Aufgang bis zum
Niedergang den weiten Bogen schnell hineilend zu
wandeln,
oft, mit Gesang zu folgen dein groBen, dem Vollen-
dungsgange der alten Natur,
Und, wie der Feldherr auf dom Ilelrne den Adler tragt
in
Kampf und Triumph, so mocht ich, daB sie mich triige
Machtig das Sehnen der Sterblichen.
Aber es wohnet auch ein Gott in dem Menschen, daB
er Vergangenes und Zuktinftiges sieht und wie vom
Strom ins
Gebirg hinauf an die Quelle lustwandelt er durch
Zeiten
Aus ihrer Taten stillem Buch ist Vergangenem be-
kannt er durch die goldenes beut..,.
(Gr.St.A.2/1,p.3173
This shows, in a context which has no explicit con¬
nection with Empedokles, Holderlin's independently held
belief in reincarnation. Again, whether llolderlin's be¬
lief in reincarnation stems originally from his reading
of Empedokles or of Herder or simply from his own inde—
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pendent cogitations is largely irrelevant. The fact re¬
mains that it forms a ptirt of Empedokles' system, and
Holderlin would have been aware of this.
Secondly, the problematics of Love and Strife in
Empedokles and of the conneetion between and compati¬
bility of his two poems, problems which puzzle modern
scholars, may perhaps be solved to some extent by refer¬
ence to Holderlin's thought, working on the assumption
(a safe one, I believe) that Holderlin understood Empe¬
dokles at least as well as these scholars. The Love/
Strife problem I refer to is the one seen by Aristotle,
who maintained that Empedokles was guilty of muddled
thinking in relation to Love and Strife, for he does not
explain what higher power compels Love and Strife to act
as they do.
The solution I suggest stems from the following con¬
siderations: as we have seen, in Empedokles' system Love
rules supreme at the outset and the ultimate aim or goal
of both the universe and the individual soul is the return
of Love's exclusive rule. Strife is therefore confined to
an intermediate and ultimately subordinate r8le in the
process, and it can be seen perhaps as something akin to
Goethe's "das Damonische" - not in itself evil, but de¬
structive in its effects when abused, repressed or mis¬
handled. Strife can in fact lead to positive results.
Its relationship with its partner Love is far from being
exclusively hostile, any more than night and day are
enemies.
If we see Love in Holderlinian terms as a metaprin-
ciple, the paradox is dissolved. Love and Strife are
self-evidently not equals in Empedokles' system: Love
rules at the beginning and will rule once more at the
11
end; Strife has its day in between at various periods,
but cannot ultimately prevail and must submit to its
"superior". In Christian terms, this is the relationship
between God and Satan, if one takes the view of Satan as
a necessary counter-balancing force to God rather than
an implacable enemy.
The other question, that of the compatibility of the
two poems, is more complex. It is perhaps easiest to fol¬
low up this theme backwards from Holderlin to Empedokles:
As is well known, Holderlin's G'V Kli is largely
an attempt to solve the difficulty of the apparent incom¬
patibility of the two principles or phenomena "Liebe" and
"Selbstheit"^, and, by extension, an attempt to recon¬
cile the two systems of philosophy termed "Kriticismus"
and "Dogmatismus": one system started from the "Ich" and
never reached God; the other started from God and left
the "Ich" as a mere puppet of this God. This is the prob¬
lem Schelling dealt with in his "Philosophische Briefe
liber Dogmatismus und Kriticismus" (1795)* This is Schel-
ling's solution to the problem:
Wer iiber Freiheit und Notwendigkeit nachgedacht
hat, fand von selbst, daf3 diese Principien im Abso—
luten vereinigt seyn miissen - Freiheit, weil das
Absolute aus unbedingter Selbstmacht, Nothwendig—
keit, weil es eben deBwegen nur den Gesetzen seines
Seyns, der innern Nothwendigkeit seines Wesens
gemaB handelt. In ihin ist kein V/ille mehr, der von
einem Gesetze abweichen konnte, aber auch kein
Gesetz mehr, das es sich nicht selbst erst durch
seine Iiandlungen gabe, kein Gesetz, das, unabhangig
von seinen Handlungen, Realitat hatte. Absolute
Freiheitvund absolute Nothwendigkeit sind iden—
tisch.
Thus, if one takes the Spinozan position as being
basically monist, one can compare it with that of Parme—
nides in the Greek context, Spinoza's 'Deus sive Natura'
being equivalent to Parmenides' Sphere. Parmenides, like
Spinoza, started from God or the Absolute or the Whole
and in the process left the individual "Ich" a mere pas¬
sive object swamped by the Whole.
If we turn now from Parmenides to Empedokles, we can
see that the latter was attempting much the same with
Parmenides1 ideas as Holderlin and Schelling were at¬
tempting with Spinoza's. The dualism of Schelling's so¬
lution above is precisely equivalent, I would maintain,





raus", For us to say that Empedokles had reached the iden¬
tical solution to the problem, it has to be shown that
these two works are in fact compatible. This I shall now
try to prove.
We have already mentioned the fact that Empedokles,
unlike Parmenides, advocated trust in the senses as a
guide to the Truth. This close and apparently paradoxical
connection between the physical and perception, thought,
truth, etc., is where the solution to our problem must
be sought:
otTTctVT^ .
"In this way therefore by the will of Fortune all
things possess thought."
All things possess thought, and this thought is sit¬
uated or takes place in the blood around men's hearts.
One can compare this theory with that espoused by the
famous friend of the Gontards, Samuel Thomas Sommering,
who in his anatomical work "liber das Organ der Seele"
put forward the view that the soul must be situated in
a liquid part of the body such as the area around the
pineal gland. Holderlin was interested in Sommering and
his theories, as is shown by the "Xenien" he wrote on
the subject, and it is probable that the parallel with
Empedokles' theories did not escape his notice.
Now, the blood is indubitably something physical.
Thoughts, on the other hand, are usually connected with
the part of man's make-up which is liable to survive the
death of the body, if any part does indeed do so. However,
they cannot have been considered in this light by Empe¬
dokles : if one believes in reincarnation, one cannot at
the same time believe in the survival of the conscious
thoughts of one life into the next. So, to Empedokles,
the death of the thoughts would not imply the death of
15
the soul.
It remains now to determine the precise nature of the
element in our make-up which does survive death. E.R.
Dodds describes the situation thus:
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...Empedocles.... avoids applying the term 'psyche'
to the indestructible self. He appears to have
thought of the 'psyche' as being the vital warmth
which at death is re-absorbed in the fiery element
from which it came.... The occult self which per¬
sisted through successive incarnations he called,
not 'psyche', but 'daemon'. The daemon has, appar¬
ently, nothing to do with perception or thought,
which Empedocles held to be mechanically determined;
the function of the daemon is to be the earner of
man's potential divinity and actual guilt.
This 'daemon' can be compared with the Unconscious, as
discovered by the empirical methods of 20th century psy¬
chology and psychiatry. When one considers the 'potential
divinity' of this element, in Dodds' terminology, one
can see that we are on familiar Holderlinian ground here:
the Unconscious as the most precious and significant part
17
of man. '
Thus, we can see that the materialism of (. fe p l cj>T?CT
-fecoC, is not, after all, incompatible with the mysticism
of ol t - the latter simply deals with the part
left over after all these physical phenomena have been
dealt with. In l_fepl Empedokles is talking as the
man of enlightenment and science, the "Aufklarung" figure,
the Kantian prescribing the limits to what human reason
can tell one. In ot ^ccBoCpj^oi , he speaks as the inspired
poet and seer - the only man who can tell mankind any
more than, reason as exemplified in OTfc.p'i O c
<T^oL©tf.p|T<5l is an exercise in revelation of a Teiresian/
Holderlinian nature. In the first poem, Empedokles speaks
by virtue of his merely human reason which, as we have
seen, is a mechanical function of the mortal part of him.
In the second, he resorts to anamnesis, the tool of the
inspired poet.
Next, we come to the important connection between
Empedokles' thought and Holderlin's philosophical essay,
"das Werden im Vergehen". These are a few of the salient
points that Holderlin makes in that essay:
— 68 —
... die Welt aller Weiten, das Alles in Allen,
welches immer ist, stellt sich nur in aller Zeit -
oder im Untergange oder im Moment, oder genetischer
im Werden des Moments und Anfang von Zeit und Welt
dar, und dieser Untergang und Anfang ist wie die
Sprache Ausdruck Zeichen Darstellung eines leben—
digen, aber besondern Ganzen...
[or.St.A .4/1,p.282j
Denn wie konnte die Auflosung empfunden werden
ohne Vereinigung... _
[jGr .St.A.4 /1 ,p. 282/]
... denn aus Nichts wird nichts...
IS* .St.A.4/1, p. 283TJ
Holderlin's thought in this essay becomes extremely
dense and complex, but its general drift can easily be
seen from these three quotations. This is Empedoklean
thought through and through, almost a paraphrase of such
fragments as the following: . / » /
V-^ltTOC ' en!> Y«C p crcbi-V O S QOI/& C, feLCTL 1
c/ c \ \//\r r\ ^ ' "> N * \ ^
01 O'V] y «. y^ecr TToC.poc, cvk tcv" ^ovo-iy
Tl Tfe K«*-i e^o\X-uo-0olt
Childish fools! For their thoughts are not of
long sense/understanding,
In that they expect something to come into being
which previously did not exist,
Or something to die and to be destroyed completely
G« TG YoCp o-vSoCfA^ otjA'V]tC"Tl
. c . V&r&cr0dCL
,y > > v \ / r\ ) ✓ ' \ , /KoLL T eo-y e^oLTToX eo-fo^t odvvjwO-TOV C^uo-TOV•
oLifet J/ocp y ecrTdL fO-rcy KG ri$ «il4v
For out of something which does not exist at all
nothing can come into being
And that something that is should be destroyed is
not to be accomplished and unknown;
For it will always be where one has put it.
In Empedokles1 system, as in Holderlin's, nothing can
actually die or disappear, because there is nowhere for
it to go. The process of "Werden und Vergehen" then, to
both Empedokles and Holderlin, is simply a separation and
rearrangement of eternal elements. Nothing is wasted,
nothing disappears, nothing dies.
The process of history would seem on this account to
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be fairly monotonous and uneventful, but one must remem¬
ber the rSles of Love and Strife, and also the fact that
Love is superior to Strife. It is true to say that Love
and Strife cannot be thought of in black and white moral
terms, as in the Christian concepts of Good and Evil.
But I would maintain that Love is most markedly the more
highly valued of the two forces. The periods when Love
rules are definitely peaks of time in the Holderlinian
sense - there is a top and there is a bottom.20
Interestingly enough in this connection, Holderlin,
in the "Grund zum Empedokles", talks of art in this sense
of being a peak of Nature:
Natur und Kunst sind sich im reinen Leben
nur harmonisch entgegengesetzt. Die Kunst ist
die Blute, die Vollendung der Natur, Natur wird
erst gottlich durch die Verbindung mit der
verschiedenartigen aber harmonischen Kunst,
wenn jedes ganz ist, was es sein kann, und
eines verbindet sich mit dem andern, ersetzt
den Mangel des andern, den es notwendig haben
muB, um ganz das zu sein, was es als besonderes
sein kann, dann ist die Vollendung da, und das
Gottliche ist in en.
This is also a "strand" situation in the Empedoklean
sense — instead of the four elements combining and se¬
parating, we have Nature and Art doing so, with "das
Gottliche" in between. Now, in the same way as Love is
superior to Strife among the motive forces, according to
Empedokles, one can also perceive a certain inequality
among the elements themselves, if only in a chronological
or physical sense. As Aetius points out:
r I \J V It
| J ^ I I ^ 1 w" "■ d. |
Empedokles claims that aither was the first to
be separated off, next fire, and after that earth.
From the earth, as it was constricted too much by
the force of the rotation, sprang the water, from
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which came air by evaporation, and the sky on the
one hand came into being from the aither, the sun
on the other hand from the fire, and the things
on the earth were compressed out of the others.'
This physical primacy was turned by Holderlin into
22
the spiritual aristocracy of "Vater Ather". The German
poet went one step further than Empedokles. The latter,
as far as we can tell, gave aither precedence only in a
time sense over the other elements. Holderlin, on the
other hand, lends the element a certain divine aristo¬
cracy of a moral nature. For him, it is a binding force
of a divine nature.
In the same way, as we have seen above, the element
(if we can so term it) Art is given a superior position
to the element Nature: it is "die Bliite, die Vollendung
der Natur". One can compare this with his statement, in
a letter to his brother dated 4th June 1799> "...daB
der Kunst- und Bildungstrieb mit alien seinen Modifika-
tionen and Abarten ein eigentlicher Dienst sei, den die
Menschen der Natur erweisen". j^Gr .St.A.6 / 1 ,p. 329«] Thus,
man serves Nature by perfecting it, bringing it to full
fruition. The two elements, Nature and Art, are "harmo¬
nised entgegengesetzt" in much the same way as Empedokles1
four elements and the two principles or forces Love and
Strife are juxtaposed. Each one "ersetzt den Mangel des
andera" in a similar fashion to that in which man com¬
plements woman. Each element must have a "Mangel", accord¬
ing to Holderlin, "um ganz das zu sein, was es beson—
deres sein kann". In other words, the very fact that
someone or something is someone or something particular
involves a "Mangel". Holderlin refers to this again in
the Frankfurt plan of his tragedy when he calls Empedo¬
kles "ein Todfeind aller einseitigen Existenz, und des-
wegen auch in wirklich schonen Verhaltnissen unbefriedigt,
unstat, leidend, bloB weil sie besondere Verhaltnisse
Empedokles' suicide has for Ilolderlin a related signi¬
ficance: again according to the Frankfurt plan, it is
sind it
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evidence of his desire "durch freiwilligen Tod sich mit
der unendlichen Natur zu vereinen", I Gr. St.A. k/1 , p. 1 ^4-7 •
The most important word there is "unendlich": Einpedolcles
rejects all that is "endlich" and "einseitig" and yearns
for the infinite and the whole. In the "Grund zum Empe-
dokles" he is described as "ein Geist..., der immer nach
Erfindung eines vollstandigen Ganzen strebte,,I Gr.St.
The stress on Nature in relation to Empedokles is of
some considerable significance also. We know what an im¬
portant r8le it plays in Holderlin's ideas, and it would
be Surprising if, considering their close affinity of
interest and viewpoint on most other matters, they did
not agree on this subject also. In fact, we have already
seen that Empedokles reaffirmed the need for trust in the
senses. This trust had been rejected by Parmenides and
was subsequently rejected by the majority of major philo¬
sophers in the European tradition, Descartes being per¬
haps the most extreme example. In ancient philosophy, the
opposition between the Stoics and the Epicureans symbo¬
lised the split in European man, between his mind and his
senses, the two being seen not as complementary faculties
of the same being but as deadly enemies fighting for con¬
trol over him. The Christian tradition in mediaeval
Europe strengthened this split and emphasised it.
I would like to suggest that Holderlin's great in¬
terest in Empedokles was largely due to the fact that
the Sicilian, above all the ancients, seriously attempted
to retain the integrity of man with all his faculties:
his system tries to embrace and bring into harmony man's
reason, his senses and the contents of his unconscious.
These three elements, when combined, make up the complete
and whole man - any bias against or rejection of one or
more of the three would lead, according to Empedokles
and Holderlin, to a distortion and a disabling "Einsei-
pii
tigkeit" . This distortion is described by Holderlin in
his description of the Germans towards the end of his
novel "Hyperion":
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. „.ich kann kein Volk mir denken, das zerriBner
ware, wie die Deutschen, Handwerker siehst du, aber
keine Menschen, Denker, aber keine Menschen, Prie-
ster, aber keine Menschen, Herrn und Knechte, Jungen
und gesetzte Leute, aber keine Menschen - ist das
nicht, vie ein Schlachtfeld, wo Hande und Arrae und
alle Glieder zerstuckelt untereinander liegen,
indessen das verg Sande zerrinnt?
This emphasis on the (re-)creation of the whole man is,
I would maintain, at the very centre of Holderlin's
thought. He lived at the end of a century whose intellec¬
tual life had been dominated to a large extent by a par¬
ticularly arid form of rationalism, materialism and scep¬
ticism. The Enlightenment had played a valuable r6le in
doing away with dark superstition (witch-hunts in the
17"th century spring to mind) and in re-awakening man's
intellectual curiosity about the world around him: it
had been the Age of Oedipus, if one likes to put it in
the most favourable light. What worried Holderlin and
others towards the end of the century was the neglect of
the Teiresias element. Eighteenth-century man was out of
balance: he had developed one part of himself - the
reason - to the exclusion of all else. Holderlin and the
so-called Romantics tried to redress the balance by em¬
phasising the other two thirds of the human make-up pre¬
viously neglected: the senses and the contents of the
unconscious. Their purpose was not to re.ject reason in
favour of old or new superstitions, but to re-create a
balance in the human psyche which had been impossible in
an age of universal scepticism, rationalism and atheism.
In fact, it is Holderlin's view that this balance had
ceased to exist (except in the case of exceptional indi¬
viduals) at the close of the golden age of ancient Greece.
Then, it had been destroyed when Plato, the most influ¬
ential thinker of his age, changed his mind in the
"Republic", rejected his previous ideas concerning the
'divine fury' of poets, the 'democratic' aspect of
anamnesis, etc., and became a rationalist and an Slitist
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(very possibly under the influence of the Athenian demo¬
cracy's treatment of Sokrates )^re jecting the senses and
the unconscious in favour of one only of man's faculties:
the Reason. No European thinker had subsequently succeeded
in re—uniting these three faculties harmoniously. Since
that time, mankind had gone from one extreme - blind
superstition - to the other - arid rationalism - without
being able to recover this lost unity. Perhaps only the
Christian Church, embracing as it does in its thought
everything from the rationalism of an Aquinas to the naive
mysticism of a Bohme, was able to hold western man to¬
gether, satisfying at least two aspects of the triad
(rejecting only the senses, in its official teaching at
least - in practice, it appealed very openly to the
senses in the colourful ritual of the Mass, etc., until
the Puritanical reaction of the Reformation put an end
to this aspect of Church life in much of Northern Europe.)
Thus, we see the central importance of Empedolcles for
Holderlin: he was the thinker who held the three faculties
together, the last defender of the whole man, "ein Tod-
feind aller einseitigen Existenz".
Before the onset of the Presokratic "Aufklarung", man's
existence had been dominated by only two of his faculties:
the senses and the unconscious. For metaphysics, he relied
upon the (supposedly) divine revelations of the priests,
the Teiresias figures whose pronouncements were not open
to question. The most intelligent and independently
minded of the Greeks found this situation unsatisfactory,
whereupon the third faculty — Reason — started to come
into its own. It is at this point that there arose the
unfortunate antagonism between reason and the other two
faculties which persists to the present day. One promi¬
nent aspect of this antagonism has been the ancient war
between art and philosophy. The great artists - Sophokles,
Dante, Holderlin, Beethoven, Wagner - have laid claim to
knowledge and wisdom unavailable to the philosophers.
This knowledge comes from the unconscious, the same source
yhich provided the Teiresias figures before the Greek
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Enlightenment with their revelations. Most philosophers
have refused to take account of these claims, with a few
exceptions such as Empedoltles, the young Plato, Schelling,
Heidegger. Of the exceptions mentioned, two were major
influences on Holderlin, one was his main philosophical ally,
and the fourth borrowed wholesale from Holderlin in
building his own system.
Empedokles was indeed one of the Presokratic philo¬
sophers. His system is in large measure based on that of
Parmenides, With the latter, the split between man's
Reason and his other faculties, between the philosophers
and the scientists on the one hand and the poets, priests
and mystics on the other, was well on its way. Parmenides
was in fact an out-and-out rationalist. Although he wrote
in what must be termed verse, by no stretch of the imagi¬
nation could he be called a poet.
Now, Empedokles largely accepted Parmenides' rational
system, as is reflected by his first poem *"J l & p L ^""D UJ ^
(first, at least, in a logical sense, if not chronolo¬
gically), One major point on which he disagreed with
Parmenides, as we have seen, is the matter of the senses.
With his reaffirmation of his trust in them, Empedokles
brought two faculties together: the Reason and the Senses.
With his second poem, ©t KoL0ai_pjilOL , he brought in the
third faculty, the Unconscious.
When we turn to Holderlin, we see that he was in a
similar position. He was preceded by a basically ratio¬
nalist tradition in European thought, from Descartes to
Eichte, comparable with the Presokratic tradition leading
up to Empedokles. Like Empedokles, Holderlin strove to
bring what was best and most important in this tradition
together with what was excluded from it, ie. the claims
of the senses and the unconscious. Thus, he can be seen
to occupy a parallel position in modern European thought
to that occupied by Empedokles in ancient Greece. His
early reading of the Sicilian philosopher/poet arguably
had a decisive influence on the whole of his life, up to
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and including (as we shall see) his ultimate mental break
down. It is very probable that he saw his own mission in
life as being parallel to that of Empedokles, Something
of this comes out in the last stanza of Holderlin's
short poem "Empedokles":
Doch heilig bist du mir, wie der Erde Macht,
Die dich hinwegnahm, kiihner Getoteter!
Und folgen mocht ich in die Tiefe,
Hielte die Liebe mich nicht,__dem Helden.
[Gsr.St.A. 1 /1 , p. 240J
Not only did Empedokles' philosophical system have,
in my view, a profound influence on Holderlin's thought;
not only did his personal fate come to serve as some¬
thing of a model, as I hope to show, for how Holderlin
saw his own life developing: it can even be said that
the entire ambience and general style of his later poetry
is consciously or unconsciously influenced by Empedokles1
poems. For example, one of the most prominent features
of Empedokles1 style is his presentation of metaphysical
and scientific abstraction in a mythological guise, as
in Fragment 6 (Aetius I,3>20):
t4 TtV-yfoO'V pt^iX^ctfoL ITp^ToV IcKoVG
2-e^C, TG <jf>frp£cr (^loC, Ay) 'C,
S^Kp-voi^ 'TfeyyGL kpo-D-Kiojo-oL f^poretor,
For the roots of all things first hear:
Shining Zeus and life—bringing Hera and Aidoneus
And Nestis who with her tears fills the springs
of mortals with water.
Here, the four mythological figures Zeus, Hera, Aido¬
neus and Nestis stand for the four elements Fire, Air,
Earth and Water, 27
One is familiar with this approach from Holderlin's
poems: "Vater Ather", "der Weingott" and so on. In the
German poet, however, it is a slightly different proce¬
dure, in that his mythological figures are, as a rule,
used more as complex symbols with at least two possible
meanings or interpretations, rather than as simple alle¬
gorical figures representing one specific substance or
entity. In some cases, one can be fairly sure that Hoi—
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derlin is using his symbol in a purposely dualist manner,
as in the case of the Christ/Dionysos figure. In others,
as in "Friedensfeier" with its "Fiirst des Fests", the
symbolism is of such a vague and multiple character that
there is no possibility of pinning it down with any
degree of certainty to meanings X,Y and Z, and this sug¬
gests to me that in these cases the symbol has taken
charge of the poet, rather than the latter using the sym¬
bol in a conscious manner, and has come flooding up from
his unconscious in an irresistible surge.28 The signifi¬
cance of such symbols can best be clarified by Jungian
psychoanalysis rather than by the philosopher or the
scholar. In view of the paramount importance of the un¬
conscious and its contents in the Holderlinian/Empedoklean
system, and the r8le given by them to the poet in re¬
vealing these contents, the parts of Holderlin's work in
which these symbols appear must be regarded as the most
important and significant by anyone who is willing to
take his metaphysical claims at all seriously. The dif¬
ficulty lies, perhaps, here as in the work of other art¬
ists, in differentiating between the genuine unconscious
inspirations and the products of the artist's conscious
mind, which are necessarily of far less interest and
significance from a metaphysical point of view.
Thus, we come back to the idea of the ultimate Truth(-s)
about reality being resident in the Unconscious. The
poet's special significance lies in his unique and pri-
veleged access to the contents of the Unconscious. This
is, by definition, not an access that can be consciously
forced. The poet's visions appear out of the Unconscious
or they do not appear. This point is central to an ade¬
quate understanding of Holderlin's tragedy, "der Tod des
Empedokles", to which we now turn.
As Holderlin's play opens, we find Empedokles at the
end of his career. We arrive on the scene after his




Die Gotter seine Kraft von ihm genommen,
Seit jenem Tage, da der trunlcne Mann
Vor allem Volk sich einen Gott cenannt,
[Gr.St.A. 4/1 ,p. 1o7]
This is the central situation. Its accuracy from a
historical point of view is dubious, relying as it does
on what Burnet describes as "a malicious version of a
tale set on foot by his adherents that he held been
snatched up to heaven in the night" ^ for the final d&-
nouement. However, it is largely irrelevant from an in¬
tellectual point of view how accurate or inaccurate the
historical background of the play is * Holderlin chose to
write his play about Empedokles because Empedokles had
been such a great intellectual influence on him, because
he saw himself in general terms as having a similar r8le
in German history and intellectual life to that played
by Empedokles in ancient Greece, and because Empedokles1
death by throwing himself into the volcano presented him
with a valuable opportunity for philosophical symbolism.
Otherwise, he might just as easily have made his hero
Goethe or (anachronistically) Coleridge or Rimbaud: the
poet deserted by the gods who inspired him is a timeless
figure - Holderlin's Empedokles is simply the most con¬
venient representative of this species for the poet's
purposes.
Another unusual salient feature of Empedokles' case,
apart from the three mentioned above, is the question of
him declaring himself a god. This is apparently histori¬
cally accurate.This declaration was, according to
Holderlin's version, the occasion for the gods (and with
them his inspired visions) desercing him. Empedokles1
mistake, his act of "hubris", had been in transferring
the epithet "divine" from his visions, which deserved
them, to himself, who did not, being their mere vessel.
Or to put it in Homeric terms: he foolishly transferred
stress from the contents of his to those of his
mortal G-v'ja.oCj and confused the two. His visions had pre-
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viously come welling up out of liis • When he ne¬
glected the latter in favour of his mortal mind and
reason, the well dried up:
0 bei den heilgen Brunnen, wo sich still
Die Wasser sammeln, und die Durstenden
Am heiflen Tage sich verjiingen! in mir,
In mir, ihr Quellen des Lebens, stromtet ihr einst
Aus Tiefen der Welt zusammen und es kamen
Die Diirstenden zu mir — vertrocknet bin
Ich nun, und nimmer freun die Sterblichen
Sich meiner - bin ich ganz allein? und ist
Es Nacht hier oben auch am Tage? weh!
Der hohers, denn ein sterblich Auge, sah,
Der Blindgeschlagne tastet nun umher -
WO S G id mc»T no (1.r\ +" f ar»9
Empedokles is well aware of his having deserved this
punishment:
Es ist vorbei
Und du, verbirg dirs nicht! du hast
Es selbst verschuldet, armer Tantalus,
Das Heiligtum hast du geschandet, hast
Mit frechem Stolz den schonen Bund entzweit,
Elender! als die Genien der Welt
Voll Liebe sich in dir vergaBen, dachst du
An dich und wahntest karger Tor, an dich
Die Glitigen verkauft, daB sie dir,
Die Himmlischen. wie blode Knechte dienten!
This is a situation with which we are familiar from
our Sophokles chapter: a hero of exceptional qualities
coming to grief due to one fatal mistake, realising and
accepting his own responsibility for the ensuing situa¬
tion, and taking the full consequences upon himself. In
this respect, Holderlin's tragedy is clearly modelled
directly upon Sophokles1 plays, in particular perhaps
"Oedipus Tyrannos", If Oedipus' fault is depicted in
Sophokles' play as an unwitting sin against Divine Law.
Empedokles in Holderlin's play is seen as committing a
crime against Nature:
Ich sollt es nicht aussprechen, heilge Natur!
Jungfrauliche, die dem rohen Sinn entflieht!
Verachtet hab ich dich und mich allein
Zum Herrn gesetzt, ein iibermutiger
Barbar! an eurer Einfalt hielt ich euch,
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Ihr reinen immerjugendlichen Machte!
Die mich mit Freud erzogen, inich mit Wonne genahrt,
Und weil ihr immergleich mir wiederkehrtet,
Ihr Guten, ehrt ich eure Seele nicht!
Ich kannt es ja, ich hatt es ausgelernt,
Das Leben der Natur, wie sollt es mir
Noch heilig sein, wie einst! Die Gotter waren
Mir dienstbar nun geworden, ich allein
War Gott, und sprachs im frechen Stolz heraus.
0 glaub es mir, ich ware lieber nicht
Geboren!
It is possible that this difference in emphasis, Divine
Law as against Nature, may be due to the two tragedians'
respective philosophical roots in the works of Herakleitos
and Empedokles, the latter being more notable for his
interest in Nature. However that may be, this section,
which reads almost like an attack on Fichte's philosophy
of nature, shows us the central dilemma of the philoso¬
pher/poet: he has cut himself off from his "Ursprung".
He as an individual has committed the same sin as Holder-
lin describes mankind in general as perpetrating in the
seventh stanza of "der Rhein":
Doch nimmer, nimmer vergiBt ers.
Denn eher muB die Wohnung vergehn,
Und die Satzung und zum Unbild werden
Der Tag der Menschen, ehe vergessen
Ein solcher diirfte den Ursprung
Und die reine Stimme der Jugend.
Wer war es, der zuerst
Die Liebesbande verderbt
Und Stricke von ihnen gemacht hat?
Dann h.aben des eigenen Rechts
Und gewiB des himmlischen Feuers
Gespottet die Trotzigen, dann erst
Die sterblichen Pfade verachtend
Verwegnes erwahlt
Und den sn getrachtet.
The key phrase in that stanza is "des eigenen Rechts":
mankind has committed an act of hubris and taken too much
on itself by imposing its own will on Nature and at the
same time forgetting its own dependence on and provenance
from Her. Such spurious independence can only end in di¬
saster, as it did in Empedokles1 (and Oedipus') case.
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Empedokles, aware of his own superiority among man¬
kind and mankind's superiority in Creation, has drawn
a false conclusion: that he must therefore be God, if
there is a God, because he is the most superior element
in Creation! He is another Oedipus figure, but even
greater than Sophokles 1 hero, for Empedolcles is not only
a man of great intellectual powers like Oedipus - he
combines the latter's best qualities with those of a
Teiresias, being in addition an inspired poet.
Now, Empedokles' mistake, as he himself subsequently
realises, is to think that the top end of Creation, the
ultimate development, is the Absolute or God (this is
the Hegelian position, with the Absolute at the top of
a great pyramid), whereas in fact the Absolute or God
is at the bottom (or, more accurately: the beginning),
at the "Ursprung". Put another way: God i_s the "Ursprung" .
Empedokles was aware (or believed) that his conscious
mind or, in Homeric terminology, his was more
highly developed than that of any of his contemporaries
or predecessors. What he forgot was that the most valu¬
able knowledge he was able to hand on to others was not
the result of the workings of his conscious mind but a
revelation from his unconscious, This revelation came
from .... the "Ursprung", Nature the gods, God. Once he
rejected (or neglected) the latter, this source dried
up, with the results that Hermokrates describes:
Es haben ihn die Gotter sehr geliebt.
Doch nicht ist er der Erste, den sie drauf
Hinab in sinnenlose Nacht verstofien,
Vom Gipfel ihres gutigen Vertrauns,
Weil er des Unterschieds zu sehr vergafl
Im tibergrofien Gltick, und sich allein
Nur fiihlte; so erging es ihm, er ist
Mit grenzenl " ' ' aft...
Empedokles himself describes his unenviable situation
in even more graphic terms:
Ach! ich der allverlassene, lebt ich nicht
Mit dieser heilgen Erd und diesem Licht
Und dir, von dem die Seele nimmer laBt,
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0 Vator Aether! und alien Lebenden
In einigem gegenwartigen Olymp? -
Nun wein ich, wie ein AusgestoBener,
Und nirgend mag ich bleiben...
[jGr.St.A.4/1 , pp. 18-1 9^1
This would serve as a very adequate description of
Adam's plight after he was ejected from the Garden of
Eden. Empedokles• situation is in fact exactly parallel:
he also has eaten of the fruit of the tree of knowledge
and trodden on forbidden territory. The Christian ele¬
ments in the tragedy, although not explicit, are too
marked to be coincidental. Apart from the parallel with
Adam, there is also a strong similarity between the hero's
predicament and the story of Christ's persecution and
death. Empedokles, in the first version at least, is pur¬
sued by the Pharisee-like figures of Kritias and Hermo-
krates who attempt to turn the people away from him. Her-
mokrates makes their intention clear as early as the
second scene:
...Sie sollen Zeugen sein
Des Fluches, den ich ihm verkiindige,
Und ihn verstoBen in die ode Wildnis,
Damit er nimmerwiederkelirend dort
Die bose Stunde biifie, da er sich
Zum Gott gemacht. __
[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.12j
The sacrifice element in Empedokles' suicide is
another parallel with Christ's story. Empedokles himself
stresses this element:
Ihr spannt das Opfertier vom Pfluge los
Und nimmer triffts der Stachel seines Treibers.
So schonet meiner auch; entwlirdiget
Mein Leiden mir mit boser Rede nicht,
Denn heilig ists,..,
jGr.St.A.4/1 , p . 24.]
The reasons for the two sacrifices are, on the face
of it, different. Christ died to release mankind from its
sins. However, another reason for His death is given in
John 4,31-8; Luther, in his translation, glosses the pas¬
sage as follows:
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Seine Speise ist des Vaters willen than. Des
Vaters willen aber ist/das durch sein leiden das
Evangeliura in alle welt gepredigt wiirde. Das war
nu furhanden/Gleich wie da zumal die Erndte nahe
war.
This is nearer to Empedokles' reason, which is explained
by him in Act II, Scene 4, where he rebukes the people:
0 lieber Undank! gab ich doch genug
Wovon ihr leben moget. Ihr diirft leben
So lang ihr Othem habt: ich nicht, Es mufl
Bei Zeiten weg, durch wen der Geist geredet,
Es offenbart die gottliche Natur
Sich gottlich oft durch Menschen, so erkennt
Das vielversuchende Geschlecht sie wieder,
Doch hat der Sterbliche, dem sie das Herz
Mit ihrer Wonne fiillte, sie verktindet,
0 lafit sie dann zerbrechen das GefaB,
Damit es nicht zu andrem Brauche dien',
Und Gottliches zum Menschenwerke werde,.,
...Denn anders ziemt es nicht fur ihn, vor dem
In todesfroher Stund am heiligen Tage
Das Gottliche den Schleier abgeworfen-
Den Licht und Erde liebten, dem der Geist,
Der Geist der Welt den eignen Geist erweckte
In dem sie sim}, zu dem ich sterbgnd kehre.34
[Gr.St.A.4/1,pp.73-4J
The very human considerations which move Empedokles,
his wish not to become or be seen to be unworthy of the
divine force, which once possessed him and used him,
could scarcely apply to the Son of God. However, they
do suggest a parallel with Ilolderlin himself: Empedokles 1
suicide, Holderlin's madness, Rimbaud's flight to Africa
and the East can all be seen as reactions to the same
phenomenon, the crisis described in Holderlin's tragedy.
Empedokles has outlived his purpose and would rather die
than endanger his achievements by serving a lower one.
He is not motivated by any overweaning pride or conceit:
he is concerned lest his previous work and (above all)
revelations be subject to scepticism and disbelief if
the people see his new, uninspired self. His usefulness
is at an end, so he prefers to leave the scene, espe¬
cially as death holds no terrors for him. As the last
line above indicates, he feels he is simply returning at
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last to his "Ursprung", having escaped the "wheel of
birth" and the necessity for any further reincarnations.
It is merely his physical body and his conscious mind
which will die. His soul (or "daemon") will be united with
God or "der Geist der Welt".
Furthermore, as Holderlin states in the Frankfurt
plan, "er betrachtet Jjseinen TocTj als eine Notwendigkeit,
die aus seinem innersten Wesen folge " |llr.St.A,4/l , p. 1 487]
In the same plan, Holderlin mentions "Ehre und Liebe" as
"die einzigen Bande, die ihn ans Wirkliche kniipfen" |"~Gr.
St.A.4/1 ,p.1477] . His rejection by the people puts an end
to even that tie, as Pausanias points out at the end of
the First "Fassung":
0 bei den Seligen! verdamme nicht
Den Herrlichen, dem seine Ehre so
Zum Ungliick ward
Der sterben mufi, weil er zu schon gelebt,
Weil ihn zu sehr die Gotter alle liebten.
Denn wird ein anderer, denn er, geschmaht,
So ists zu tilgen, aber er, wenn ihm
was kann der Gottersohn?
Unendlich trifft es den Unendlichen.
Ach niemals ward ein edler Angesicht
Emporender beleidiget! ich muflt
Es sehn,...
j^Gr.St.A.4/1 , p . 8 5TJ
This is not to say that Empedokles does not go through
some Hamlet- (and Christ-)liloe hesitations on the way to
his death, but his ultimate attitude is one of calm ac¬
ceptance. The whole gamut of his emotions and thoughts on
the subject are indicated in his soliloquy in Act II,
Scene 6:
Ha! Jupiter Befreier! naher tritt
Und naher meine Stund und vom Gekliifte
Kbmrrrt; schon der traute Bote meiner Nacht
Der Abendwind zu mir, der Liebesbote.
Es wird! gereift ists! o nun schlage, Herz,
Und rege deine Wellen, ist der Geist
Doch tiber dir wie leuchtendes Gestirn,
Indes des Himmels heimatlos Gewolk
Das immer fliichtige voruber wandelt.
Wie ist mir? staunen muB ich noch, als fing'
Ich erst zu leben an, denn all ists anders,
Und jetzt erst bin ich, bin - und darum wars,
- 84 -
Dafl in der frommen Ruhe dich so oft,
Du MiiBiger, ein Sehnen uberfiel?
0 daruin ward das Leben dir so leicht,
DaB du des Uberwinders Freuden all
In Finer vol1en Tat am Ende fandest?
[Gr.St.A.4/1 ,p.80T]
He then gives his (and, I would maintain, Holderlin's)
final and deepest thoughts on the subject of death. We
note that he connects it closely with Nature and with
what would appear to be a state of Dionysian intoxication:
... Sterben? nur ins Dunlcel ists
Ein Schritt, und sehen mocKst du doch, mein Auge!
Du hast mir ausgedient, dienstfertiges!
Es mufl die Nacht itzt eine Weile mir
Das Haupt umschatten. Aber freudig quillt
Aus mutger Brust die Flamme. Schauderndes
Verlangen! ¥as? am Tod entziindet mir
Das 4eben sich zuletzt? und reichest du
Den Schreckensbecher, mir, den garenden,
Natur! damit dein Sanger noch aus ihm
Die letzte der Begeisterungen trinke!
[Gr.St.A.4/1,pp.80-Uj
He then concludes, in a calmer tone:
Zufrieden bin ichs, suche nun nichts mehr
Denn meine Opferstatte, Wohl ist mir...
[Gr.St.A. 4/1 , p . 81~[|
I dwell at such great length on Empedokles1 death and
his own attitude towards it in the play because I feel
convinced that Holderlin is expressing his own heart¬
felt sentiments through his main character, and that the
latter's attitude towards his death is in reality a re¬
presentation not only of Holderlin's attitude to death
as such, but also to his own impending fate.
Several elements of a parallel nature support this
conclusion. Firstly, there is the element of sacrifice:
Empedokles kills himself largely in order to benefit the
people; Holderlin risks and eventually loses his sanity
so that mankind might have the benefit of the visions
that emerge from his Unconscious at the moment of greatest
risk. The poet must plunge so deep into his Unconscious
(if his work is to have the value he intends) that there
is always the risk that he will be unable to come back
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out of it. The resultant take-over of the conscious mind
by the unconscious, and even the possible complete de¬
struction of the former by the latter, was the risk for
Ilolderlin, and is in fact what eventually occurred. In
twentieth-century terminology, Holderlin's mind fell into
a psychotic condition.
Holderlin showed time and again in the years preceding
his definitive madness that he was aware of this risk, but
considered the benefits of his poetic activity for mankind
to outweigh the personal danger. In the initial four
lines of the first version of "Patmos", he expresses it
thus :
Nah ist
Und schwer zu fassen der Gott.
Wo aber Gefahr ist, wachst
Das Rettende auch.
rbr.St.A.2/1,p. 165
Holderlin's sacrifice of his sanity, then, was a
sacrifice for the people as was Empedokles1 suicide.
There is no evidence that Ilolderlin felt deserted by the
gods and then consciously decided to become mad. His mind
simply snapped when the strain became too much - the
strain of constant "Selbstvertiefung", the strain of
loneliness, the strain of the personal fates of Diotima
and Sinclair, the strain of his superhuman striving after
excellence, after the Absolute. In this sense, there is
a slight difference between the two men's respective
sacrifices, but the general principle remains the same.
The second parallel, which we have already discussed,
is that between their rSles in their respective cultures
and societies. This rfile, that of the philosopher/seer
(and democratic politician), with the more precise simi¬
larity of historical position we have seen, is something
of which Iiolderlin showed himself to be well aware, as I
have tried to show.
Thirdly, there is the symbolic significance of the
manner of Empedokles1 suicide. The act of hurling himself
into the volcano is at one level a symbolic representa*
1
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tion of Empedokles returning to the "Ursprung", to the
original chaos before it all began. If one is to take the
Cf \ /->
KoCu 1ZJL'V seriously, he is also pointing out the way
the whole of the universe is destined to develop and end.
Also, this original chaos has marked similarities with
the state of affairs inside the mind of a madman: Holder-
lin's leap into insanity is a direct parallel to Empedo¬
kles 1 leap into the volcano.
At another level, one can scarcely ignore the possibi¬
lity of a straightforward Freudian interpretation of the
leap: 33he crater would then be seen as a symbol for the
female vagina, the leap as either a return to the womb
or a representation of the sexual act - the former being
perhaps more likely in view of the traditional concept
of 'Mother Earth'.
Furthermore, the element that Empedokles lacked after
the gods deserted him was the "female" element of intui¬
tion, inspiration - what Diotima represented for Hyperion
(and his creator). Empedokles was left with the workings
of his conscious mind, his reason, and this was inade¬
quate without its complement and dialectical opposite,
the inspirational, unconscious element. The volcano and
its contents can be seen as a symbolic representation of
this element.
The union of the two dialectically opposed elements
and its significance is described by Holderlin in the
"Grund zum Empedokles":
Dies Geflihl gehort vielleicht zum hochsten,was
gefiihlt werden kann, wenn beide Entgegensetzte,
der verallgemeinerte geistig lebendige kiinstlich
rein aorgische Mensch und die Wohlgestalt der
Natur sich begegnen. Dies Gefiihl gehort vielleicht
zum hochsten, was der Mensch erfahren kann, denn
die jetztige Ilarmonie mahnt ihn an das vormaiige
umgekehrte reine Verhaltnis, und er fiihlt sich
und die Natur zweifach, und die Verbindung ist
unendlicher.
jGr.St.A.^/1 ,p. I 53 •_]
This is the reaching of the Absolute. As Holderlin
goes on to explain, the polarity and dialectical oppo-
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sition of the two factors or forces, "das Aorgische" and
"das Besondere" (roughly equivalent to the and the ev) ,
reach a "Versohnung" in "der Tod des Einzelnen, derjenige
Moment, wo das Organische seine Ichheit.... |~und**J das
Aorgische seine Allgemeinheit...,ablegt..." fGr.St.A.4/1,
P«153^J. This is Holderlin's (and Schelling's) solution
to the age-old dilemma of European thought: how to recon¬
cile and relate the individual to the universe, the sub¬
ject to the object. It may seem paradoxical to some that
this "Versohnung" should take place at the moment of
death, but it is a feature of both the Christian and the
Platonist traditions (both of which come together in
European Romanticism) to see death in a positive light,:
Holderlin, Novalis, Blake, Wagner, among others, wrote
works where death is treated as not only a merciful re¬
lease, but as a gateway to great things. Life is asso¬
ciated with the Day: sobriety, self-control, self-limita¬
tion, constriction; Death is equated with the Night: Love,
33
passion, the daemonic, ecstasy, self-expansion, release.
The ethos is summed up in a stanza from Clemens Brentano1s
early poem "Wenn der Sturm das Meer umschlinget...":
In uns selbst sind wir verloren,
Bange Fesseln uns beengen,
SchloB und Riegel muB zersprengen,
Nur im Tode wird geboren.^
This attitude is not in the least pessimistic or nihi¬
listic if one assumes the existence of an after-life.
Holderlin gives a vivid description of this Night ele¬
ment in the following lines from "Brot und Wein":
...die Schwarmerische, die Nacht kommt,
Voll mit Sternen und wohl wenig bekiimmert um uns,
Glanzt die Erstaunende dort, die Fremdlingin unter
den Menschen,
liber Gebirgshohn traurig und prachtig herauf.
Wunderbar ist die Gunst der Hocherhabnen und niemand
WeiB, von wannen und was einem geschielSt von ihr.
So bewegt sie die Welt und die hoffende Seele der
Menschen,
Selbst kein Weiser verstoht, was sie bereitet,
denn so
Will es der oberste Gott, der sehr dich liebet, und
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darum
1st noch lieber, vie sie, dir der besonnene Tag.
Aber zuweilen liebt auch klares Auge den Schatten
Und versuchet zu Lust, eh es die Not ist, den
Schlaf,
Oder es bliclct auch gern ein treuer Mann in die
Nacht hin,
Ja, es ziemet sich, ihr Kranze zu weihn und Gesangj
Weil den Irrenden sie geheiliget ist und den Toten,
Selber aber besteht. ewis-. in freiestem Geist.
The second last line shows us the close connection in
Holderlin's mind between "die Nacht" or the daemonic on
the one hand and madness and death on the other - in the
context, we can safely assume, I feel, that "Irrenden"
implies "Irren" - and hence between madness and death
themselves. This shows us an even closer connection be¬
tween the fates of Empedokles and Holderlin, fates which
bring both of them equally within the realm of "die Schwan-
merische, die Nacht".
This passage also shows us clearly the neutral char¬
acter of the Night, which is "wohl wenig bektiminert um
uns". She can, however, affect us drastically either for
good or ill, depending on the situation and on how she is
treated, being at her most dangerous when severely re¬
pressed as in the case of political tyranny of the sort
Hyperion tried to oppose. In this sense, it is a fore¬
runner of Freud's "libido".55
This Day/Night antithesis is, I would suggest, a very
similar theory to that of Empedokles concerning Love and
Strife, in that neither half of the antithesis is right
or good while the other is wrong or bad. It should be
noted that if any direct parallel were to be drawn (and
this would have its difficulties), then Day must surely
be equated with Strife, not Loves the day is the element
of the particular, and hence of rivalry between various
particulars. The "Gipfel der Zeit", the era where Love
rules, is an age when individuals lose sight of their
particularity or uniqueness, losing themselves rather in
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a Dionysian celebration of community, stressing what they
have in common with one another.
Holderlin seems to have been particularly concerned
with this question of the Day/Night antithesis between
1798, when he was working on "der Tod des Empedokles" and
his main philosophical essays and 1800, around the time
of the composition of "Brot und Vein". The very title of
this poem, quite apart from any religious reference, indi¬
cates the dualism between the .sobriety of the Day ("Brot")
and the ecstasy of the Night ("Vein"). The paradox or
antithesis is expressed concisely in the following lines:
■«..es sei urn Mittag oder es gehe
Bis in die Mitternacht, immer bestehet ein Mafi,
Allen gemein, doch ipglichem 1st eignes beschieden.
JGr.St.A.2/1 , p.9 iTJ
For Holderlin, the great difficulty lies in this prob¬
lem of how to reconcile the claims of "das Aorgische",
with the threatened submersion of the individual "Ich",
and the post-Kantian (and French revolutionary) enthu¬
siasm for personal freedom and self-expression. In philo¬
sophical terms, this was the conflict between "Dogmatis-
mus" and "Kriticismus". In the context of ancient philo¬
sophy, Empedokles was faced with precisely the same prob¬
lem: in Parmenides' system the individual "Ich" and man's
spirituality were swamped in the vastness and immutability
of the universe; Empedokles' life work (as, I believe,
Holderlin was aware) was an attempt to reconcile this
monist system with the claims of the individual soul, as
represented in the Orphic and Pythagorean traditions. In
Holderlin's poem, the ultimate "Versohnung" is to be
accomplished (in "Hesperien") by Dionysos:
Ja! sie sagen mit Kecht, er sohne den Tag mit der
Nacht aua...
[Gr.St.A. 2/1 , p. 9^*1
Thus, Dionysos is the "metaprinciple", but he is only
the "Fackelschwinger", "des Hochsten Sohn" - here the
Christ/Dionysos dualism comes into play - and here we see
clearly how the Empedoklean Love/Strife regime, which
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concerned Aristotle, is put into perspective as a system
(or universe) created by and ultimately under the aegis
of "der Hochste", apparently similar to or identical with
the God of the Christians.
In the "Grund zum Empedokles", it is Death that recon¬
ciles Day and Night; in "Brot und Vein", it is Dionysos
who performs the same function. This may seem at first
sight contradictory. However, we have already seen how
Holderlin associates with one another the ideas of death,
madness, ecstasy. At the same time, we have seen how one
side of the dualism - Night — is in itself associated with
these ideas. Thus, the final "Versohnung" would appear to
favour Night rather than Day. Again, we have already seen
how Night must be equated with Empedokles' Love, Day with
Strife. So we find the claim for Love's primacy over
Strife confirmed by this further analysis. We come in the
end to the following equation:
Love = Death = Madness = Ecstasy = Dionysos = "des Hochsten
Sohn".
Hence, the submersion of the "Ich" in the "Gipfel der
Zeit" is not to be equated with the submission to an ar¬
tificial moral code and repression of "das Damonische"
associated with the Day (or Strife). It is rather an ecs¬
tatic, passionate, joyful and voluntary union —
denn wir sind herzlos, Schatten, bis unser
Vater Aether erkanpt jeden und alljgn gehort.
[&r.St.A.2/1,p.95j
Thus, the "Gipfel der Zeit" is not so much the Rule of
Love as the occurrence of Love. The loneliness and isola¬
tion of the Rule of Strife or Day is temporarily abolished.
The "Gipfel der Zeit" or 'Rule' of Love is, among other
things, a communal escape from individual loneliness and
isolation. The community is tied together by the consi¬
derations detailed by Holderlin in his essay "tjber Reli¬
gion" :
Weder aus sich selbst allein, noch einzig aus den
Gegenstanden, die ihn umgeben, kann der Mensch
erfahren, daB mehr als Waschinengang, daB ein Geist^
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ein Gott, 1st in der Welt, aber w ohl in einer
lebendigeren, iiber die Notdurft erhabnen Beziehung,
in der er stehet mit dein, was ihn umgibt.
Und jeder hatte demnach seinen eigenen Gott, in—
soferne jeder seine eigene Sphare hat, in der er
wirkt und die er erfahrt, und nur insoferne mehrere
Menschen eine gemeinschaftliche Sphare haben, in
der sie menschlich, d.h. iiber die Notdurft erhaben
wirken und leiden, nur insoferne haben sie eine
gemeinschaftliche Gottheit; und wenn es eine Sphare
gibt, in der alle zugleich leben, und mit der sie
in mehr als notdiirftiger Beziehung sich ftihlen,
dann, aber auch nur insoferne, haben sie alle eine
gemeinschaftlic
This bond, then, stems from a commonly accepted spiri¬
tual belief of a religious nature. We have seen how the
poet's vocation is exercised, according to Holderlin, by
virtue of a bond between the "Geist" of the poet and the
"Geist der Welt", I believe it is Holderlin's contention
that something similar occurs, except on a far more mas¬
sive scale, at the "Gipfel der Zeit", The GKcrfotcn^of the
poet is experienced by the whole community.^6 This is the
state of affairs that Empedokles had been striving to
achieve in Akragas. We shall now consider his rftle in
this respect, and try to draw some general conclusions
both as relates to Holderlin's ideas and activities and
with regard to more general theories of political philo-
We have already seen the r8le Holderlin ascribed to
Dionysos in preparing the "Gipfel der Zeit": he is the
"Fackelschwinger" and "der gemeinsame Gott" ("gemeinsam"
in the sense that he creates a "Gemeinschaft"), Dionysos
stands for intoxication and every type of ecstatic exper¬
ience in Greek mythology. He is the god of tragedy, and
we have seen, in our Sophokles chapter, the importance
Holderlin gave to that branch of literature. He was also
the god of wine, and in "Stuttgart" we find the line:
"Und den eigene "' * ^ ie Perlen, der Wein."
luded to in the short poem "Empedokles" from which we
sophy.
This reference to Cleopatra's extravagance (also al—
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have already quoted) has the deeper symbolic significance
that the ecstatic "Rausch" of a Diorxysian experience of
■whatever type leads those involved to forget their indi¬
viduality or "Ich" and join together in a communal vision
of the Absolute - the type of result that can ensue after
(or during) an adequate performance of a Sophoklean or
Shakespearean tragedy or a Wagnerian music drama.
This, then, is the rSle of Dionysos, or the Dionysian
element in life: to break down barriers between indivi¬
duals, dissolve differences and animosities, and create
a community held together by their common experience and
acceptance of the spiritual content of the event. This is
the effect that Empedokles had on the "Agrigenter11. We
can now see this phenomenon as evaluated by two characters
in Holderlin's play, each with a very different point of
view. Firstly, a favourable account from Panthea:
...dann tritt er auch
Heraus ins Volk, an Tagen, wo die Menge
Sich iiberbraust und eines Machtigern
Der unentschlossene Tumult bedarf,
Da herrscht er dann, der herrliche Pilot
Und hilft hinaus und wenn sie dann erst recht
Genug ihn sehn, des immerfremden Manns sich
Gewohnen mochten, ehe sies gewahren,
1st er hinweg,.. —.
jjGr.St.A.^/1 ,p.6j
And the opposite view from Kritias:
Das Volk ist trunken, wie er selber ist.
Sie horen kein Gesetz, und keine Not
Und keinen Richter; die Gebrauche sind
Von unverstandlichem Gebrause gleich
Den friedlichen Gestaden iiberschwemmt.
Ein wildes Fest sind alle Tage worden,
Ein Fest fur alle Feste und der Gotter
Bescheidne Feiertage haben sich
In eins verloren, allverdunkelnd hiillt
Der Zauberer den Himmel und die Erd
Ins Ungewitter, das er uns geinacht,
Und siehet zu und freut sich seines Geists
In seiner StiJ.len Halle.
[Gr.St.A.4/1 ,p. 1 oTI
Kritias represents the forces of the Day: order, the
rule of law, clear distinctions, sobriety. lie argues for
control and repression (in the neutral sense) of the
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people. Like Dos toyevslcy * s Grand Inquisitor, in "the Bro¬
thers Karamasov", he does not think the masses can be
trusted to be free, but must be controlled and regulated
by sober, calculating lawgivers. This is the point of view
that Plato came round to supporting in his old age, as of
"the Republic".
Kritias sees Empedokles as a demagogue who is de¬
stroying the fabric and framework of orcfered society. - This
is what Kritias sees as the most important element in
civil life: the framework, the laws. Empedokles, on the
other hand, is only interested in the content, in the
people themselves. He knows them thoroughly. He knows
their needs and aspirations, spiritual and emotional, and
how to supply these needs. He is a "Pilot" who guides
them on the correct path, and is able to do so thanks to
their trust in him. Kritias complains that Empedokles
makes the people ignore laws and customs. Like Sophokles'
Kreon, he stands for the established customs of human so¬
ciety as against divinely inspired acts and moral codes.
He rejects the Dionysian element completely. To him,
"trunken" is a term of abuse.^7
What Kritias does not understand is the fact that it
is Empedokles1 r8le to direct the daemonic forces in
human nature in the direction?£ove rather than Strife.
Kritias wants to repress the daemonic; Empedokles wants
to channel it. Needless to say, the problematics of Hol-
derlin's play should not be regarded as his scholarly con¬
tribution to Empedoklean studies, but rather asadiscussion
of problems which absorbed him personally and which he
regarded as permanently relevant to human society per
se.
As we have seen, Hermokrates amd Kritias, in the first
version of the play, stand for cold reason and the re¬
pression of the passions. This, in Holderlin's view (as
expressed through his main character), is dangerous. His
warning is of universal application:
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"0 gebt euch der Natur, eh sie eudi nimmt!"
[Gr.St.A.4/1fp.65j
The danger lies in the possibility of an explosion
of the repressed forces, as when Hyperion's army runs
riot in the novel.
Nature is the force that is apostrophised throughout
the Empedokles tragedy, moreso possibly than in any
other work by Holderlin. It is his failure to retain a
humble attitude towards Her that is Empedokles' sin. He
thought he was superior to Her, and this brought his
ruin. The futility of opposing the workings of Nature
is expressed by Empedokles when Pausanias laments at the
thought of Empedokles' death:
Vergehn? ist doch
Das Bleiben, gleich dem Strome den der Frost
Gefesselt. Toricht Wesen! schlaft und halt
Der heilge Lebensgeist denn irgendwo,
DaB du ihn binden mochtest, du den Reinen?
Es angstiget der Immerfreudige
Dir niemals in Gefangnissen sich ab,
Und zaudert hoffungslos auf seiner Stelle,
Fragst du, wohin? Die Wonnen einer Welt
MuB er durchwandern. und er endet nicht.
jGr.St.A.4/1,p.79j
This is the process described by Holderlin in his
essay "das Werden im Vergehen":
...in eben dem Momente und Grade, worin sich
das Bestehende auflost, fiihlt sich auch das
Neueintretende, Jugendliche, Mbgliche.
Kh?.St.A. 4/l,p.282~J
The dynamic element, the part which brings about
change, is "das Mogliche", which pushes itself into rea¬
lity, displacing "das Wirkliche", which goes into "Auf-
losung" and ceases to have any effect. The permament fac¬
tor in the situation is the element of "Beziehungen und
Krafte" (Love and Strife). It is my belief that Holderlin
wrote this essay very much under the spell of Presokratic
philosophy, in particular Herakleitos and Empedokles. We
have seen how Holderlin would have absorbed Herakleitean
and other sources
ideas through Sophokles). The flux idea is very Herakl.ei—
tean. Pa.rmen.ides opposed Herakleitos on this issue,
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stressing rather the element of stability in the universe.
Empedokles can be seen as a reconciler of these two op¬
posed views. He retained much of Parmenides* ideas while
at the same time allowing for the element of change, ac¬
counting for it by means of the two governing principles,
Love and Strife. Thus, the dynamic element of change in
Holderlin's essay is entirely Empedoklean in spirit.
Holderlin has drunk deeply from this particular well.
The general identity of life and thought is surely
enough to indicate that, for Holderlin, Empedokles was
the most important of the Greeks — more important, for
example, than Plato, with whose later writings Holderlin
could hardly have agreed. Xt may be suggested that cer¬
tain elements which Holderlin and Empedokles share — the
belief in reincarnation, for example - could easily and
more conveniently have been drawn by Holderlin from
eighteenth century sources such as Herder. It is unde¬
niable that these elements were present in many eigh¬
teenth century writings Holderlin is lieible to have read.
But then, it is equally undeniable that the corresponding
elements in Empedokles' system were present in, for ex¬
ample, the theories of Parmenides, Herakleitos, Pytha¬
goras and the Dionysian and Orphic cults. The aspect
which makes the comparison Empedokles/llolderlin (rather
than, for example, Herder/Holderlin) particularly appo¬
site is the fact that each one drew these "influences"
together into directly corresponding systems within their
respective cultures. Holderlin was to the German "Gipfel
der Zeit" what Empedokles was to the Greek "Gipfel der
Zeit".
It may also be maintained that Holderlin's Empedokles
in the play bears little or no relation to the actual
historical figure. This is largely true, in that Holder¬
lin, as we have pointed out, projected his own problems
and ideas onto the hero of his tragedy. In liarticular,
it might be maintained with considerable justification
that Holderlin's Empedokles loses more and more of the
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Greek's philosopher's characteristics and becomes more
and more like Holderlin himself as he goes through the
succeeding versions of the tragedy. The stark desolation
of the first version, surrounded by enemies and deserted
by the gods, plagued by a Trakl-like sense of guilt, is
replaced by a very different figure in the third version.
This difference is apparent from Empedokles' very first
speech:
... vorbei, vorbei
Das menschliche Bekummernis ! als wiichsen
Mir Schwingen an, so ist rair wohl und leicht
Hier oben, hier, und reich genug und froh
Und herrlich wohn ich, wo den Feuerkelch
Mit Geist gefullt bis an den Rand, bekranzt
Mit Blumen,..
|Gr.St.A.4/l,p.121 J
In place of the hostile but distinctly human charac¬
ters Kermokrates and Kritias, we meet the strange mysti¬
cal figure of Manes the Egyptian^whom Empedokles credits
with the characteristic of omniscience:
Ich kenne dich im finstern Wort, und du,
Du Alleswissender, erkennst mich auch.
[Gr.St.A. 4/1 , p. 136^]
Das sage du mir, der du alles siehst!
[Gr .St.A.4 /1 , p. 1397]
Manes talks of Empedokles' "schwarze Sunde" and re¬
bukes him for his light-heartedness. But Empedokles is
unrepentant. He sees his death simply as a sacrifice for
the people, -with no suggestion of any personal sin to
be atoned for. Manes had once been his teacher, but Erape-
dokles has outgrown him:^
Du lehrtest mich, heut lerne du von mir.
[Gr.St.A.4/1 ,p. I39T]
This new Empedokles sees his death as a privilege and
a cause for joy:
Ihr Fernentwerfenden! euch dank ich, daB ihr mirs
Gegeben habt, die lange Zahl der Leiden
Zu enden hier, befreit von andrer Pflicht
In freiem Tod, nach gottlichem Gesetze!
[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.139TJ
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There has been past suffering for him, but there is
no clear suggestion that it was deserved, as in the first
version. This indicates, I would suggest, that the Erape-
dokles of the third version is an out and out represen¬
tation of Holderlin, whose madness was a sacrifice for
the people pure and simple, and a release from undeserved
suffering.
This, then, is the major difference between Empedokles
(in the first version of the play) and Holderlin: the
matter of guilt, Holderlin originally intended his hero
to be another Oedipus, a man who had stepped over the
boundary line and suffered accordingly. The first ver¬
sion, in other words, is a Greek play, with Greek themes
and Greek conclusions. This may have been what left Hol-
derlin dissatisfied with it. To him, the re turn of the
gods was something more than a simple restoration - it
was a return at a higher level. Since Empedokles' day,
Christ had died on the cross and much else had taken
place, Holderlin himself, in building his system, had all
the benefits and advantages of being able to look back
at the Greeks and their achievements, and build on them,
Holderlin is not Empedokles, but the German equivalent,
on the German level, Holderlin's philosophical system,
as I have tried to show, is very largely compatible with
that of Empedokles, and Holderlin, I believe, was well
aware of this fact, as oi* the fact that each of them
came at an identical stage in the development of their
country's thought. When Holderlin depicted his hero's
fate in his tragedy, there can be little doubt that he
was thinking of himself and his impending fate. Like
"Hyperion"," der Tod des Empedokles" is full of autobio¬
graphical elements. Unlike "Hyperion", it is a work
about the end of life, about an impending act of self-
——— W8.S
sacrifice, .Empedokles 5 no longer the man who had
written the "Lehrgedichte" and led the people of Akragas.
That Holderlin chose the figure of Empedokles to repre¬
sent what he had to say in this play shows how dear the
... .41
Sicilian was to him.
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CHAPTER HOUR : "PLATO and KANT"
The title of the poem "Menons Klagen urn Diotima"
gives us two clear pointers towards Plato, in the two
names. Diotima is prominent in the "Symposium", while the
name "Menon" takes us in another direction: to Plato's
dialogue of that name, in which the young Meno and Sokra-
tes discuss the question of knowledge, virtue, etc.,
whether they are inborn or, if not, how they are ac¬
quired, whether they can be taught and, if so, by whom?
In his "Anabasis", Xenophon gives a very negative picture
of this Meno, as a self-seeking young man lacking any
semblance of a conscience. Plato, however, gives a far
more positive view. Here we find an extremely self—con¬
fident but intelligent character who is genuinely in¬
terested in finding the truth. He gives Sokrates a dif¬
ficult time with his sceptical remarks but listens to his
arguments with respect. He occupies a position in rela¬
tion to Sokrates which reminds one of the Hyperion-Adamas
relationship, or that between Pausanias and Empedokles.
In "Meno" 76 a-d we have an interesting reference to
Empedoklean ideas in relation to the definition of
colour, but the relevance to Holderlin becomes clearer
when virtue is defined as "the desire for the beautiful
and the ability to attain to it". Their search for the
truth breaks down temporarily, causing Sokrates to go
into the question of the possibility of knowledge in
considerable depth. This brings him to the doctrine of
"anamnesis". As G.C. Field points out, "the general sug¬
gestion that the process of acquiring knowledge in these
fields is really a process of remembering what we held
known in a previous existence outside of the body is
1
first put forward in the 'Meno'",
The soul has learned/remembers for ever/since
the beginning of time.
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If one puts this in modern terms, one might say: the
ultimate truths about life and the universe lie in the
Collective Unconscious,
Ottomar Wichmann makes an interesting point in rela¬
tion to this question. He relates Plato's theory of ana¬
mnesis to Kant's idea of "Spontaneitat" - what Wichraann
defines as "das selbsttatige, selbstandige und selbstge-
3
wxsse Vermogen des Geistes" - and sees its roots in
Pythagorean theories of "prastabilierte Harmonie" and
transmigration of souls. However this may be (and Paul
4
Natorp disagrees with him, tending rather to trace
"anamnesis" to Herakleitos' doctrine of the One and the
Whole,), the arguments as to the origin of the idea
cannot affect Wichmann's conclusion: "Platon ist sich
bewuflt von diesem Apriori, diesem 'Schopfen aus sich
5selbst' her eine allgemeine Fahigkeit nachzuweisen,,,",
This brings us to the connection with Kant, His
theory of "Spontaneitat" is what one might term the
"Rousseauan" element in his thought.^ It involves the
individual exercising his freedom of action or of judg¬
ment, and is an "allgemeine Fahigkeit", rather than
something which may be developed by exceptional indivi¬
duals, In other words, it binds people together in a
community of equals rather than separating them according
to intellect or other individual characteristics, al¬
though it has to be admitted that, in Kant, this faculty
is not so highly valued as the ultimate source of all
knowledge and truth. In this sense, Plato is even more
of a 'democrat' than Kant,., However, Kant's successors
brought more of this element into the concept.
It is not usual to see Plato in this light, and there
can be no doubt that, in his later works, he became much
more of a rationalist and an Slitist, but his doctrine
of "anamnesis" weighs heavily on the other end of the
scales. If the ultimate truths about reality are buried
inside every human being (admittedly, deeper in some than
in others) as a God-given gift, then the individual, no
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matter what intellectual powers or other qualities he may¬
or may not have, takes on a value and an interest which
no out-and-out rationalist would grant him.^Plato's con¬
ception is nearer to the Christian idea of the value of
the individual soul. This does not mean, of course, that
Plato at any stage rejected the importance of intellect
and reason (any more than did Kant or Holderlin), and
one must alxvuys bear in mind the difference between
("knowledge") and opG'vj ("true judg-
\ ^
ment"). Only the man of superior wisdom and intellec-
7 /
tual powers can aspire to lO"'T'vj|A'^ - but this only
means that not every man has it in him to be a Sokrates,
a Plato or a Kant, which is a fairly obvious fact.
Xf we turn now to Holderlin's "Wie wenn am Feiertage",
we find the following lines:
... Des gemeinsamen Geistes Gedanken sind,
Still endend, in der Seele des Dichters,
Dai3 schnellbetroffen sie, Unendlichem
Bekannt seit langer Zeit, von Erinnerung
Erbebt, und ihr, von heilgem Strahl entziindet,
Die Frucht in Liebe geboren, der Gotter und Men-
schen Werk,
Der Gesang, damit er beiden zeuge, gliickt.9
(Gr.St.A.2/1,p.119j
To paraphrase: the highest truths about reality ("des
gemeinsamen Geistes Gedanken") are known to the poet
(who is mankind's 'brain' or organ of cognizance of the
Absolute) through anamnesis ("Erinnerung"), his soul
being associated with " das Unendliche" for a long time.
The actual process of creation, whereby the poet puts
his knowledge into works of art, is a moment of inspira¬
tion ("schnellbetroffen") fired by a "heilger Strahl"
and accompanied by "Liebe", whereby the poet is able to
reach the Absolute (&puO^ taking him to <fV OF » in
Platonist terms). He thereby achieves a synthesis of the
divine and the human, and mediates between the two
("beiden zeuge").
Thus, according to Holderlin, it is the poet's rfile
to gain conscious knowledge of the eternal truths, so
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that he may convey them to the rest of mankind and keep
them on the correct path. Otherwise, the people's "true
belief", not being based on knowledge, might give way to
false belief or worse.
Here Holderlin is following Plato directly, as one
can see from "Meno" 99cd, where oracles, seers, creative
people and great statesmen are seen as being divinely
inspired. There is nothing natural or instinctive about
their activity; it is rather divine or super-natural.
This feature is stressed by Holderlin in, for example,
the first stanza of his poem "Menons Klagen um Diotima",
with which we started this chapter:
-... so flieht das getroffene Wild in die Walder,
Wo es um Mittag sonst sicher im Dunkel geruht;
Aber niramer erquickt sein grimes Lager das Herz
ihm...
(Gr.St.A.2/1,p.753
The wounded deer is a symbol for man, vainly seeking
the truth in mere sensual reality. There is a clear anti¬
thesis between a normal deer that would be content enough
with its natural, instinctive existence, and the wounded
deer (ie. man) who is searching for "ein Anderes". This
can be compared with a very similar passage from Holder-
lin's letter to his brother, dated 4/6/1799:
Warum leben sie nicht, wie das Wild im Walde,
geniigsam, beschrankt auf den Boden, die Nahrung,
die ihm zunachst liegt, und mit der es, das Wild,
von Natur zusammenhangt, wie das kind mit der
Brust seiner Mutter?'
(Gr.St.A .6/1,p.327j
Thus, Holderlin and Plato are in complete agreement
on this point: the idealising tendency of mankind is
divinely inspired, not instinctive. As Wichmann points
out: "So angesehen ist diose UnbewuBtheit freilich et-
was sehr Ehrenvolles...".
The poet's rftle in the process, and in relation to
anamnesis, comes out in "Menons Klagen" at the end of the
sixth stanza:
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'Venn es drunten ertont, und ihre Schatze die Nacht
zollt,
Und aus Bachen herauf glanzt das begrabene Gold.
(Gr.St.A.2/1,p.77j
The "begrabene Gold" is the Absolute or the knowledge
thereof, "die Nacht" is the unconscious, not of an indi¬
vidual but of mankind. The reference to "Bache" empha¬
sises the naturalness of the process, which cannot be
forced; therefore its medium or vessel has to be someone
who is sensitive to such natural processes in a world-
historical sense, in fact a poet rather than simply a
philosopher (but admittedly a poet with a thorough know¬
ledge and understanding of philosophy). The philosopher
per se, being limited to what he can prove definitively
by the logic of an argument, is by his very nature unable
to avail himself of the same opportunities.
This poem is by no means the only place in Holderlin's
work where this idea comes out. For example, in "Mnemo¬
syne", the very title of the poem — Atv^f^ocrvy/vj has the
primary meaning "memory", and then became the proper name
for the mother of the Muses, possibly because memory
played such an important part in the arts, particularly
poetry, in early Greek society — refers us to the idea
of memory of a deeper, more metaphysical kind
which is, for a man developing a theory of "Mythologie
der Vernunft", the source of inspiration for the parti¬
cipants in all the arts. In the poem itself, we find in
the first stanza a reference to the murky possibilities
which threaten if the emotions ignore the mind or vice
11
versa:
... Aber bos sind
Die Pfade. Namlich unrecht,
Vie Rosse, gelin die gefangenen
Element' und alten
Gesetze der Erd. Und immer
Ins Ungebundene gehet eine Sehnsucht.
[Gr.St.A.2/1 ,p. 197TJ
Then the great secret is revealed:
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Vorwarts aber und riickwarts wollen wir
Nicht sehn. Uns viegen lassen, vie
Auf schwankem Kahne der See. .
(Gr.St.A. 2/1 ,p. 197_J
This secret can be applied to the world-historical or
the private, individual context. Holderlin is depicting
a situation of & as in Sophokles 1 tragedies.
The dynamic element of change which rules the world and
our lives for the most part has given way to a stillness,
a 'peace beyond understanding'. This is the condition
which it is the individual's and mankind's aim to achieve.
Holderlin, as I hope to show, saw art as the prime means
of achieving this state, which might be termed, following
Jung, "the identity of the conscious and the unconscious",
or the ultimate achievement of the state recommended by
the Delphic oracle: y*ytoDt erfcoi.n/TO'V . TheGris a
result of achieving a balance between dialectically op¬
posed forces: mind and passions, conscious and uncon¬
scious, state and people, etc..
These ideas are not, in themselves, strictly philoso¬
phical. But we have already seen that Holderlin saw art
as embodying truths more profound than those thait are
within the reach of a strictly philosophical argument.
One can relate this to the passage in the "Systempro-
graram": "... weder Gott noch Unsterblichkeit auBer sich
suchen diirfen". |~Gr . St. A. 4/1 , p. 298^| • If an individual
wishes to find any sort of ultimate truth with absolute
value, he cannot expect to find it simply by the logic
of an argument. The argument can take you so far, but
its ultimate end is something incommunicable to others
who have not shared the experience. This I take to be an
important ingredient in Holderlin's apparently extrava¬
gant claims for poetry, and his constant call for humi¬
lity before Nature.
"Anamnesis" for Plato can be seen, at least in his
earlier works, to occupy a similar position. In the
"Mnemosyne" poem, if I am right in equating Mnemosyne,
Mother ol" the Muses, with the Platonist doctrine of
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"anamnesis", the lines in the last stexnza take on a spe¬
cial mythic significance:
Am Kitharon aber lag
Eleuthera, der Mnemosyne Stadt. Der auch, als
Ablegte den Mantel Gott, das Abendliche nachher
loste,
Die Locken. Himmlische namlich sind
Unwillig, wenn einer nicht die Seele schonend sich
Zusammengenommen, aber er mui3 doch; dem
Gleich fehlet die Trauer,
[Gr.St.A.2/1 ,p. 198TJ
Mnemosyne's town, Eleuthera LoL = "freedom"),
can be seen as an attempt on Holderlin's part to equate
the ideas of Truth and Freedom: only in a free society
can man develop his inner capabilities to the full; only
when the individual is free can he fulfil himself. When
the Greek "Gipfel der Zeit" ended, knowledge of the
Eternal Truths disappeared at the same time as political
freedom. Humility Q'wenn einer nicht die Seele schonend
sich/ Zusammengenommen^J is crucial in the search for
truth.
The analogy can be drawn here between the tyranny of
the mind over passions and political tyranny - the ty¬
rant thinks he knows best what is good for the people
and represses the latter's independent desires; in the
same way the conscious mind or reason thinks it knows
best what r8le the passions and the unconscious should
play and runs the risk of repressing them. The ideal is
a balance between state and people, which are not iden¬
tical - the idea that political freedom can be achieved
or retained without a sense of responsibility is not im¬
plied, but Holderlin saw mankind as a general rule as
having a tendency to idealise (but also a contrary ten¬
dency: "Namlich unrechtWhen this tendency to
idealise is allowed to develop freely, all is well. A
similar set of criteria applies to the individual: each
human being is a composite of good and 'bad' tendencies.
The 'bad' tendencies are not in themselves evil: they
are neutral. It is only repression which turns them into
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the wrong channel, and can ultimately cause an explosion
of these repressed forces.
The ideal balance is achieved when the individual
"die Seele schonend sich/ Zusammengenommen...". But this
is difficult to achieve if the individual is striving
for the Absolute or consciously attempting to idealise.
The great heroes were really great, but their greatness
led them to forget themselves at times and lose their hu¬
mility. This is the tragic dilemma expressed in the short
phrase : "aber er muI3 doch". If the hero does not attempt
anything, he will never achieve anything. We have gone
into this matter in the chapter on Sophokles.
However, if we turn back now to the Kantian aspect
of the problem, it will be of interest to investigate the
psychological basis of his theory of 11 Spontaneitat" ,
within the general context of his philosophy. Kant's
ideas about the unconscious were formed within the context
of the profound differences on the subject which obtained
at that period between the Anglo-Saxon Empiricists on the
one hand and the Continental nationalists on the other.
The most famous debate was that between Locke and Leibniz:
Locke with his idea of the 'tabula rasa' denying the pos¬
sibility of innate ideas.
Kant's position on this question is somewhat complex.
He agrees with Locke on the difficulty, if not impossi¬
bility, of assuming the existence of "Vorstellungen" of
which one is not conscious. However, he sees an answer
to the problem in the idea of recovering them through
"Schliisse" .
Kant compares the human soul with a large "Karte" on
which some spots are illuminated and others not. The dark
spots are the realm of "dunkle Vorstellungen", the bright
parts that of the "klare Vorstellungen", the very
brightest that of the "deutliche Vorstellungen". The dark
part, as Kant sees it, is by far the largest area in the
soul.
This is at first sight a remarkably modern psycho¬
logical theory, and indeed, as Vladimir Satura points
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out: "Wenn diese Lehre kants voin UnbewuBten mit jener der
heutigen Psychologie verglichen wird, sieht man, daB sie
die Hauptaspekte des UnbewuBten eher nur beriihrt als all-
seitig ausarbeitet, , . , Von den heute iiblichen Klassen
fehlt ihm nur das Verdrangt-UnbewuBte und das Kollektiv
UnbewuBte. "12 There is no need to assume any direct in¬
fluence from Kant to see that Holderlin understood the
consequences of Kant's thought in this direction and ex¬
tended the concept as appropriate for his own post-
Fichtean system of ideas. This involved the addition of
the very ideas or types of the unconscious that Satura
sees as being excluded from Kant's scheme of things:
"das Verdrangt-UnbewuBte", in the shape of the "Rosse"
going out of control in "Mnemosyne", for example, and
"das Kollektiv-UnbewuBte" in the shape of "Erinnerung",
"Gedachtnis" etc. throughout his works.
This brings us back to Plato. As Satura again points
out, "die Idee selbst von der Existenz des UnbewuBten
geht auf Plato zuriick und zieht sich durch die ganze
13
ratxonalistische Tradition". ^ The process of recovering
truths from the unconscious described by Kant is closely
related to Plato's dialectics, whereby the truth can be
brought to light or uncovered. This is the process de¬
scribed by Hblderlin (in the letter to his brother dated
k/6+1799 ) as being the main function of philosophy:"Die
Philosophie bringt jenen Trieb zu idealisieren zum
BewuBtsein..." {Gr.St.A.6/1,p.329^
In Plato's philosophy there is a close relationship
between the KTiK'V] , the jw.oH. e-OTi
and anamnesis: the £ l et. XeK'H.K'V] originally applied
to the process of argument and counter-argument in a de¬
bate, but Plato also uses it (for example, in "Theaitetus"
189 E — 190 A) to apply to an internal dialectical pro¬
cess of thinking which leads to a 'judgment' (S^oi.)
formed by the person concerned, this being the culmi¬
nating point of the dialectical process; the |iA-olc.G't>TLK'^
TB'X/V'V) t as in "Meno" 85c to 86c, for example, is the
process of realising or releasing the 'idea' ( or
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in a human being by means of the questioning so
favoured by Sokrates; the connection with anamnesis lies
in the common factor of awakening something which lies
dormant, in this case or 'judgments', which are
present in everyone's unconscious. As we have seen, this
procedure is very relevant to Holderlin's theory of trag¬
edy: "Alles 1st Rede gegen Rede, die sich gegenseitig
aufhebt". £gt.St.A. 5 » P• 201 7J . Here we can also note that
the aspect of Holderlin's theory of prosody and aesthe¬
tics known as the "Wechsel der Tone" shows clear signs
of having been influenced by Plato's dialectics: in Hoi—
derlin's note on "der Rhein",^ for example, the actual
procedure of "Progrefi und Regrefl" is the dialectical
process itself and the point reached in the last triad,
where everything is "mit durchgangiger Metapher... aus-
geglichen ", is the culminating point in Plato's dia¬
lectics, where the is formed. The dialectical pro¬
cess in "der Rhein" is very different from the pessimism
of Kant's dialectics, destined merely for the "Auflosung
der Trugschliisse" , and, perhaps less obviously, from the
dialectics of Hegel's system: there is no direct progress
from thesis + antithesis to synthesis but rather an al¬
ternating process of analysis and synthesis. The "Ent—
gegensetzung" Holderlin refers to is that between Plato's
two principles of analysis and synthesis or S l oLupfecrv^and
ryvVod.yu3^vj > in the sense that, for example, in the first
Triad there is a "ProgreB" in the "Form" from the par¬
ticular ("Im dunkeln Efeu safl ich...") to the general
("Doch unverstandig ist/Das ¥tinschen vor dem Schicksal.
.."), while the second Triad ("der Form nach... entgegen*
gesetzt") goes from the general ("Ein Ratsel ist Rein-
entsprungenes, Auch/Der Gesang kaum darf es enthiillen." )
to the particular ("...Der Vater Rhein, una liebe Kinder
nahrt/ln Stadten, die er gegrlindet." ) . These two opposites
are not followed by a synthesis. They are rather counter¬
balanced by a concurrent unity in the "Stoff", in that
both Triads deal with the course of the Rhine.
The third and fourth stanzas form a direct parallel
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but at the same time a dialectical opposite: "der Form
nach gleich, dem Stoff nach entgegengesetzt", in that
they both end in a "harmonischer Ausgleich" ..unbe-
zwungen, lachelnd..." , "...Gutes mehr/Denn Boses fin-
dend. . ) but have different "Stoffe" (human destiny in
general in the third Triad, Rousseau and his ideas in
the fourth Triad),
The culminating point of the dialectical process
comes in the fifth and final Triad, which contains the
t in Plato's terminology, beginning with the lines:
Dann feiern das Brautfest Menschen und Gotter,
Es feiern die Lebenden all,
Und ausgeglichen
1st eine Weile das Schicksal,
[Gr. St.A. 2/1 , p. 147V]
The union of the divine and the human, the reaching
of the Absolute, is a temporary circumstance (".,. eine
Weile,..") rather than a permanent synthesis. This is a
necessary result of its character as an experience rather
than a "Begriff" in the Hegelian sense.
Then, in the centre of the last Triad, we have the
important lines:
... bis in den Tod
Kann aber ein Mensch auch
Im Gedachtnis doch das Beste behalten,
Und dann erlebt er das Hochste.
Nut hat ein jeder sein MaB.
Denn schwer ist zu tragen
Das Ungliick, aber schwerer das Gllick.
Ein Weiser aber vermocht es
Vom Mittag bis in die Mitternacht,
Und bis der Morgen erglanzte,
Beim Gastmahl helle zu bleiben.
[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.l487j
It is impossible to have a permanent experience of
the Absolute, but man can retain "das Beste" and "dann"
(ie. on his death) he can experience "das Hochste". The
manner in which he can retain "das Beste" is of parti¬
cular interest to us within the context of this chapter:
"Im Gedachtnis". This is not the simple memory, I would
suggest, but anamnesis, the source of tho knowledge of
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"das Beste" (f*o KcoVo'V') for Plato and for Holderlin. The
man 'remembers' "das Beste" from having experienced it
at exceptional moments of his life, but also from before
his birth.
The connection with Plato is further reinforced by
the reference to Sokrates ("Ein Weiser") who in Plato's
"Symposium" (223 B—D) is reported to have discoursed on
the subject of tragedy and comedy through the night,
remaining bright and awake after having reduced Aristo¬
phanes and Agathon to sleep. In Holderlin's poem, I would
suggest that the terms "Mittag", "Mitternacht" and "Mor-
gen" take on an additional symbolic significance as
stages in man's life, which would imply that the "Gast-
mahl" also has a secondary meaning, as life itself. Man's
great task in life is to remain awake and watchful -
"helle zu bleiben" - through all these stages, to the
end of his life.
After this culminating point of the poem, the last
stanza takes on a more specifically religious or Chris¬
tian tone: "Dir mag... Gott erscheinen", "und nirnmer ist
dir/Verborgen das Lacheln des Herrschers,,The work
then ends with the return to night and "Uralte Verwirrung".
However that may be, the most important points for us
in the present context are the Platonist dialectical pro¬
cess which takes one to the Absolute (however temporarily)
and the retention of "das Beste" or po "im Gedacht-
nis". The dialectical process in Plato is, as Natorp puts
it, "Grundlage der Philosophie liberhaupt oder in andrer
¥endung ... ihr hochster Gipfel". ^5 It will therefore be
readily apparent why Holderlin, as a Platonist, laid
such stress on it in his poems, especially from about
the time of "der Khein" (1801) onvards, and why it was
of such great importance to him, as he puts it in the
"Anmerkungen zuin Oedipus", "die Poesie, auch bei uns,
den Unterschied der Zeiten und Verfassungen abgerechnet,
zur der Alten erhebe^ " . [&r. S t .A. 5 , P . 1 957]
This peculi^irity of his aesthetic theory is further
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described in the "Anraerlcungen zur Antigona" as follows:
O
■So wxe namlich xmmer dxe Phxlosphie nur ein
Vermogen der Seele behandelt, so dafi die Dar-
stellung dieses Einen Vermogens ein Ganzes macht,
und das blof3e Zusaramenhangen der Glieder dieses
Einen Verraogens Logik genannt wird, so behandelt
die Poesie die verschiedenen Vermogen des Men-
schen, so dafl die Darstellung dieser verschie¬
denen Vermogen ein Ganzes macht, und das Zusammen-
hangen der selbststandigeren Teile der verschiedenen
Vermogen der Rhythmus, im hohern Sinne, oder das
kalkulable Gesetz genannt werden kann.
[Gr.St.A.5,p.265J
"Die Poesie", unlike philosophy, is concerned with
the whole man, with all his faculties. We have seen how im¬
portant this was for Holderlin in the chapter on Empedokles.
Here, we can note the rSle he ascribed to the "kalkulable
Gesetz", his poetic version of Plato's SloL-XfrK'nK'H .
If one looks at a poem such as "der Rhein" simply from
the poet's point of view, it is an example of the
^idbVc-KTcK'V} : the poet follows his own dialectical
thought process which ultimately leads him to the or¬
gasmic culminating point — the Absolute. The artistic
process is not simply a spontaneous outpouring. The poet
must work hard and soberly on the technical aspects of
his craft. As Holderlin puts it in "Reflexion":
Da wo die Nuchternheit dich verliiBt, da ist
die Grenze deiner Begeisterung. Der groBe Dichter
ist niemals von sich selbst verlassen, er mag
sich so weit iiber sich selbst erheben, als er
will. Man kann auch in die Hohe fallen, so wie
in die Tiefe.
[Gr.St.A.4/1,p.233d
The Ter)(Vv) of the poet is the fixed, conscious aspect
of his work. The production of a poem is dependent on
achieving a balance or happy synthesis between the
and the "Begeisterung", the unconscious element. Or, to
put it in orthodox Platonist terms: the S t oLA GK'Tt.K'^
of the poet's thought leads to the uncovering of
a calready present in the poet's unconscious (and
ultimately in manlcind' s unconscious per se ).
If we turn now to the relationship of the poet to his
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audience, we will see that for Holderlin this was an
example of fXctL€d<nK'*i Tfe^V^ • We have already seen how
Holderlin believed that art could draw an audience up¬
wards to a vision of the Absolute. This it was able to
do because of a characteristic of art described by Hol¬
derlin in the letter to his brother dated ^-/6/l799!
"Die schone Kunst stellt jenera Triebe zu idealisieren
sein unendliches Objekt in einem lebendigen Bilde, in
einer darges tellten hohern Welt dar, , {jir. S t. A. 6/1 , p. 32Sg|
Art, like philosophy, is concerned with the "unendliches
Objekt" of man's urge to idealise: fo (Kt/Ao-V or the Ab¬
solute. The difference lies in the fact that art is able
to show man this "Objekt" in a "lebendiges Bild": the
"daemonic" aspect of a work of art is able to affect the
emotions of the audience or reader while, at the same
time, the intellectual content occupies his mind. The
orgasmic emotional release occasioned by a great work
of art is not merely emotional; if the artist is a real
master of his craft, it will involve the audience's
same
faculties in their totality in much the^way as the cre¬
ative act itself involves all the poet's faculties. Thus,
the achievement of the identity of the conscious and
the unconscious is possible only through a work of art.
A work of philosophy, occupying as it does only one of
man's faculties, cannot achieve the same effect. This
effect is described by Holderlin in the "Grund zum Empe-
dokles" in the following terms:
Dies Gefuhl gehort vielleicht zum hochsten,
was gefuhlt werden kann, wenn beide Entgegen—
gesetzte, der verallgemeinerte geistig lebendige
klinstlich rein aorgische Mensch und die Wohl-
gestalt der Natur sich begegnen. Dies Gefuhl
gehort vielleicht zum hochsten, was der Mensch
erfahren kann, denn die jetzige Harmonie mahnt
ihn an das vormalige umgekehrte reine Verhaltnis,
und er flihlt sich und die Natur zweifach, und die
Verbindung ist unendlicher.
[Gr.St.A •V1 , p. 1 537]
This may be compared with the famous section at the




Die Kunst 1st eben deswegen dem Philosophen
das Hochste, weil sie ihm das Allerheiligste
gleichsam offnet, wo in ewiger und ursprlinglicher
Vereinigung gleichsam in Einer Flamme brennt,
was in der Natur und Geschichte gesondert ist,
und was im Leben und Handeln, ebenso wie im
Denken, ewig sich fliehen mufl. Die Ansicht,
welche der Philosoph von der Natur kiinstlich
sich macht, ist^,fv.ir die Kunst die urspriingliche
und naturliche.
The effect of a work of art is dependent, in Holder—
lin's terms, on the awakening of a memory of a "vor-
malige Iiarmonie" — the harmony of the 11 intellektuale
Anschauung" in "Urteil und Sein" - by a temporary re-
establishment of that harmony. In other words: anamnesis
1.7
is the basis of all art. Holderlm saw his work's spe¬
cial significance in the fact that he combined in his
poems the two main methods mentioned by Plato for
reaching the truth: the "divine fury" of the poet and the
Slcd^K'Tl.K'Vl of the philosopher. The metaphysical
basis of Holderlin's dialectics or "Wechsel der Tone"
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may seem dubious, but there can be little doubt that he
took it seriously. This comes out clearly at the be¬
ginning of his essay "Uber die Verfahrungsweise des
poetischen Geistes":
Venn der Dichter einmal des Geistes inachtig
ist, wenn er die gemeinschaftliche Seele, die
allem gemein und jedem eigen ist, gefiihlt und
sich zugeeignet, sie festgehalten, sich ihrer
versichert hat, wenn er ferner der freien Be-
wegung, des harmonischen Wechsels und Fort-
strebens, worin der Geist sich in sich selber
und in anderen zu reproduzieren geneigt ist,
wenn er des schonen im Ideale des Geistes vor—
gezeichneten Progresses und seiner poetischen
Folgerungsweise gewifi ist...
[Sr.st.A.y 1 >P.2iti7|
The phrase "die gemeinschaftliche Seele, die allem
Cf
gemein und jedem eigen ist" is a reference to the £1/
KoLi 'ttcf'V , the doctrine of the interpenetration of the
one and the whole, and can be compared with the lines in
"Wie wenn am Feiertage..:
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... Des gemeinsamen Geistes Gedanken sind,
Still endend, in den Seele des Dichters...
jGr.St.A.2/1 , p. 1 19 7]
Thus, the poet has a special gift for "Selbstver—
tiefung", by virtue of which he can find within himself,
in the depths of his unconscious, truths of universal
validity. As we have noted above, Holderlin was a direct
forerunner of the psychologist Jung in this respect. The
latter's doctrine of the Collective Unconscious is di¬
rectly parallel to Holderlin's idea.
The "freieBewegung... worin der Geist sich in sich
'"V
selber und in anderen zu ^e^roduzieren geneigt ist" is
the dialectical process of "Wechsel der Tone", which is
seen as a universal law of thought. It is not a conscious,
careful logical argument but a "freie Bewegung" of self-
revelation of the spirit, a process similar to that en¬
visaged by Heidegger as being the main r8le of the philo¬
sopher. To Heidegger, as to Holderlin, the truth reveals
itself in the act of philosophising. The philosopher does
not propound carefully elaborated theories or doctrines —
he philosophises. This is very similar to the ^€:KTl K-vj
T6^Wl of Plato - Sokrates, in the dialogues, does not
give out a set system of dogmas to be learned by rote,
but rather uses his question—and—answer technique to ap¬
proach or discover the truth there and then. This freedom
and spontaneity of the dialectical process in Plato's
dialogues, I would maintain, was an inspiration for Hol-
derlin in his later work, and formed the intellectual
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basis for the theory of "Wechsel der Tone". For Holder-
lin, the great poet is the man who is aware of this uni¬
versal law of thought, which enables him to bring to
light "des gemeinsamen Geistes Gedanken". In other words,
he is conscious of the existence of the Absolute and of
how to reach it.
An interesting example of anamnesis being applied to
the sphere of ethics, rather than aesthetics or meta¬
physics, is provided by a line in one of the "hymnische
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Entwtirfe" :
Im Gedachtnis aber lebet Phlloktetes...■
(Gr.St.A.2/1 , p. 2247]
This line is of particular interest in that it pro¬
vides an example in Holderlin of what one thinks of more
often as the Kantian and Fichtean concern with ethics.
It is therefore interesting to note that "Gedachtnis" is
the basis of Philoktetes1 behaviour, rather than any
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Moral Law. Philoktetes was, of course, the hero of one
of Sophokles' plays: the physically weak but morally
strong opponent of the unscrupulous Odysseus, who re¬
presents the principle of "might is right". Holderlin's
view of Odysseus is clear from his first essay "liber
Achill":
Von UlyB konnte QlomerJ Sachen genug beschrei—
ben. Dieser ist ein Sack voll Scheidemlinze, wo
man lange zu zahlen hat, mit dem Gold ist man
viel balder fertig.
[Gr.St. A. 4/1 , p.224/1
Here Holderlin is arguably seeing Odysseus through
Sophokles1 eyes rather than Homer's.
In connecting the idea of "Gedachtnis" with Philok¬
tetes, Holderlin is implying that anamnesis is the source
of moral as well as metaphysical truth. One might be
tempted to object that Philoktetes' attitude is more an
example of Kant's Moral Law at work: he does what is
right of his own free will, not from any desire to
achieve a given end. As John Kemp puts it:
... in obeying the moral law for the sake of
the law alone, the will is autonomous because jt
is obeying a law which it imposes on itself, '
However, Holderlin associates Philoktetes' name with
"Gedachtnis", not "Gesetz". There is no hint of Kantian
"universalisability". This can be explained in terms of
the general synthesising tendency of the Post-Kan^ans,
and their starting point" (in the case of Schiller and
Holderlin, at least) in the third "Kritik", with its
notions of aesthetic intuition and so on. Like ivant,
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Holderlin was impressed by Rousseau's theory of 'bont6
naturelle1, and as a result drew the basically logical
conclusion that men acted correctly, if they did, not
by virtue of having gained conscious understanding of
any law, but by virtue of something in-born0 He con¬
nected this, again quite logically and consistently,
with Plato's idea of 'anamnesis'. Kant explained evil
in terms of an "Abfall" from 'bont& naturelle'. For
example, in "die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der
blofien Vernunft", we have the following argument:
Wie es nun moglich sei, daB ein natlirlicher—
weise boser Mensch sich selbst zum guten Menschen
mache, das tibersteigt alle unsere Begriffe; denn
wie lcann ein boser Baum gute Friichte bringen?. . .
Die Wiederhers tellung der urspriinglichen An-
lage zum Guten in uns ist also nicht Erwerbung
einer verlorenen Triebfeder zum Guten; denn
diese, die in der Achtung furs moralische Gesetz
besteht, haben wir nie verlieren konnen, und ware
das letztere mbglich, so wiirden wir sie auch nie
wiedererwerben.^
Holderlin's ideas on the subject, as we have seen, are
somewhat more complex, involving such modern notions
as repress ion. However, this much Ilolderlin always re¬
tained in common with Kant: he never lost his belief in
the basic, original goodness of man, however evil his
actions might be from time to time.
a
Thus, we find that "Gedachtnis" or ar^nnesis is the
ultimate source of all knowledge in the fields of meta¬
physics, aesthetics and ethics. For Holderlin, the truths
embodied in works and actions in all three fields spring
from inside the person concerned rather than being im¬
posed from without. Similarly, "Spontaneitat" in lvant
is an active principle whereby man acts as a free agent,
following an inner light of his own. The highest form
of this free activity (for Holderlin) is the 'divine
fury' of the poet, in Platonist terms. Already for Kant,
poetry is the highest art form, as he makes clear at the
begiiming of Section 53 of the third "kritik":
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Unter alien behauptet die Dichtkunst (die fast
ganzlich dem Genie ihren Unsprung verdankt, und
am wenigsten durch Vorschrift, oder durch Beispiele
geleitet sein will) den obersten Hang. Sie erwei-
tert das Gemiit dadurch, daB sie die Einbildungs-
kraft in Freiheit setzt und innerhalb den Schranken
eines gegebenen Eegriffs, unter den unbegrenzten
Mannigfaltigkeit moglicher damit zusammenstimmen-
der Formen, diejenige darbietet, welche die Dar-
stellung desselben mit einer Gedankenftille ver-
kntipft, den kein Sprachausdruck vollig adaquat
ist, und sich also asthetisch zu Ideen erhebt.
Sie starkt das Gemiit, indem sie es sein freies,
selbsttatiges und von den Naturbestimmung unab—
hangiges Vermogen fuhlen laBt, die Natur, als
Erscheinung, ncich Ansichten zu betrachten und zu
beurteilen, die sie nicht von selbst, weder fur
den Sinn noch den Verstand in der Erfahrung dar¬
bietet, und sie also zum Behuf und gleicbsam zum
Schema des ijbersinnlichen zu gebrauchen.
Thus, in Kant also, ethics and aesthetics have this
element in common, that their basis is in each case a
spontaneous outpouring. Similarly, in Holderlin, Philolt—
tetes is spontaneously right in a moral sense, due to
"Gedachtnis"; Holderlin himself is spontaneously right
in a moral sense, due to "Gedachtnis".
I would not care to suggest that the three thinkers
we have been considering in this chapter — Plato, Kant
and Holderlin — would have agreed with each other en¬
tirely across the board. In particular, as I have men¬
tioned, Holderlin would have disapproved, I am sure, of
Plato's turn towards rationalism from "the Republic" on¬
wards. He also extended Kant's ideas, no doubt, beyond
what Kant himself would have approved of. However, Hoi—
derlin's basic philosophical concerns and, in general
terms, his conclusions are in harmony with those of Kant
and (perhaps to a lesser extent) Plato. Holderlin's life's
work (and also Schelling's) can be seen largely as a
logical extension of Kant's *God, Freedom and Immortality'.
In this sense, I would maintain that Holderlin and
Schelling were Kant's true successors. Neither Fichte
nor Hegel maintained Kant's theistic belief in a God
recognisable as such - the Absolute Ego and "Geist",
however noble and all-pervasive they may be, are hardly
comparable. Fichte's ideas on God are complex and contro¬
versial. He himself was most indignant at the accusation
of atheism which cost him his professorship at Jena in
1799. However, in his earlier writings, God is seldom
mentioned, and an equation of the Absolute Ego with God
is scarcely in harmony with the spirit of the 'Wissen-
schaftslehre'. It is only in his later period, with such
works as Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben, oder auch die
Peligionslehre (1805-06), that a strong Christian element
seems to enter his thought. Fichte had seen the need to
go behind consciousness to find its ultimate ground (in
God). Whether one sees his later work as a logical con¬
sequence of his earlier writings or not, the fact remains
that the religious element is much more -prominent in the
25
later period.
..I say that Holderlin's and Schelling's ideas are per¬
haps less in harmony with orthodox Platonism. However,
this must be qualified by the reminder that Plato's theo¬
ries concerning Eros, Anamnesis, the Dialectics and Div¬
ine Fury are completely in harmony with their thought and
were almost certainly major influences on Holderlin when
he was formulating his philosophical system. The element
of disharmony or contradiction stems simply from the fact
that Plato changed his mind and, in particular, started
to doubt the desirability (if not the adequacy) of his
early ideas concerning Eros and Divine Fury. Holderlin,
being a poet himself and coming under the influence of
Kant's anti-rationalism and democratic, Rousseauan ideals,
could not accept this turn in Plato's thought. For this
reason, one must surely conclude that, of all the Greek
philosophers, Empedokles - not Plato - was the one that
Holderlin would have found himself in most complete agree¬
ment with: Empedokles was a poet, accepted Divine Fury and
was a democratic politician. With that conclusion, we can
now leave the Greeks behind, and examine more closely the
development of Holderlin's system from the awakening of his
philosophical interests to the full maturity of his ideas.
- 118 -
CHAPTER FIVE : "BETWEEN KANT and HEGEL"
The period in German philosophy with which we deal in
this chapter was a crucial one in many ways. With Hume's
help, Kant had dismantled the oppressive rationalist
dogmatism of Leibniz, and had proceeded to investigate
the possibilities of the human mind, and of metaphysical
knowledge. The ultimate questions of philosophy, the
questions which interest every member of the human race
according to their various capacities for ruminating on
the subject - does life have a meaning? is there a God?
will any part of me survive the death of my body? -
these, the very questions whose answers men are likely
to seek in the works of a philosopher, Kant left largely
unanswered. In his ethical writings, he was concerned to
establish the autonomy of the will, in other words to
free moral action from any religious basis in revealed
commandments, and also from metaphysical determinism
such as that implied by Spinoza's system. In this, he
might perhaps be seen as performing a function similar
to that of the Chinese sages who, without making any
claim to knowledge of any god or of anything that might
be termed super—natural or meta—physical, confined them¬
selves to drawing up rules for human conduct in this
life which will maximalise individual contentment and
the stability of society. At various points in his
works, however, Kant brings in God (whose existence he
nowhere proves, but simply assumes on the basis of
equivocal empirical evidence) as a necessary prop to
his moral system.^ Before one accepts Kant's ethics
'in ^toto' , one has to accept his assumptions concerning
God. Thus, it might be maintained that Kant is leaving
the door wide open for atheism and radical nihilism in
metaphysics and ethics. This is a problem which concerned
the younger generation of German intellectuals deeply -
one thinks of Kleist, with his "kantkrise", which may
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haxve been a contributing factor in his ultimate suicide,
persuading him that it was futile to remain in a world
where nothing important could be known or proved.
This concern was voiced with particular clarity and
force by Jean Paul Richter in the section of his novel
"Siebenkas" entitled "Rede des toten Christus vom Welt-
gebaude herab, daB kein Gott sei":
... [ich] erschrak. . . liber den gif tigen Dampf,
der dem Herzen dessen, der zum ersten Mai in
das atheistische Lehrgebaude tritt, erstickend
entgegenzieht. Ich will mit geringern Schmerzen
die Unsterblichkeit als die Gottheit leugnen:
dort verlier' ich nichts als eine mit Nebeln '
bedeckte Welt, hier verlier' ich die gegenwartige,
namlich die Sonne derselben; das ganze geistige
Universum wird durch die Hand des Atheismus zer-
sprengt und zerschlagen in zahlenlose quecksil-
berne Punkte von Ichs, welche blinken, rinnen,
irren, zusammen— und auseinanderfliehen, ohne
Einheit und Bestand...
Auch hab' ich die Absicht, mit meiner Dichtung
einige lesende oder gelesene Magister in Furcht
zu setzen, da wahrlich diese Leute jetzo, seit-
dem sie als Baugefangne beim Wasserbau und der
Grubenzimmerung der kritischen Philosophie in
Tagelohn genommen worden, das Dasein Gottes so
kaltbliitig und lcaltherzig erwiigen, als ob vom ^
Dasein des Kraken und Einhorns die Rede ware.
Now, this is the problem that a whole generation
of German writers and thinkers set themselves to solve.
For our purposes, five names are outstanding: Fichte,
Schiller, Holderlin, Schelling, Hegel. Their quest was
for knowledge, understanding and, if possible, proof
concerning the questions Kant had left unanswered or
in doubt. Many years later, Friedrich Nietzsche des¬
cribed their quest, .and this whole period of German
thought, in the following terms:
Es kam der Honigmond der deutschen Philosophie;
alle jungen Theologen des Tlibinger Stiftes gingen
alsbald in die Btische - alle suchten nach 'Ver-
mogen'. Und was fand man nicht alles - in jener
tinschuldigen, reichen, noch jugendlichen Zeit des
deutschen Geistes, in welche die Romantik, die
boshafte Fee, hineinblies, hineinsang, damals,
als man 'finden1 und 'erfinden' noch nicht aus-
einanderzuhalten wuflte! Vor allem ein Verraogon
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furs 'libersinnliche ' : Schelling taufte es die
intellektuale Anschauung,., Man kann dieser ganzen
ubermutigen und schwarmerischen Bewegung, welche
Jugend war, so ktihn sie sich auch in graue und
greisenhafte Begriffe verlcleidete, gar nicht mehr
Unrecht tun, als wenn man sie ernst nimmt und
gar etwa mit moralischer Entriistung behandelti
genug, man wurde alter, — der Traum verflog.
I hope to show that the condescension and disdain
with which Nietzsche treats the philosophical efforts
of the Romantics are completely unjustifiable, and are
merely a symptom of the sad decline of German philoso¬
phical debate in the course of the nineteenth century,
the 'argumentum ad hominem1 having replaced reason and
logic as the main debating technique. The philosophical
position which Nietzsche regards as 'realistic' and, by
inference, adult, is in fact the position that filled
the Romantics with such horror and dismay.
It is an interesting point that Nietzsche blamed Kant
for the "excesses" of the Romantics. In Nietzsche's
words, Kant "war stolz darauf, im Menschen ein neues Ver-
mogen, das Vermogen zu synthetischen Urteilen a priori, 5
entdeckt zu haben. Gesetzt, daB er sich hierin selbst
betrog: aber die Entwicklung und rasche Bltite der
deutschen Philosophie hangt an diesem Stolze und an dem
Wetteifer all er Jiingeren, womoglich noch Stolzeres zu
entdecken..,"^
Now, it lies outwith the scope of this thesis to
attempt an in-depth analysis of Kant's philosophy, but
one point might be made here briefly: Kant's philoso¬
phical opus, despite the destructive aspects of his early
attacks on rationalism, was basically constructive in
character. He was concerned to form a solid philosophical
basis upon which mankind could advance in all intellec¬
tual fields towards ever greater enlightenment. Nietzsche,
on the other hand, was in all essentials a destructive
thinker, concerned to show that all such hopes are illu¬
sory, and that human existence is ultimately meaningless.
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This fundamental difference can be adduced as an inter¬
esting example of the phenomenon noted by Fichte and
Jaspers: the influence of a person's basic character and
outlook on his choice of philosophical stance. However
this may be, one must not lose sight of the fact that
either the Romantics are right and Nietzsche was wrong
or Nietzsche was right and the Romantics were wrong;
either God exists, or he does not exist; either life has
a meaning or it has no meaning; either each one of us
possesses an immortal soul, or he possesses no such
thing. Let us proce ed to examine the evidence in favour
of the more optimistic viewpoint;.
At the beginning of the 1790's, there were several
signs that Kant's philosophical position was regarded
widely as inadequate in certain respects. The criticisms
and the developments of Kant's work can perhaps best be
arranged according to their main focus or starting point
in his work. Fichte, for example, with his overwhelming
preoccupation with ethics, was largely concerned with
the second "Kritik", whereas Schiller, Holderlin and
Schelling were taken up more with the third. Let us first
consider Fichte's innovations.
One of the main points in Kant's work which worried
Fichte was the "Ding an sich". He saw it as a dangerous
remnant of dogmatic rationalism in the critical philo¬
sophy. This unknowable entity, outwith the grasp of human
cognition, was in Fichte's view inconsistent with the
general liberating spirit of Kant's work, and a threat
to the freedom of man and to his supremacy over Nature
- hence Fichte's need to posit a supra-individual mind
or subject which is not subject to the limitations of
Kant's individual "Ich". Fichte, in his mature works,
expresses his opposition to the determinism of the
Spinozan system, which he sees as the main alternative
to his own, and which, interestingly enough, he does
not claim is wrong - simply undesirable and unacceptable!
7
This is what Copleston means by the term "one-sided
exaggeration" in reference to Fichte's position (and
- 122 -
Hegel's) - this "Ego-centric" form of Idealism neglected
the aspect of the truth Spinoza had understood (here we
see the roots of Schelling's philosophy of Nature).
Thus, in Fichte's system, we have an all-powerful
"Ich" or subject (representing mankind, if you will, or
its intellectual faculties and efforts), which is com¬
pletely dominant over the "Nicht-Ich" (which might be
equated with Nature or matter). Now, in his "Differenz-
schrift" (1801), Hegel went into a thorough critique
of Fichte's position, making it clear why Holderlin,
Schelling and he found it necessary to go beyond it in
their own work. The basic problem is that posed by the
opposition and mutual limitation of the "Ich" and the
"Nicht-Ich". Fichte claims that his "Ich" is infinite
and unlimited in its scope. But it finds itself opposed
by the "Nicht-Ich", which would appear to impose a
limitation on the scope of the "Ich",8 exactly what
Fichte was attempting to avoid when he posited the "Ich"
originally. In Hegel's words:
Diesen Widerspruch sucht Fichte zu vereinigen,
aber dessenungeachtet laBt er den Grundschaden
des Dualismus bestehen; so ist er nicht aufgelost,
und das Jyetzte ist nur ein Sollen, Bestreben,
Sehnen. 9
This problem was the cause of Schelling's interest
in Spinoza's philosophy of Nature and in the ancient
>/ .
concept of the £k-«y-'To£.<3'lv. To Fxchte, Philosophical
Idealism and the Spinozan system were irreconcilable
opposites. Schelling, however, sought to perfect Idea¬
lism by the inclusion of Spinoza's philosophy of Nature.
His aim was to take the starting-point of Kant and
Fichte (the "Ich") and the starting-point of Spinoza
(God), and incorporate them both into his own system,
thereby overcoming the flaws in the previous systems of
Idealism.
We have already seen how Schiller, Holderlin and
Schelling, unlike Fichte, took Kant's third "Jiritik"
as their starting—point. This is of particular interest
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in view of the fact that it was in this "Kritik" that
Kant made his major attempt to solve the problem of the
unknowable thing-in-itself, by means of the 'aesthetic
intuition'. In the "Kritik der reinen Vernunft", Kant
had dealt with the theoretical activities of human reason
and its limitations. In the "Kritik der praktischen Ver¬
nunft", he had dealt with practical thinking. Now, in
the "Kritik der Urteilskraft", he considers the fol¬
lowing question:
Ob nun die Urteilskraft, die in der Ordnung
unserer Erkenntnisvermogen zwischen dem Verstande
und der Vernunft ein Mittelglied ausmacht, auch
fur sich Prinzipien a priori habe...
The wider implications of this investigation are
described by Copies ton, in a remarkably interesting
passage of his "History of Philosophy", in terms of "the
problem of reconciling the scientific view of the world
as a mechanical system with the demands of the moral
and religious consciousness",^Copleston finds it"argu¬
able that, in attempting to solve this problem, " ^an"TJ
left us with 'a bifurcated reality"1 .^rhe difficulty he
sees is the following:
There is no valid reason for asserting that
the phenomenal world is the only reality. Hut
at the same time there is no theoretical proof
of the existence of a supersensuous reality. It
is a matter of practical faith, resting on the
moral consciousness.^3
Copleston concludes:
It is true that in the third 'Critique' Kant
endeavoured to bridge the gulf between the two
worlds to the extent in which he considered this
to be possible for the human mind. But it is
imderstandable if other philosophers were not
satisfied with his performance...
Thus, in this respect, Kant's third "Kritik" might
with some justification, be regarded as his most impor¬
tant work, or at least his most constructive work.
Although Kant does deal with works of art in this
work,in general he subordinates them to the beauties of
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Nature, and seems to maintain that these works are to
he valued in proportion to the extent to which they par—
15take of these beauties. It is his theistic attitude
towards Nature which he is concerned to stress, along
with man's relationship to this God-created Nature. Ul¬
timately, even in this third "Kritik", Kant's appeal is
to faith rather than logical proof, despite all his argu¬
ments for the teleological view of Nature, but in this
he comes nearest to providing a solution to these ulti¬
mate problems. It is therefore hardly surprising if this
work became a great source-book for his contemporaries and
successors in their attempts to gain secure knowledge of
these matters.
The first important figure to take this route was
Schiller. Hegel described "das 'grofle Verdienst Schil—
lers'..., als der Erste die Kantische Subjektivitat und
Abstraktion des Denkens durchbrochen und den Versuch ge-
wagt zu haben, 'iiber sie hinaus die Einheit und Versoh—
nung denkend als das Wahre zu fassen'",^
Needless to say, in the process he laid far greater
stress on and attributed far greater importance to the
work of art than Kant was prepared to do. Schiller was
also concerned to stress the connection between aesthetic
and moral excellence in a manner reminiscent of Plato's
theory of forms. But perhaps the most significant point
that Schiller stresses is the synthesising nature of
aesthetic judgment and enjoyment. The dichotomy between
reason and matter is solved in the aesthetic act. Sen¬
suous dependence and moral freedom are seen to be recon¬
cilable in that the individual is at the same time exer¬
cising his practical perception and judgment and also
acting as a receiver of impulses from external physical
reality. The aesthetic act is a synthesis, bringing to¬
gether the two elements, the subject and the object. In
the process of developing this theory, Schiller laid far
greater stress on the emotional element in the aesthetic
act than Kant had done. In this, he was arguably coming
nearer to the reality of the artistic situation. He also
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took one step further in the direction of Schilling's
theory of the "Elcstase" . Furthermore, in his "Theosophie
des Julius", he took one step further along the road
towards Holderlin's theory of Love as a 'Metaprinciple of
-] n
Unification'. Schiller's lnale/female orgasmic unifica¬
tion of subject and object is in stark contrast to the
antagonistic relationship between "Ich" and "Nicht-Ich"
in Fichte's system and is well on the way towards the
system of Holderlin and Schelling, although the "Ich"
"13
is still by far the senior partner. It is important
to note, nevertheless, that for the first time in our
experience of the German Idealists, the idea of Nature
affecting the "Ich", rather than being affected by it,
is regarded with equanimity, if not approval. This is
very different from Kant's calm theistic speculations
on the teleological structure of Nature, and in parti¬
cular from Fichte's downright disapproval of and anta¬
gonism towards material Nature. This contrast can per¬
haps be explained by the different starting-points Fichte
and Schiller took in Kant's work: Fichte started from
the second "Kritik" which discusses how the "Ich" should
act (what it acts on is largely irrelevant), whereas
Schiller took the third "Kritik" as his starting-point,
where Kant discusses the relationship between the "Ich"
and the "Nicht-Ich", the subject and the object. This
relationship or dichotomy, which was to be the ultimate
stumbling-block for Fichte, was the starting-point for
Schiller, Holderlin and Schelling. In this subject/object
dichotomy and synthesis lies the root of the famous con¬
cept of the Dialectics, which played an important rftle
in the further development of Idealism, and which some
scholars, such as Fuhrmans, seem to identify with Idea¬
lism per se. It has its (modern) origins in Kant's con¬
cept of mutually incompatible theses which cannot be
brought into harmony unless one ignores the difference
established in his work between "Ding an sich" and
"Erscheinung".
This, then, was the task men like Schelling and Hol_
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derlin saw before them: to find some way of uniting in
harmony what in Kant seemed to be irreconcilable and in
mutual opposition, and to redress the one-sided "Ich"-
concentration of Kant and Fichte by trying to take ade¬
quate account of Nature , human passions, "das Damo-
nische" and God.
At this point we enter the most complex part of the
development of German Idealism. It is simple enough to
consider Kant's philosophical system for its own sake,
and then to discuss where Fichte differed from him. At
the other end, chronologically, it is also fairly easy
to define the differences between Hegel's mature system
and the ideas propounded by Schelling and Holderlin.
The difficult part is the period when the young friends,
Schelling, Holderlin and Hegel, were working together to
develop an adequate system of philosophy. Who influenced
whom when and how? Where did they disagree and to what
extent? These are all questions which have called forth
considerable discussion and contention in recent years.
It is my present purpose to concentrate more on the ideas
for their own sake rather than on making distinctions
between personalities. This much needs to be said, how¬
ever: in general terms, throughout the 1790's, it was
Schelling and Holderlin who led and Hegel who followed.
This situation continued, as far as the interested German
public was concerned, well into the first decade of the
new century. Hegel's "Differenzschrift" (1801) was widely
taken as the contribution of an orthodox Schelling dis¬
ciple. During the next two years he co-operated with
Schelling on the "Kritische Journal der Philosophie". It
was only really with the publication of the "Phenomeno¬
logy" in 1807 that it became apparent to the wider public
that Hegel had developed his own system of Idealism which
was incompatible with Schelling's ideas. This is not to
say, of course, that Hegel had not been brooding over
this system for some considerable time prior to the pub¬
lication of the "Phenomenology". This became clear on the
belated publication of his Jena lectures, covering the
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period 1803—06*.'. - How much further back than Jena one can
place Hegel's stirrings of independence is a matter of
dispute among scholars, a dispute which tends to overlap
with the even hotter dispute over the authorship of the
"Systemprogramm".
It will perhaps be appropriate at this point to gain
a firm grasp of the chronology of the period. So many
immensely important works of philosophy and literature
were being produced within such a short period that this
can sometimes be confusing. For the present purpose, we
shall confine ourselves to the works ■. of Kant,
Fichte, Schelling, Holderlin and Hegel up to but excluding
/ \ 20
the Jena period (in the case of Schelling and Hegel):
1781 Kant: "Kritik der reinen Vernunft",
1788 Kant: "Kritik der praktischen Vernunft".
1790 Kant: "Kritik der Urteilskraft".
1791 Holderlin's first poems published.
1792 Fichte: "Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung".
1793 Hblderlin leaves Tiibinger Stift.
1 791- Fichte: "Grundlage der gesamten Y/issenschaftslehre" .
Schellingt "liber die Moglichkeit einer Form der
Philosophie uberhaupt".
Hblderlin: "Thalia-Fragment" of "Hyperion".
Hblderlin attends Fichte's lectures at Jena.
1795 Schelling: "Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie".
Schelling: "Philosophische Briefe iiber Dogmatismus
und Kritizismus".
Hblderlin: "liber Urtheil und Seyn".
Hegel: "Das Leben Jesu".
Hblderlin arrives in Frankfurt.
1796 "Das alteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus".
Hegel: "die Positivitat der cnristlichen Keligion",
Hegel: "Eleusis".
1797 Schelling: "Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur",
Hblderlin: "Hyperion", Vol,I.
Hegel arrives in Frankfurt.
1798 Schelling: "Von der Weltseele".
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Holderlin: "Homburger Aufsatze".
Holderlin moves to Homburg; works on "Empedokles".
1799 Holderlin: "Hyperion", Vol. II.
1800 Schelling: "System des transzendentalen Idealismus".
Hblderlin moves to Stuttgart.
If we stop here at the turn of the century, we shall
find ourselves at a convenient turning-point in many ways:
Hblderlin has written all his strictly philosophical
works, is on the verge of producing his major Elegies
and Hymns and of going on his fateful trip to Bordeaux;
he has six years of sanity left to him. Schelling has
completed the first phase of his work, "die negative
Philosophie", and is firmly established as a major inde¬
pendent thinker, having freed himself from Fichte with
his works on Nature in the last three years of the cen¬
tury. Hegel has completed his early 'theological' essays,
and is on the verge of joining Schelling at Jena and of
publishing his first philosophical work, the "Differenz-
schrif t".
The interesting period from our point of view is the
six years between 179^- and 1800. During this time we can
watch the three friends going through a fascinating pro¬
cess of development. At the very least, we can say for
them that they produced one of the four main varieties
of German Idealism. A more generous (and possibly more
accurate) estimate is that they produced the only variety
of German Idealism which provides a solid bulwark against
the materialist and nihilist tendencies which have domi¬
nated much of European thought since their day.
During his five years at Tubingen, apart from his
official studies (well described by U.S. Harris in his
book "Hegel's Development") find his literary interests,
we know a reasonable amount about Hblderlin's philoso¬
phical interests from his letters — it is fairly safe to
assume that he would bother to mention in his personal
correspondence only the writers who interested him perso-
nally. In a letter to Neuffer in November 1790, he
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mentions Leibniz lor . S t.A. 6/1 , p. 56rj . Writing- to his
mother in February of the next year, he discusses Spinoza
at some length. This passage is worth quoting:
Ich studierte denjenigen Teil der Weltweisheit,
der von den Beweisen der Vernunft fur das Dasein
Gottes und von seinen Eigenschaften, die wir aus
der Natur erkennen sollen, handelt, mit einem
Xnteresse daflir, dessen ich tnich nicht schame,
wenn es gleich auf einige Zeit mich auf Gedanicen
flihrte, die Sie vielleicht unruhig gemacht hatten,
wenn Sie sie gekannt hatten. Ich ahnete namlich
bald, daB jene Beweise der Vernunft furs Dasein
Gottes, und auch fur Unsterblichkeit, so unvoll-
kommen waren, daB sie von scharfen Gegnern ganz
oder doch wenigstens nach ihren Hauptteilen
wtirden umgestoBen werden konnen. In dieser Zeit
fielen mir Schriften iiber und von Spinoza, einem
groflen edeln Manne aus dem vorigen Jahrhundert,
und doch Gottesleugner nach strengen Begriffen,
in die Hande. Ich fand, daB man, wenn man genau
prtift, mit der Vernunft. der kalten, vom Herzen
verlassenen Vernunft, auf seine Ideen kommen muB,
wenn man namlich alles erlclaren will. Aber da
blieb mir der Glaube meines Herzens, dem so un—
widersprechlich das Verlangen nach Ewigem, nach
Gott gegeben ist, tibrig.
^Gr.St.A.6/1,p.63-4J
Here, Holderlin seems to have left Leibniz well behind
PI
him and be coming round to a roughly Kantian position.
His respect for Spinoza is to be noted, however, and com¬
pared lith that subsequently shown by Schelling in his
writings.
In a letter to Neuffer in November, he mentions Rous¬
seau ^Gr.St.A.6/1,p.• In 1793> we find mentions of
Plato J^G-r,St.A.6/l ,p.867] and Hemsterhuis £Gr•St.A.6 /1 ,
p.89^J . In September of that year, he left the Stift.
On doing so, he was described in his testimonial as
"Philologiae, inprimis graecae, et philosophiae, inprimis
Kantianae... assiduus cultor" J^Gr. St .A. 7/1 > P» ^79Tj .
If one judges solely from the letters, his main philo¬
sophical interests at this stage would appear to be Spi¬
noza, with whom he is far from being in complete agree¬
ment and Plato (and the Platonists). It is not until a
letter to Hegel dated 10th July 179^ that we find the
following statement:
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Kant und die Griechen sind beinahe meine ein-
zige Lektlire. Hit dem asthetischen Telle der
kritischen Philosophie such ich vor^liglich ver-
traut zu werden.
[&r .St.A.6/1 , p . 1 287J
It is to be noted, however, that Holderlin had been
acquainted with the works of Schiller since at least his
mid-teens, and had shown fervent enthusiasm for them
throughout his period at the Stift. Thus, it might be
said that he was acquainted with the consequences of Kant




In any case, it did not take Holderlinj^to see the need
to go beyond Kant, as is shown in his letter to Neuffer
dated 10th October 179^-s
Vielleicht lcann ich Dir einen Aufsatz liber die
asthetischen Ideen schicken; weil er als ein Kom—
mentar liber den Phadrus des Plato gel ten kann,
und eine Stelle desselben mein ausdrlicklicher Text
1st... Im Grunde soil er eine Analyse des Schonen
und Erhabnen erhalten, nach welcher die Kantische
vereinfacht, und von der andern Seite vielseitiger
wird, wie es schon Schiller zum Teil in seiner
Schrift liber Anmut und Wlirde getan hat, der aber
doch auch einen Schritt weniger liber die Kantische
Grenzlinie gewagt hat, als er nach meiner Meinung
hatte wagen sollen. Lachle nicht! Ich kann irren;
aber ich habe gepriift, und lange und mit Anstreng-
ung geprlift. __ _
[Gr.St.A.6/1,p.137J
Xn the following month he travels to Jena and attends
lectures by Fichte:
Fichte ist jetzt die Seele von Jena. Und gottlobl
daB ers ist. Einen Mann von solcher Tiefe und
Energie des Geistes kenn ich sonst nicht. In den
entlegensten Gebieten des menschlichen Wissens die
Prinzipien dieses Wissens, und mit ihnen die des
Rechts aufzusuchen und zu bestimmen, und mit glei-
cher Kraft des Geistes die entlegensten, klihnsten
Folgerungen aus diesen Prinzipien zu denken, und
trotz der Gewalt der Finsternis sie zu schreiben
und vorzutragen, mit einem Feuer und einer Be—
stimmtheit, deren Vereinigung mir Armen ohne dies
Beispiel vielleicht ein unaufloslich.es Problem
geschienen hatte, - dies, lieber Neuffer! ist doch
gewifi viel, und ist gewiB nicht zu viel gesagt
von diesem Manne. Qlr . S t .A . 6/I , pp, 1 39—^oTj
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This gives us some idea of Holderlin's philosophical
position in this key year of 179^j in which Fichte's
star was at its zenith - the year which saw the publica¬
tion of the "Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre"
as well as an important paper by Fichte's disciple
23
Schelling.
This year also saw the publication of the "Fragment
von Hyperion", in Schiller's "Thalia". This version of
the novel Holderlin had been working on for over two
years was described by the author in a letter to Neuffer
dated 10th October: it is a representation of "der grofie
Ubergang aus der Jugend in das Wesen des Mannes voni
Affekte zur Vernunft, aus dem Reiche der Phantasie ins
Reich der Wahrheit und Freiheit'.', Jjjr .S t.A. 6/ 1 , p. 1 37j«J
This is straightforward orthodox Idealism, with no
suggestion of any return to the "Ursprung" or of a spe¬
cial rfile for Nature.
After moving to Jena, Holderlin starts work on the
"metrische Fassung". This, as one might expect, is
largely .F-ich"fcean in tone:
Du denkest wohl, ich spreche jugendlich.
Ich weifl, es ist Bedurfnis, was uns dringt,
Der ewig wechselnden Natur Verwandtschaft
Mit dem Unsterblichen in uns zu geben,
Doch dies Bedurfnis gibt das Recht uns auch.
Auch ist mir nicht verborgen, daB wir da,
Wo uns die schonen Formen der Natur
Die Gegenwart des Gottlichen verkiinden,
Mit unsrem Geiste nur die Welt beseelen.
[Gr.St.A.3,P. 1937]
The general tone is Fichtean. In particular, the last
line is a thoroughly Fichtean concept - an aspect of
Fichte's thought that was to be of considerable impor¬
tance for Novalis. However, the fifth line is significant:
as in the letter to his mother, quoted above, Holderlin's
appeal is to something other than reason: it is his poet's
intuition which leads him to stress Nature despite his
admiration for Fichte. It is his poet's intuition which
leads him to believe in God and freedom despite Spinoza.
His faith in this intuition is what led Holderlin on past
*
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Kant, past Schiller, past Fichte, until he was satisfied
that he had established a system of philosophy (in col¬
laboration with Schelling) which took account of both this
intuition, which he trusted implicitly, and human reason
and logic, which he was far from despising.
Elsewhere in this "metrische Fassung" he talks of the
"Hulfe" which Nature provides, "die Bereitwilligkeit,
womit sie der Vernunft die Hande bietet". £&r.St.A.3»P»186j
This is clearly a development of the element in Schiller's
aesthetics mentioned above, whereby, in contradistinc¬
tion to the Kantian position, room was allowed for man
to be affected in a passive manner in the aesthetic ex¬
perience. This is the difference between the thinkers
(Kant and Fichte) and the poets (Schiller and Holderlin):
the latter are aware, through their experience as artists,
that the archetypal artistic experience is one of pas¬
sivity, a readiness to remain open to experiences and im¬
pressions from Nature or human individuals, and to one's
own unconscious inspirations
It is precisely this passive aspect which Kant, Fichte
and subsequently Hegel refused to admit into their sys¬
tems. Their concern was to establish the rights of the
all—conquering,. "Ich" rather than to examine closely the
conditions for the existence of this "Ich". Their point
of departure was the existence of the "Ich" - the other
extreme from Spinoza. Perhaps the main insight of Holder-
lin and Schelling was centred on their vision of the
interaction of the "Ich" and the "Nicht-Ich", subject and
object, active and passive principles. Their Absolute was
not a logical conclusion at the end of a long dialectical
process (Hegel), but an event which occurs as a result
of the interaction of these two elements.
Thus, here in Jena, we see Hblderlin reaching the
point equivalent to that which Empedokles occupied at the
outset of his career. The task facing the German poet
and philosopher was identical to that awaiting Empedokles
at the conclusion of the Greek Enlightenment: the addi¬
tions and modifications Holderlin was about to make to
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the German Idealist system can be compared closely with
those Empedokles had made to Parmenides' system: trust in
the senses and interest in the Unconscious (Revelation)
were major concerns to both the Greek and the German.
The year 1795 sees Holderlin (and Schelling) groping
forward into the unknown, for something beyond Fichte1s
position. This "something" did not come fully into fru¬
ition until two years later, with the publication of the
first volume of "Hyperion" and of the first of Schelling's
works on Nature. However, these early beginnings are
worthy of close study.
The first important document of the year is Holder-
lin's letter to Hegel dated 26th January. In it he de¬
scribes his first impressions of Fichte's system when he
read "seine ersten Blatter" in Waltershausen, before he
came to Jena and before he had a chance to meet him and
attend his lectures:
Fichtens spekulative Blatter - Grundlage der
gesamten Wissenschaftslehre — auch seine gedruckten
Vorlesungen liber die Bestimmung des Gelehrten wer-
den Dich sehr interessieren. Anfangs hatte ich
ihn sehr in Verdacht des Dogmatismus; er scheint,
wenn ich mutmaflen darf, auch wirklich auf dem
Scheidewege gestanden zu sein, oder noch zu stehn
- er mochte liber deis Faktum des BewuBtseins in der
Theorie hinaus, das zeigen sehr viele seiner
Aufierungen, und das ist ebenso gewiB, und noch
auffallender transzendent, als wenn die bisherigen
Metaphysiker liber das Dasein der Welt hinaus
wollten - sein absolutes Ich (= Spinozas Substanz)
enthalt alle Realitat; es ist alles, und aufler ihm
ist nichts; es gibt also fiir dieses absolute Ich
kein Objekt, denn sonst ware nicht alle Realitat
in ihm; ein BewuBtsein ohne Objekt ist aber nicht
denkbar, und wenn ich selbst dieses Objekt bin,
so bin ich als solches notwendig beschrankt, sollte
es aach nur in der Zeit sein, also nicht absolut;
also ist in dem absoluten Ich kein BewuBtsein denk-
bar, als absolutes Ich hab ich kein BewuBtsein,
und insofern ich kein BewuBtsein habe, insofern
bin ich (fur mich) nichts, also das absolute Ich
ist (flir mich) Nichjs.
JjGr .St.A.6 /1 ,p. 1 5 57]
His understanding of Fichte was obviously imperfect
at this stage. In particular, he does not seem to have
understood the r8le of the "Nicht-Ich". It is also rather
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strange, at first sight, that he should equate Fichte's
"Ich" with Spinoza's "Substanz", One remembers that he
made his first acquaintance with Fichte's work "unrnittel-
bar nach der Lekttire des Spinoza". [jr.St.A.6/1,p.156 j]
We can assume, I feel, that Holderlin eventually noticed
that Spinoza's "Substanz" and Fichte's "Ich" were tra¬
velling in opposite directions, so to speak, or at least
that Fichte pointed this out to him in lectures or dis¬
cussions at Jena. The fact that Holderlin noticed the
parallel between these two theories at this early stage
is perhaps significant, in that the future form of his
and Schelling's system was based on the correspondence of
and relationship between these two elements. In this
sense, it can be seen as a fruitful mistake.
However, this may have been something more than a be¬
ginner's mistake on Holderlin's part. His friend Schel-
ling, in his letters to Hegel during 1795> in which he
explained Fichte's ideas, equated the Absolute Ego with
God, rejecting the Kantian idea of a transcendent deity,
which Hegel still accepted. Spinoza also rejected this
concept, and equated the infinite divine substance with
Nature - hence Holderlin's description of him, in the
letter quoted above, as "Gottesleugner nach strengen
Begriffen |jGr .St. A. 6/1 , p. 64-IJ . That Fichte did not
equate the divine with Nature must have been obvious to
his young disciples, but they may nevertheless have felt
justified in pointing to similarities between the two
25
systems in thxs respect.
However this may be, Holderlin himself stresses that
this was a first impression, and, later in the same let¬
ter, he goes on to discuss the matter of the "Ich" and
the "Nicht-Ich" in terms that show beyond any doubt that,
by the time he wrote this letter, he understood Fichte's
26
ideas on this subject, at least. It is most unfortunate
that Hegel appears to have lost a section of the letter
which began: "Fichte bestatiget mir..."
In general, perhaps the most interesting aspect of
Holderlin's account is the fact that he noticed that
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Fichte was dissatisfied with the limitations imposed on
human reason by Kant, and that Holderlin's first instinct
was to defend the Kantian position for the sake of pre¬
serving the freedom established by Kant for the "Ich".
His high regard for Kant is further shown in the same
letter by the following passage:
Dafi Du Dich an die Religionsbegriffe machst,
ist gewifi in mancher Riicksicht gut und wichtig.
Den Begriff der Vorsehung behandelst Du wohl
ganz parallel mit Kants Teleologie; die Art, wie
er den Mechanismus der Natur (also such des Schick-
sals) mit ihrer ZweclcmaBigkeit vereiniget, scheint
mir eigentlich den ganzen Geist seines Systems zu
enthalten; es ist freilich dieselbe, womit er alle
Antinomien sch.l i r>Vi t«=>-h-
Several points deserve to be mentioned here. Firstly,
Holderlin's attitude towards Kant would seem to be largely
conditioned by the tone and aspirations of the third
"Kritik". Kant's teleological view of Nature has not es¬
caped his attention. To equate Kant's "Teleologie" with
"Vorsehung" and Nature with Fate is in agreement with
the spirit of the third "Kritik", but is also pointing
beyond it, towards future concerns with Revelation. When
Kant pointed towards a supposed teleological structure
in Nature, it is doubtful if he himself meant to achieve
any more than to provide another piece of empirical evi¬
dence to support his theistic beliefs. However, this ele¬
ment in the third "Kritik" was of overwhelming signifi¬
cance for future developments. It showed Holderlin, in
all probability, the flaw in Fichte's system: if Nature
(= the "Nicht-Ich") has a teleological structure, how can
it play the rfile ascribed to it by Fichte? It must surely
do more than limit the activities of the "Ich": it must
somehow act on the "Ich", in a reciprocal fashion. When
Holderlin equated Nature with Fate, he is stressing this
ac tive rfile.
Then, there is the question of the Antinomies. In his
second "Anmerkung" to Section 57 of the third "Kritik",
Kant describes their function as follows:
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Folgende wichtige Bemerkung bietet sich hier
von selbst dar: daB es namlicli dreierlei Arten der
Antinomie der reinen Vernunft gebe, die aber alle
darin iibereinkommen, dafi sie dieselbe zwingen, von
der sonst sehr natiirlichen Voraussetzung, die
Gegenstande der Sinne fur die Dinge an sich selbst
zu halten, abzugehen,,,
DaB es drei Arten der Antinomie gibt, hat sei-
nen Grund darin, daB es drei Erkenntnisvermogen:
Verstand, Urteilskraft und Vernunft gibt, deren0„
jedes... seine Prinzipien a priori haben mufl,.. '
Of these, the most radically significant are the four
which deal with rational cosmology:
1. Thesis^ The world is finite.
AntithesisThe world is infinite.
2. Thesisj_ The world is made up of simple sub¬
stances combined. . ,. . ,
indivisible
_Ant_ithe_si_s£ The world is made up of _ . ^ entities
which cannot be reduced to simple
parts. »■
3. Thesis J. Everything in world cannot be explained
in terms of a causality of Nature. There
must also be a causality of Freedom.
Airt ithe_sisEverything in the world can be explained
in terms of the causality of Nature.
4. Thesisj. God must necessarily exist.
AntithesisThere is no necessary being.
In general, in each of these four cases, the 'Thesis'
represents the orthodox doctrine of "Dogmatism", the
'Antithesis' that of Anglo-Saxon Empiricism. Kant's ap¬
proach is to try to show that neither side has proved or
can prove its case, until some certitude has been attained
with regard to the theoretical possibilities and abili¬
ties of human reason in the field.
When Kant eventually turns his attention to the solu-
tion of thes Antinomies, he does so by a synthesing pro¬
cess which had its consequences in the form of the
Schellingian and Hegelian dialectics. Now, when Holderlin
states that Kant's method of solving the Antinomies was
to be compared with the manner in which he brought toge—
♦
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ther the "Mechanisraus" and the "ZweckmaBigkeit" of Nature,
he was referring to precisely this synthesising process.
Here we see the first sign of the general tendency of the
German Idealists, with the possible exception of Fichte:
when faced with two contradictory propositions or argu¬
ments concerning a certain subject, their first instinct
is to bring the opposing views into harmony by tailing a
wider view, rather than agreeing with one side or the
other. However, for Kant at least, it is undesirable to
accept the dogmas of atheistic nihilism and moral sub¬
jectivism. It was, indeed, to a large extent the advan¬
tage of Leibnizian Dogmatism that it provided an appar¬
ent bulwark against these views. Kant, however, rejects
the rationalists' attempts to prove their dogmas, while
at the same time keeping sight of the basic problem and
agreeing with their general world-view. He also rejects
the Empiricist dogmas of the Anglo-Saxon philosophers:
why should one assume that all there is to reality is
what is given to one in sense data?
Kant sees the solution in the distinction between the
"Erscheinung" and the "Ding an sich". He agrees that the
world as a "Ding an sich" is either finite or infinite,
but he claims that it is impossible for either the em¬
pirical or the rationalist qaproach to prove its case one
way or the other. The same approach is applied by him to
the simple/complex Antinomy. As regards the natural cau¬
sality/freedom Antinomy, his solution is more complex.
The Behaviourist approach to ethics may be empirically
true: a man may become a mass murderer because of his
background, lack of education, etc.. But Kant claims that
these circumstances are no excuse for his actions: the
fact remains that he ought not to have become a mass
murderer. Iv'hence does Kant take this "ought"? From Reason,
which is free from natural causality. Lastly, on consi¬
dering whether God is necessary or not, Kant takes the
following approach: if one restricts the world to the
collection of "Erscheinungen" postulated by the Empir¬
icists, there is no room for a necessary first cause,
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because by this view everything in existence is contin¬
gent and empirically conditioned. However, Kant claims
that it is still possible to posit a non—sensible cause
of the \>rhole sensible world. This differs from the Leib-
nizian position in the respect that the latter involves
an attempted proof of the divine causality of each indi¬
vidual monad.
In this way, then, Kant attempted to take account of
the ideas, dogmas and preoccupations of both the Empir¬
icist and the Rationalist tradition. The connection be¬
tween this solution of the Antinomies and the "Mecha—
nismus"/"Teleologie" synthesis referred to by Holderlin
becomes clear when one reads the following passage from
the third "Kritik"j
Da es aber doch wenigstens moglich ist, die
materielle Iv'elt als bloBe Erscheinung zu betrachten,
und etwas als Ding an sich selbst (welches nicht
Erscheinung ist) als Substrat zu denken, diesem
aber eine korrespondierende intellektuelle Anschau—
ung (wenn sie gleich nicht die unsrige ist) unter-
zulegen: so wiirde ein, ob zwar ftir uns unerkenn-
barer, ubersinnlicher Realgrund fur die Natur Statt
finden, zu der wir selbst mitgehoren, in welcher
wir also das, was in ihr als Gegenstand der Sinne
notwendig ist, nach mechanischen Gesetzen, die
Zusammenstimmung und Einheit aber der besonderen
Gesetze und der Formen nach denselben, die wir in
Ansehung jener als zufallig beurteilen miissen, in
ihr als Gegenstande der Vernunft (ja das Naturganze
als System) zugleich nach teleologischen Gesetzen
betrachten, und sie nach zweierlei Principien
beurteilen wtirden, ohne dab die mechanische Er-
klarungsart durch die teleologische, als ob sip
einander widersprachen, ausgeschlossen wird,'-"
Thus, our situation in the universe might be compared
with that of a young lion born in a safari park. He is
born into a world of "Erscheinungen" which, from his
point of view, are simply there: a set of particular
natural phenomena (and others such as fences, signs,
hides) whose origins are a mystery to him. If the park
is large enough, he might live out his whole life in it
without ever seeing a game warden or any other human
being. It is nevertheless the case that his entire en-
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vironment and the conditions of his existence are planned
by man, a creature of whose very existence he has no em¬
pirical knowledge. Likewise, within that planned environ¬
ment, he possesses considerable personal freedom — to
hunt, to play, to breed. Also, he has personal responsi¬
bility, whether he acknowledges it or no: if he attacks
a human visitor to the park, he will be held accountable.
This rough parallel, then, shows one the basic Kantian
view of man's place in the universe. It is his attempt
to solve the problem mentioned by Copleston in the pas¬
sage quoted above: how to reconcile the Copernican and
Christian world views, or the world of the "Erscheinung"
and the world of the "Ding an sich".
If we return now to Holderlin's letter, we can note
two further points:
1. In equating Kant's "Teleologie" with Hegel's more
religious term "Vorsehung", Holderlin strengthens
an implication which is latent in the Kantian pro¬
position: the teleological aspect of Nature (to
which we belong) is the force against which the
Idealists are normally seen as fighting - necessity,
blind fate, the Yd'Vj of the Greeks.
2. In applying the mechanism/teleology dualism not
only to Nature but also to "Schicksal", he divides
this force into two distinct species: the fate or¬
dained by divine will and the fate composed of con¬
tingent phenomena. Here lies the basis of much of
Holderlin's future work: the freedom of action of
the "Ich" is rightly employed by the individual in
opposing the second species (as in building dams
to keep out the sea, harnessing Nature to produce
against
food, defending oneself : ... ^ attack, etc.), but
opposition to the first species of fate is, in
Holderlin's eyes, hubris. This ignoring or opposing
of the divine aspect or variety of Fate is the sin
of Oedipus, Empedokles, Plato from "the Republic"
onwards, Fichte, and Hegel from Jena onwards (if
one looks at their actions and ideas through Holder-
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linian eyes). Hubris, in fact, can be seen as the
great danger of the Idealist world view, and also
of the Empiricist position - both see the world
from the point of view of the "Ich".
Here we have the tightrope the post-Kantian Idealists
were walking: they were dissatisfied with Kant's ultimate
conclusion that these "ultimae res" were unknowable;
they approved of his dismissal of Dogmatism with its ul¬
timately deterministic negation of freedom, but they
feared that Kant's admission of unknowability would lead
to scepticism about the existence of God, immortality
and the need for freedom. Their worst fears have been
fully justified by the subsequent development of Euro¬
pean thought. The teleological aspect of Nature ana the
dialectics were the elements in Kant's thought which pro¬
vided them with the best hope of overcoming this problem.
Holderlin gained further assistance and inspiration from
the Greeks, as we have seen.
During the first half of 1795 in Jena, Holderlin was
in constant personal contact with Eichte, Schiller and
Goethe. It was at this stage that the famous meeting and
discussion at Niethainmer's house took place, with Eichte,
Holderlin and Novalis among the guests - the only known
occasion on which Holderlin and Novalis met. This dis¬
cussion apparently turned largely around the subjects of
religion and revelation, and the future tasks of philo¬
sophy. Given the future development of their thought, it
is fairly safe to assume that Holderlin and Novalis ex¬
pressed dissatisfaction with the present state of Idea¬
lism, and looked to Revelation as a solution or comple¬
ment. Fichte1s reaction can only have been sceptical. ^
However this may be, it is important to note that Reve-
pO
lation was one of the main topics of discussion, 1
In the summer, Holderlin moved to Nurtingen, where he
seems to have gone through a period of loneliness and
frustration, as is shown by a letter to Schiller dated
4th September:
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Das MiBfalien an rair selbst unci dem, was mich
umgibt, hat mich in die Abstraction hineingetrie-
ben; ich suche mir die Idee eines unendlichen Pro¬
gresses der Philosophie zu entwiclceln, ich suche
zu zeigen, daB die unnachlaBliche Forderung, die
an jedes System gemacht werden muB, die Vereinigung
des Subjekts uhd Objekts in einem absoluten - Ich
oder wie man es nennen will zwar asthetisch, in der
intellektualen Anschauung, theoretisch aber nur
durch eine unendliche Annaherung moglich ist, wie
die Annaherung des Quadrats zum Zirlcel, und daB
um ein System des Denkens zu realisieren, eine
Unsterblichkeit ebenso notwendig ist, als sie es
ist fur ein System des HandehlS.Ich glaube, da-
durch beweisen zu konnen, inwieferne die Skeptiker
recht haben, und inwieferne nicht...
Ich fiihle nur zu oft, daB ich eben kein seltener
Mensch bin.
Ich friere und starre in dem Winter, der mich
umgibt. So eisern mein Himmel ist, so steinern
bin ich.
^
Auf den Oktober werd ich warscheinlich eine
Hofmeisterstelle in Frankfurt beziehen...
The proposition that Holderlin has set himself to
prove here has striking similarities with the manner in
which Hegel criticised the Fichtean system in the "Dif—
ferenzschrift", on the grounds that, despite its avox^ed
intention of doing away with Kant's unknowable thing—in—
itself, Fichte's system left the Absolute equally unat¬
tainable except by an infinite number of "Begrtindungs —
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schritte".
Perhaps the key point in Holderlin's discussion of
the problem in his letter to Schiller is where he says
that the "Vereinigung" which is impossible theoretically
is nevertheless possible "asthetisch, in der intellek¬
tualen Anschauung". In fact, these philosophical ambi¬
tions of Holderlin are a logical extension of the prob¬
lematics of the short essay "liber Urtheil und Seyn" which
he had written on the flyleaf of a book while he was still
in Jena (probably in April). To this essay we now turn.
For the purposes of this discussion, I shall accept
the proposition supported by Henrich and Harris that
Beiflner's arrangement of the essay, with the section on
"Urteil" coming first, is a mistake and has no justifi-
- *[k2 -
32
cation either in the content or otherwise. If we there¬
fore take "Sein" first, the argument of the essay runs
as follows:
a) "Sein" = the original seamless joining of subject
and object.
b) This "Sein" is not the same as "Identitat" - the
proposition "Ich = Ich" can only be pro¬
duced by a "Trennung" of the "Ich" from
itself. Self—consciousness can only be
achieved by separation and opposition.
"Also ist die Identitat keine Yereinigung
des Objekts und Subjekts, die schlechthin
stattfande, also ist die Identitat nicht
= dem absoluten Sein." ^G-r . S t. A. k/1 , p. 21 7jj
With that, Holderlin closes the first half of his
essay. The following points are worth noting:
1. In the beginning, the subject and the object are
joined together in the "Sein". There is no con¬
sciousness involved at this stage, because con¬
sciousness involves separation. (The play on words
— "Ur-teil"/"Teilung" — is very Heideggerian.)
2. In describing this state of consciousness-less
harmony, Holderlin adds the simile: "wie es bei
der intellelctualen Anschauung der Fall ist." Ergo,
for Holderlin, consciousness and the "intellek-
tuale Anschauung"would seem to be incompatible.
This might, at first sight, seem strange, consi«-
dering the fact that the "intellektuale Anschauung"
is Holderlin's great hope for attaining absolute
knowledge of the most important metaphysical truths.
However, one must remember that this is not seen
by him as a method whereby X can know Y in Fichte's
sense (Y being a passive object), but rather as an
interpenetration or two-way relationship of X and Y.
Here, consciousness is used in the narrow sense of
logical separation into isolated phenomena and
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categories (in a roughly Aristotelian sense).
3. The 'tntellektuale Anschauung" is a condition brought
about by the binding force of Love in the Platonic
sense. Hence the original "Sein" can be equated with
the original rule of Love in Empedokles * system.
"Teilung", the "Urteil", consciousness, are pheno¬
mena related to Empedolclean Strife.
4. Consciousness, in this Holderlinian sense, is as
we have seen, a state of mind whereby distinctions
are made and phenomena are isolated from or even
hostile towards each other. One might equate this
with the Aristotelian and Empiricist strands in
philosophy, with their tendency to see things as
isolated unique phenomena, rather than concentrating
on what binds them together.
5. ^ichte's system, taking as it does its beginning
from a state of "Teilung", never attains to the
harmony of Holderlin's "Sein" but wastes itself in
eternal "Sehnen" and opposition - in other words,
Fichte's system involves a permanent state of Empe-
doklean Strife.
6. In replacing "Ich = Ich" by "Sein" as the starting
point of his system, Holderlin was tacitly sup¬
porting the Rousseauan conception of ^Jaont6 natu-
relle^ against original sin, in that the original
Empedoklean state of Love or harmony applies just
as much to the individual as it does toibrld history.
If we now carry on to the second section, on "Urtheil",
we find the following propositions:
a) "Urtheil" = the original separation of the subject
and object, previously joined together in
the "intellektuale Anschauung", whereby
"erst Objekt und Subjekt moglich wird".
b) This separation involves the mutual interrelation-
- m -
ship of subject and object - "und die
notwendige Voraussetzung eines Ganzen,
wovon Objekt mad Subjekt die Teile sind."
0-r.St.A.4/1 ,p.2167]
c) "Ich = Ich" is the "theoretische Urteilung? "Xch =
Nicht-Ich" is the "praktische Urteilung".
d) His final paragraph deals (in a rather confusing
manner) with the three realms of "Ver-
nunft", "Verstand" and "Anschauung". He
sees "Vernunft" as the realm of "Notwen-
digkeit", "Verstand" as that of "Moglich-
keit" and "Anschauung" as that of "Wirk—
lichkeit". In the process he makes what
at first seems to be a strange claim:
"Wenn ich einen Gegenstand als moglich
denke, so wiederhol ich nur das vorher-
gegangene BewuBtsein, kraft dessen er
wirklich ist." fTir.St.A, h/ 1 , p . 21 6^] I
take this to be a Platonist reference to
the Theory of Forms, and also a claim to
the effect that the "intellektuale An¬
schauung" is his torically prior to the
condition of "Verstand".
In general, with regard to the "Urtheil" section, one
might make the following remarks:
1. Behind the claim (in Section d above) for the pri¬
ority of "Wirklichkeit" over Moglichkeit" there
lies the deeper and more important implication that
the difference between Holderlin's system and that
of Fichte can be reduced to the fact that where
Fichte bases his ideas on Kant's second "Kritik"
and on the realm of "Verstand" (and therefore "Mog—
lichkeit" ), he (Hblderlin) bases his on the third
"Kritik" and on "intellektuale Anschauung" (and
therefore "Wirklichkeit"). In Kant, Reason (whether
.'Pure' or 'Practical') and Understanding have two
elements in common: they both furnish a priori laws
- 1^5 -
(the first of freedom, the second of nature), and
they are both independent of the particular sub¬
ject (unlike Judgment). The respective signifi¬
cance of Reason, Understanding and Judgment is
relative to the two elements of the Universal and
the Particular: Understanding is the ability to
have knowledge of the Universal, Reason that to
determine the Particular through the Universal,
Judgment that to subsume the Particular under the
Universal. Thus, Judgment is the only one of the
three situations where one is faced originally by
the Particular; this, as we have seen, is the very
area where Pichte's system seems to encounter dif—
ficulties o
2. Holderlin's way of expressing his proposition con¬
cerning "Moglichkeit" and "Wirklichkeit" is almost
certainly influenced by the doctrine of
as expounded by Plato in the "Meno", the "Phaedrus"
and elsewhere. Kant1s ideas on the subject are al¬
together more matter-of-fact:
Nun beruht... alle unsere Unterscheidung des
bloB Moglichen vom Wirklichen darauf, daB das
erstere nur die Position der Vorstellung eines
Dinges respektiv auf unsern Begriff und iiber-
haupt das Vermogen zu deriken, das letztere aber
die Setzunei des Dinges an sich selbst... be—
deutet.
However, this quotation (from Section 76 of the
third "Kritik") shows us that, for Kant also,
"Wirklichkeit" has priority over "Moglichkeit",
the former being connected with the concept of the
"Ding an sich".
3. One need hardly stress that, for Holderlin, this
"Wirklichkeit" was not the empirical reality of
natural science, but the semi-mystical reality
intuited in the "intellektuale Anschauung" - his
solution, in fact, to the problem of reconciling
the Copernican and Christian world views. This
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reality is a composite of th9 empirical or material
reality (the "Nicht—Ich") and spiritual reality (the
"Ich"), whereby,rather than one component overcoming
the other (as in Fichte) or rising up above it (as
in Hegel), the two components are brought together
1/
m harmony by the "Metaprinciple" of Qr "Liebe'J
4. The fact that, for Hblderlin, subject and object
together form a larger whole and that the one is
incomplete without the other, can be seen as Hoi —
derlin's major contribution to German thought. His
theory holds just as well for the individual within
himself as for his relationship with the external
world — in Novalis' words, "der Mensch ist so gut
34
Nicht-Ich, als Ich". In the historical sense, man
(or his intellectual faculties) became separated
from Nature with the onset of the Pre—Sokratic En¬
lightenment, and he soon came to see Nature simply
as an alien, even hostile force which he could only
combat and strive to control. In the personal sense,
a man becomes divided within himself when and if he
begins to see his various faculties (reason, senses,
unconscious) as mutually opposed, as, for example,
in the Freudian world view.
Thus, we find that Hblderlin had already gone a con¬
siderable length beyond Fichte's position. His insight
that "Ich" and "Nicht-Ich" are combined originally within
the larger unit of the self or "Sein" is completely new.
At the period in question, Schelling (still at theuStift")
was an orthodox Fichtean, even if he betrayed considerable
sympaithy with Spinozan ideas in his "Philosophische
Briefe" of that year. In his "Abhandlungen zur Erlauterung
des Idealismus der ivissenschaftslehre" (1796-7), he was
still maintaining:
Das einzige Beispiel einer absoluten Identitat
der Vorstellung und des Gegenstandes finden wir
also in uns selbst. Was sich allein unmittelbar,
und dadurch erst alles andere, erkennt und ver—
steht, ist das Ich in uns. Bei allem andern Objekt
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bin ich genothigt zu fragen, wodurch das Seyn des-
selben mit ineiner Vorstellung vermittelt werde? Ich
aber bin urspriinglich nicht etwa fur ein erkennen?
des Subjekt auBer mir, wie die Materie, sondern fur
mich selbst da, in mir ist die absolute Identitat
des Subj^kts und des Objekts, des Erkennens und des
Seyns... 35
To Holderlin, man was a composite in the sense of
Kant's second antinomy. In the beginning, he is unaware
of his composite nature; this awareness comes with the
"Ur-teilung", For Fichte, and for Schelling at this
stage, man was a simple entity possessing self—awareness
from the outset, then awareness of the "Nicht-Ich". When
Schelling talks of the Identity of "Erkennen" (= Holder-
lin's "Urtheil") and "Seyn" in the individual and/or the
Universe, this is very different from Holderlin's posi¬
tion, whereby the original "Seyn" is divided against and
within itself by the onset of "Erkennen" or "Urtheil".
Thus, we see that Friedrich Strack's description of
the situation at this stage in the history of German
Idealism has all the hallmarks of accuracy:
Wenn es stimmt - wie Plitt "berichtet;. —, daB
Holderlin bei seinem Besuch in Tubingen im Sommer
1795 Schelling tiber seine philosophischen Versuche
'getrostet1 und zu ihm gesagt haben soil: 'Sei du
nur ruhig, du bist grad soweit als Fichte, ich habe
ihn ja gehort', dann besagen diese tforte auch, daB
Iiolderlin sich dem Freund gegeniiber philosophisch
gewachsen fulilte mad ihm sogar noch einiges voraus
zu haben glaubte, wahrend Hegel zur gleichen Zeit
im Brief an Schelling darliber klagt, 'nur bin Lehr-
ling' in der neuesten Philosophie zu sein. 3o
Thus, rather than seeing the philosophical differences
between Holderlin and Schelling at this stage as evidence
of a significant disagreement, one should understand them
as the difference between two different stages on the
same path. Holderlin had had the opportunity to attend
lectures by Fichte at Jena, and to discuss his ideas with
him in private. He had come to terms with his system and
made considerable progress in achieving what Schelling
evidently agreed was desirable (as is shown by his
"Philosophische Briefe"): a combination of Fichte's sys-
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tem with Spinoza'£, with the help of Xant1 s third "Eritik"
and Plato's "Vereinigungsphilosophie". Schelling himself
later went on to achieve this desirable aim in his
writings on Nature from 1797 onwards, following Holder-
lin's lead.
What of young Hege1, whom we last encountered wrest¬
ling with the concept of "Vorsehung" in his unpublished
essays on religious themes? Y/hat lay behind his concern
with religious topics, very different from the more
strictly philosophical interests of Holderlin and Schel-
ling? The following excerpts from his writings of the
period may help us to understand what he was attempting
to achieve:
a) Es liegt in dem Begriffe der Religion, daB sie
nicht blofie Wissenschaft von Gott, seinen Eigen-
schaften, unserem Verhaltnis und dem Verhaltnis
der Welt zu ihm und der Rortdauer unserer Seele,
was uns allenfalls entweder durch blofle Vernunft
annehmbar oder auch auf einem anderen Weg uns
bekannt ware - nicht eine bloBe historische oder
rasonierte lvenntnis ist, sondern daB sie das Iierz
interessiert, daB sie einen EinfluB auf unsere
Empfindungen und auf die Bestiramung unseres
Willens hat - indem teils unsere Pflichten und
die Gesetze einen starkren Nachdruck dadurch er-
halten, daB sie als Gesetze Gottes uns vorge-
stellt werden; teils indem die Vorstellung der
Erhabenheit und der Gtite Gottes gegen uns -
unser Herz mil Bewunderung und mit Empfindungen
der Demut und Dankbarkeit erfullt.
Die Religion gibt also der Moralitat und ihren
Beweggrlinden einen neuen erhabenern Schwung, sie
gibt einen neuen starkren Damm gegen die Gewalt
der sinnlichen Antriebe ab. ?'
b) Die reine aller Schranken unfahige Vernunft ist
die Gottheit selbst — Nach Vernunft ist also der
Plan der Welt liberhaupt geordnet; Vernunft ist
es, die dem Menschen seine Bestimmung, einen
unbedingten Zweck seines Lebens lcennen lehrt; oft
ist sie zwar verfinstert, aber doch nie ganz aus-
geloscht worden, selbst in der finsternis hat
sich immer ein schwacher Schimmer derselben er-
halten -
Unter den Juden war es Johannes, der die Men¬
schen wieder auf diese ihre Wiirde aufmerksam
machte - die ihnen nichts fremdes sein sollte,
sondern die sie in sich selbst, in ihrem wahren
Selbst,... in der Ausbildung des gottlichen
Eunkens, der ihnen zu teil geworden ist, der
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ihnen das Zeugnis gibt, daI3 sie in einera erhabenern
Sinne von der Gottheit selbst abstamraen - Ausbil-
dung der Vernuxift ist die einzige Quelle der ¥ahr-
heit und der Beruhigung, die Johannes etwa nicht
ausschlieBend oder als eine Seltenheit zu besitzen
vorgab, sondern die alle,.Menschen in sich selbst
aufschlieBen konnen...
Concerning quotation (a), I should like to make the
following points:
1. Hegel is interested in religion not so much as a
revelation of metaphysical "truths as for the pos¬
sibilities and means it supplies for influencing
the behaviour of the people.
2. The main advantage religion has in the performance
of this task is that, unlike abstract ethical
tracts, it can appeal directly to the emotions (in
a manner similar to that of Pindar's Odes, Sopho-
klean tragedy and Wagner's "Gesamtkunstwerk").
3. In the process, religion's main 'enemy', and the
force it most needs to control, is "die Gewalt der
sinnlichen Antriebe". Hegel's attitude here is
similar to that of Plato in his later years, from
"the Republic" onwards. Holderlin, for example,
would scarcely have used the word "Damm" in this
context. Rather than bringing all man's faculties
together, Hegel would seem to wish to manipulate
the people's emotions (for their own good, needless
to say) without any serious appeal to their reason.
However, this is an early essay and perhaps misre¬
presents Hegel's position by 1795» Let us therefore move
on to the excerpt from "das Beben Jesu". About this, the
following points can be made:
1. The surprising equation of God with "die reine
aller Schranlcen unfahige Vernunft" would seem to
be an out-and-out relic of "Dogmatismus". We may
remember that Hegel was reputed to be far less en¬
thusiastic about Kant at the Stift than Holderlin.
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For one moment, in the second paragraph, when one
is asked to consider a quality that all men possess
"in sich selbst, in ihrem wahren Selbst", one might
assume that Hegel is about to discuss some Holder-
linian concept of the Unconscious. But no: the
inner quality concerned is the divine spark of rea¬
son, which, unrealistically enough, all men are
supposed to possess in equal measure. Why all men
should be expected to possess equal powers of rea¬
son, when their capacities for running, playing
musical instruments, lifting weights, etc., are so
obviously disparate, is not explained. X feel that
Hegel, who has clearly based his approach on
Plato's theories, is here guilty of a misunder¬
standing of the €:K"TIK'V]• The latter is
SC \otodu already present in
the unconscious of anyone and everyone, not for
bringing everyone's logical prowess up to the level
of a Sokrates or a Plato.
Once more, we note the reject^Sf or sceptical atti¬
tude towards the senses and the emotions. Hegel's
attitude here towards man's "Triebe nach Gluckfelig—
keit" is part of the general vision of the pure ra¬
tionalist, which Hegel evidently was at this time.
His world view, like that of the aging Plato, is
one of man's reason rising up out of the mire of
Nature, and leaving it behind as rapidly as pos¬
sible. Hegel here might be said to have earned a
share in Kant's rebuke of Plato:
Die leichte Taube, indem sie im freien Fluge
die Luft teilt, deren Widerstand sie fuhlt,
konnte die Vorstellung fassen, daB es ihr im
luftleeren Raum noch viel besser gelingen werde.
Ebenso verlieB Plato die Sinnenwelt, Weil sie dem
Verstande so vielfaltige Hindernisse legt, und
wagte sich jenseits derselben auf den Flugeln
der Xdeen, in den leeren Raum des reinen Ver-
s tandes... P^
Hegel's radically different attitude towards
Plato's rationalism can be seen from this passage,
taken from his mature works:
■'Was Solcrates begann, ist von Plato vollfuhrt.
Er erkennt nur das Allgemeine, die Idee, das
Gute als das Vesenhafte, Durch die Darstellung
seiner Ideen hat Plato die Intellektualwelt er-
offnet. Sie ist nicht jenseits der Wirklichkeit,
im Hiramel, an einem anderen Orte, sondern sie ist
die wirkliche Welt... Das Wesen der Ideen ist
die Ansicht, daiB nicht das sinnlich Existierende
das Wahre ist, sondern allein das in sich be-
stimmte Allgemeine, — die Intellektual-Welt das
Wahre, Wissenswerthe, ubephaupt das Ewige, an und
ftir sich Gottliche ist. 4-0
Thus, kant and Hegel agree about the general
nature of Plato's theories. The only point of dif—
ference is that, while Kant disapproved, Hegel ap—
proved.
The basic difference between Hegel's attitude to¬
wards Nature and that of Fichte is that, while the
latter sees Nature as something opposite and op¬
posed to man, Hegel sees it as the root or base out
of which man grew. As we have seen, Hegel was al¬
most certainly strongly influenced by Plato's later
works in this matter. His attitude is seen at its
most extreme in the following passage from "das
Leben Jesu":
In den Stunden seines Nachdenlcens in der Ein—
samkeit kam ihm Q= Jesu0 einst der Gedanke, ob
es nicht der Muhe verlonnte, durch Studiurn der
Natur und vielleicht durch Verbindung mit hoheren
Geistern es soweit zu bringen zu suchen, unedlere
Stoffe in edlere, fur den Menschen unmittelbarer
brauchbare zu verwandeln, etwa wie Steine in
Brot, oder sich von der Natur uberhaupt unab-
hangiger zu machen..., aber er vies diesen Ge-
danken ab, durch die Betrachtung der Schranken,
die die Natur dem Menschen in seiner Macht liber
sie gesetzt hat, - durch die Betrachtung, daf3 es
selbst unter der Wiirde des Menschen ist, nach
einer solchen Macht zu streben, da er in sich
eine uber die Natur erhabene Kraft besitzt, deren
Ausbildung und Erhohung die wahre Bestimmung
seines Lebens ist... 4-2
What for Hegel was "unter der Wurde des Menschen"
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would be hubris for Holderlin: a substantial dif¬
ference .
Thus, we see that, in this important year of 1795»
the three friends from the Stift, despite similarities,
especially between Holderlin's ideas and those of Schel-
ling, all have distinct philosophical positions, which
can be characterised as follows:
a) He^el was to all intents and purposes an orthodox
Platonist of the rationalist variety, with little
trace of Kantian or Spinozan preoccupations.
b) Schelling was a fairly orthodox Fichtean, with,
however, very un-Fichtean sympathies for Spinoza.
c) Holderlin had gone beyond Kant to Fichte, and then
beyond Fichte to achieve the synthesis of Fichte
and Spinoza which was to form the basis of his and
Schelling's future system.
These distinctions must be borne in mind as we proceed,
to the year 1796 and to one of the great areas of conten¬
tion in German Idealist studies: the "Sys temprogramm".
One can summarise its contents in the following terms:
a) All future metaphysics must be based on "die Moral','
or Kantian "pralctische Postulate". This would seem
to indicate a stronger interest in ivant' s second
"Kritik" than in the third on the part of the
writer.
b) The author starts his system with " das freie,
selbstbewuhte Wesen", the "Ich". Simultaneously
with this "Ich", a "Welt" appears in a "Schopfung
aus Nichts". This would appear to be orthodox
Fichtean doctrine.
c) The desired relationship of science to Nature is
" schopferisch". The important question is: "Wie mui3
eine Welt fur ein moralisches ivesen beschaffen
sein?" Fichte once more.
d) The next paragraph is largely devoted to an anar—
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cliist rejection of the state on the grounds that it
represses human freedom. This also is compatible
with what we know of Fichte.
e) Then comes a section interesting enough to quote in
full:
Endlich kommen die Ideen von einer moralischen
Welt, Gottheit, Unsterblichkeit — Umsturz alles
Afterglaubens, Verfolgung des Priesterturns, das
neuerdings Yernunft heuchelt, durch die Vernunft
selbst. - Absolute Freiheit aller Geister, die
die intellektuelle Welt in sich tragen, und we-
der Gott noch Unsterblichkeit auBer sich suchen
dtirfen. |Gr. St .A.4/1 , p. 298 7J
The first part would seem to indicate an enthu¬
siasm for Kant. The last sentence presents problems
of interpretation. It would seem to imply that some
"Geister" contain within themselves "die intellek—
tuelle Welt" while others do not. One can perhaps
compare this with the lines from Holderlin1s "Men—
schenbeifall":
An das Gottliche glauben
Die allein, die es selber sind.
[Gr.St.A. 1/1 , p. 250TJ
Can one equate "die intellektuelle Welt" with
Reason? We are told to seek God and immortality
within ourselves, but how? By the development of
our reason, Hegel 1s"divine spark"? Or by a more
Holderlinian examination of the contents of the Un¬
conscious? From the context, the first alternative
would seem to be intended.
f) The next section puts forward the proposition:
"dafl der hochste Akt der Vernunft, der, indem sie
alle Ideen umfafit, ein asthetischer Akt ist, und
daB Wahrheit und Giite , nur in der Schonheit ver-
schwistert sind." for . St .A. 4/1 , p . 25? S TJ
This leaves Fichte behind, and turns from the
second to the third "Kritik". The influence of
Schiller and/or Plato would also seem to be present,
in the r8le of "Schonheit".
There follows a hymn of praise to "der asthe-
tische Sinn", which is just as necessary for phi¬
losophers as it is for poets.
The next paragraph deserves to be quoted in full:
Die Poesie bekommt dadurch e ine hohere Wiirde,
sie wird am Ende wieder, was sie am Anfang war —
Lehrerin der Menschheit; denn es gibt keine Phi¬
losophic, keine Geschichte mehr, die Dichtkunst
allein wird alle ubrigei ^ Kunste
This Chiron—esque paragraph is the most ^older-
linian section of the "Systemprogramm", containing
as it does a reference to a return to the "Ursprung"
and a claim for the superiority of the aesthetic act
over the "Begriff".
This is followed by what would appear to be a re¬
ference to Hegel's ideas:"der grofle Haufen" needs a
"sinnliche Religion". But, this writer claims,
"Nicht nur der grofie Haufen, auch der Philosoph be-
darf ihrer" . {*Gr .St.A.^-/1 ,p. 29 8~j]
This goes beyond Hegel to a Holderlinian plea
for the whole man.
Here a new and important idea makes its appearance:
Zuerst werde ich hier von einer Idee sprechen,
die, soviel ich weiB, noch in keines Menschen
Sinn gekommen ist - wir mils sen eine neue Mytho—
logie haben, diese Mythologie aber muB im Dienste
der Ideen stehen, sie muB eine Mvtholo«:ie der
This mythology must be "vernlinftig" to appeal to
the philosophers and "asthetisch" to appeal to the
masses, with the aim of making the philosophers
"sinnlich" and the masses "verniinftig" so as to
join the whole people together. In place of the
traditional situation in Christian (especially
mediaeval Catholic) Europe, where an £lite class
of priests and theologians hold all the secrets
and the masses remain in ignorant fear, the writer




the masses being introduced painlessly to these
secrets through the work of art. The main advantage
of the artist over the philosopher would seem to
lie in the former's ability to appea.1 to men's
hearts as well as to their minds. What is totally
absent is any appeal to the concept of revelation.
j) The "Systemprogramm" enc? on a prophetic note:
Ein hoherer Geist vom Himmel gesandt, mu/3 diese
neue .Religion unter uns stiften, sie wird das
letzte, grof3te Werk der Menschheit sein.
§r .St.A.4/1,p.2993
It is perhaps worth noting that the author does
not appear to identify himself with this "hoherer
Geist". This may be a tacit admission on his part
that he is not a poet.
Let us now consider who might have written this mani¬
festo. Whoever the author was, he can be said with assur¬
ance to have come under the influence of the ideas of
a) Kant b) Fichte c) Plato. This would fit very well with
what we know of Holderlin, far less well with Hegel,
whose interest in Kant and Eichte at this stage was in
its infancy. Also the attitude towards Nature expressed
in the section on physics is not in accord with the at¬
titude expressed by Hegel (through Jesus) in the section
of "das Leben Jesu" quoted above. In this respect, the
attitude of the "Systemprogramm" is Fichtean, not He¬
gelian. On the other hand, there is no reference to the
teleological aspect of Nature in the Kantian/Holderlinian
sense. Nor is there any suggestion of the original "Seyn"
posited by Holderlin in "tiber Urtheil und Seyn". On the
contrary, the "Ich" and "die Welt" are represented as
coming into existence separately and as being in oppo¬
sition from the outset. If we are to admit Holderlin as
the author of the "Systemprogramiri", we must assume that
between writing "Urtheil und Seyn" and the "Systernpro-
gramm" he went back from his philosophical position in
the former to a strict Fichtean orthodoxy. This does not
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seem at all likely in view of the further development of
his work in the course of the next ten years.
The second half of the "Systemprogramm" is, as we have
seen, far more Holderlinian in its tone and doctrines. If
we are to admit Hegel as its author, we must assume that
there has been, in Harris' words, "a major advance in
Hegel's theory of human nature" which "involves a revolu¬
tion in his conception of the relation between "Vernunft"
and "Phantasie"The conception of the "Volkserzieher"
(or artist) appealing to the "Herz" of the masses in
order to bring them up to an appreciation of the ideas
and develop their "Vernunft" is in perfect harmony with
Hegel's known ideas at this time; but that is the only
use of "Phantasie" or the aesthetic sense in his eyes.
In the "Systemprogramm", on the other hand, the concep¬
tion of the "Ssthetischer Sinn" seems to be altogether
more Kantian, in the sense that it is involved in the
philosopher's apprehension of the Truth rather than
merely in his communication of it to others.
Thus, I feel sure that we can exclude the possibility
of either Hegel or Holderlin having written the "System¬
programm", if one accepts its date as 1796. It is too
Fichtean for Holderlin and too Holderlinian for Hegel.
What other possibility remains?
Let us consider whether Schelling might have composed
the piece. I would put the following points forward for
consideration:
a) Schelling at this stage was a fairly orthodox
Fichtean in metaphysics.
b) He was searching for a means of advancing beyond
Fichte in the same direction as Holderlin.
c) He still maintained the Fichtean theory of the
"Ursprung" (put; forward in the "Systemprogramm")
a year later, in 1797*
d) The r6le ascribed to poetry in the "Systernprogramm"
is identical to that given it by Schelling in the
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"System des transzendentalen Idealismus".
There is admittedly no trace of a Spinozan attitude
towards Nature, but this could have been developed by
Schelling subsequent to the writing of this document.
In conclusion, then, I would say that if one of the
three friends must be cited as the author of the "System-
programm" and if it was written in 1796, by far the most
likely candidate is Schelling. If this proposition could
be generally accepted, it would be a great help to us in
ascertaining how close Schelling was on Holderlin's heels,
so to speak, in the development and perfection of German
Idealism. Leaving out of consideration the Fichtean the¬
ory regarding the "Ursprung", there are only two major
elements lacking: a Spinozan theory regarding Nature and
an Empedoklean/Platonic theory regarding the Unconscious
as a vessel of divine revelation. As we have seen, the
"Systemprogramni"'s view of poetic creation seems to owe
more to Kant's "Kritik der Urteilslcraft" than to Plato's
"Phaedrus".
By this time, of course, Holderlin was living in
Frankfurt, and had met and was in contact with his
Diotima, Susette Sontard, Even his choice of the name
"Diotima" for his ideal - and real - beloved is indica¬
tive of his philosophical preoccupations: it was, after
all, Diotima who taught Sokrates about Love as the
/i /i
binding force between man and the godsThis is the
same binding force that he mentions in his letter to
Niethammer dated 24th February 1796:
' |_IchJ will... das Prinzip finden, das mir die
Trennungen, in denen wir denken und existieren,
erklart, das aber auch vermogend ist, den Vider-
streit verschwinden zu machen, den Widerstreit
zwischen dem Subjelct und deni Objekt, zwischen un-
serem Selbst und der Welt, ja auch zwischen Ver-
nunft und Offenbarung, - theoretisch in intellek-
tualer Anschauung, ohne dab unsere praktische Ver-
nunft zu Hilfe kommen miiBte. Wir bedtirfen dafiir
asthetischen Sinn...
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From Frankfurt onwards, then, we are confronted with
Holderlin's mature philosophical system. We have already
seen how his early interest in the Greeks was decisive in
the development of this system. In 1797» with the publi¬
cation of the first volume of "Hyperion", the public at
large, or those amongst them who followed developments
closely enough, became aware that German Idealism had
taken a further step, with the new attitude towards Na¬
ture, and also towards the "Ursprung". In this same year,
Schelling started to publish his very un-Fichtean essays
on Nature. Something startlingly new had made its ap¬
pearance on the German philosophical scene.
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CHAPTER SIX : CONTINUITY in HOLDERLIN and SCHELLING
(a) HOLDERLIN
I have tried to demonstrate in this thesis that there
is a consistency and depth to Holderlin's thought which
is impressive on both the literary and the philosophical
plain. Whatever others may conclude about the worth of
his achievements, it seems clear that he took his life's
task very seriously indeed, and would scarcely be flat¬
tered if commentators made condescending allowances for
the fact that he was "merely" a poet. He would want his
work to be judged on its own terms, ambitious as these
terms might seem to the professional philosopher or even
to the professional student of literature. Like Beethoven
in his later years, Holderlin saw his work as embodying
truths more profound than those attainable by philosophy.
Attempts have been made by Germanists and philosophers
to prove that Holderlin and Schelling afford no viable
alternative to the more widely defended systems of Kant
and Hegel, partly on the grounds that their thought is
inconsistent in itself, and therefore not worthy of
serious investigation. In the recent past, for example,
Jochen Schmidt has published a volume with the provo—
1
cative title: "Holderlins spater Widerruf". In this
book, Schmidt attempts to prove, mainly on the basis of
the late odes "Chiron", "Hlodigkeit" and "Ganymed", that
Holderlin had a profound change of mind and direction in
the last period before his madness. He is supposed to
have rejected the Dionysian aspect of his earlier work
in favour of classical restraint:
Es ist... das entscheidend Neue der spaten Ge—
dichte, dafi sie die Entgrenzung nicht mehr als Er-
losung aus der Enge des Daseins ersehnen, sondern
sie abzuwehren versuchen, weil die tatsachliche
innere Gefahrdung so stark ist, daC nvpa die
Furcht vor der Zerstorung iiberwiegt.
This conclusion is in startling contrast to that of
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Guido Schmidlin, for example, who sees a symbolic signi¬
ficance in Holderlin's ultimate madness, equating "der
3
geisteskranke Dichter" with "der absolute Geist". In
this interpretation, Holderlin's madness is comparable
symbolically with the deaths of Sokrates, Empedokles and
Christ. Schmidlin in fact suggests that Holderlin himself
attempted (unsuccessfully) to communicate this symbolism
to Schelling: "Holderlin wollte sich Schelling zeigen und
ihm den chironischen Sinn seiner Krankheit zu verstehen
geben".
Thus, both Schmidt and Schmidlin refer to the ode
"Chiron" - to support diametrically opposed theories con¬
cerning the last phase of Holderlin's poetic activity.
It will therefore be of interest in the context of the
present chapter to examine the ode in question, and also
the adequacy of these two interpretations.
5Schmidt's examination of the poem stresses the re¬
straint and sobriety of the style and tone, the avoidance
of all ecstatic emotion, makes considerable play with the
description of the state of alienation from Nature and
the original "Ur-Teilung" symbolised by the centaur and
g
the "Halbfrott" and by the figure of Prometheus which, as
7
Schmidt points out, was identified by Sinclair with
"Reflexion", "der uns vom Olympus losgerissen". }fe notes
the further division or "Gift" between the "Tatsphare"
in human life (= Herakles) and the "Logossphare"
g
(= Chiron). He describes Chiron's r8le in the following
terms:
Als Ktinstler ringt Chiron nun in Erinnerung an
die urspriingliche Einheit um Synthese des inzwi-
schen Getrennten... Chiron vermag die Synthese
nur theoretisch zu imaginieren, nicht wirklich zu
gestalten... denn es scheint nun festzustehen, dab
gerade die Idealitat der Vorstellung die Konsti-
tuierung ktxns tlerischer *<ealitat verhindert und
dab es Kunst und Dichtung nur geben kaim, sofern
sie hinter den idealen Vors tellungen des Kiins tiers
zurtickbleibt.
He then turns to the symbol of the "Gewitter", used
both in "Chiron" and in the earlier "Blinde Sanger", but
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ie very different ends in each case, according to Schmidt:
in "Chiron", he claims, "statt zum harmonischen Wachstum
flihrt sie zum grenzenlosen Wuchern".^
He further describes what seems to be a drastic change
of direction on Holderlin's part: "Die Bertihrung mit der
Sphare des ^lementaren kann zerstorend wie Feuer wirken.
Die Erde wiirde dann nicht befruchtet, sondern verbrannt,
Wo der blinde Sanger den Einbruch des Elementaren als
starkstes Mittel der Belebung vorbehaltlos bejaht, dort
^ 11
beftirchtet Chiron Gefahr und Zerstorung. "
At the end of this analysis comes the following confi¬
dent statement:
Es kann hier nur skizziert werden, wie nahe
Holderlin mit diesem umfassenden Entwurf, der alle
wichtigen Manifestationen des menschlichen Geistes
in geschichtlicher Reihenfolge auf ein absolutes
Ziel hin ordnet, derri in der 'Phanomenologie des
Geistes ' und am SchluB der 'Enzyklopadie1 entwilc—
kelten Grundansatz der Hegelschen Philosophie
steht. Im Unterschied zu Schelling, der die Kunst
schon im 'System des transcendentalen Idealismus1
(1800) an die oberste Stelle riickt, da nach seiner
Meinung die asthetische Anschauung die objektiv
gewordene intellektuelle ist, gelangt Hegel zu der
gleichen Reihenfolge der Instanzen des Geistes wie
Holderlin: Kunst - Religion - Philosophie. Die
Grtinde sind nicht bis in jec^ Nuance, aber doch im
wesentlichen die gleichen.
If we examine these topics one by one, we may in the
process come to some conclusion as to the acft[uacy of
Schmidt's theory of the "spater Widerruf". As far as the
style and tone of "Chiron" are concerned, we can agree
with Schmidt that the statements are more curt and angu¬
lar, the word order unusual - all prominent features of
Holderlin's "Spatstil". This, however, is scarcely rele¬
vant to the content of the poem, metaphysical or other¬
wise. If Schmidt is implying, with his references to
Friedrich Schlegel and the "Verschmelzung von individua-
1 3
litat und Universalitat", that Holderlin's earlier
poems were simply mindless examples of uncontrolled
Romantic "Schwarmerei", and that he suddenly, about the
time of "Chiron" (begun on Holderlin's return from France
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in 1802), worried by signs of madness in himself, re¬
verted to a Goethean restraint and Classicism, two points
must be mentioned in reply: firstly, the description of
1 4
Holderlin's earlier poems and other works is surely in¬
adequate. The style and tone are different, to be sure -
more passionate, perhaps, and certainly less obtuse -
but that this change is a collapse and an admission of
failure rather than merely a change or even a sign of
logical progress is something Schmidt fails to prove con¬
vincingly. Secondly, even if we are willing to agree that
the change in tone between "der Blinde Sanger"(1801) and
"Chiron"(1802-3) has its roots in events in Holderlin's
biography, there is no need to assume that it is his own
approaching madness which has caused him to make a con¬
scious change of direction. Surely, the death of Diotima
in June 1802 is sufficient as an explanation for the lack
of ecstatic passion in "Chiron" and others of the "Nacht-
gesange" (published together in the "Taschenbuch fur das
Jahr 1805. Der Liebe und Freundschaft gewidmet"), whose
very title can be taken as an expression of the mood
brought about by this event:
Weh mir, wo nehin ich, wenn
Es Winter ist, die Blumen, und wo
Den Sonnenschein,
Und Schatten der Erde?
Die Mauern stehn
Sprachlos und kalt, ira Winde
Klirren die Fahnen. _ _
("Halfte des Lebens")|Gv.St.A.2/1,p.11 7»
We are more accustomed to think of "Nacht" in Holder-
lin in terms of his philosoj^hy of history, but there is
no reason why it cannot apply just as easily to the
microcosm of the individual as to the macrocosm of the
world. When we read in the first stanza of "Chiron" the
following lines:
... doch mir zurnt, mich
Hemint die erstauimnde Nacht nun imtner.
[Crr .St.A. 2/ 1 , p. 3
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we have a darker picture in our minds than that conveyed
by the first two stanzas of "Brot und Wein", where "die
Nacht" is also termed "die Erstaunende", but is described
in a positive fashion in the second stanza, even though
she is "die Fremdlingin unter den Menschen" and "wohl
wenig bekumrnert urn uns". The difference in tone could
well be due to a change in personal circumstances for
Holderlin between "Brot und Wein"(1800) and "Chiron".
The most prominent change is, as stated, the death of
Diotima. But whether Holderlin's biography is necessary
at all to explain the tone of the poem is another matter:
it is difficult to imagine a lighter or more ecstatic
tone being appropriate to the subject - Chiron is, after
all, suffering from an unhealable wound.
It is perhaps also worth pointing out that "der Blinde
Sanger", which Schmidt wishes to put forward as an ex¬
ample of ecstatic mysticism and formless Romanticism,
itself fits well inside the period of the "gesetzlicher
Kalkul", having probably been written some months after
Holderlin started work on "der Rhein". In his attempt to
point out and emphasise the difference and contrast be¬
tween the two versions as clearly as possible, in the in¬
terest of his larger argument, Schmidt seems to have for¬
gotten that even in the cold calculations of Holderlin's
poetic theory, allowance is made for the fact that dif¬
ferent tones predominate in different poems, and in dif¬
ferent parts of one poem.
The next main point Schmidt emphasises in his analysis
is Holderlin's description of the state of aliena.tion from
Nature:
As Schmidt puts it:
'Der auf Nutzung und Erkenntnis bedaclite Umgang mit
der Natur fiihrt zum Verlust der urspriinglichen Ver-
trautheit mit ihr, und damit reduzieren sich die
nur in dieser Vertrautheit moglichen tieferen,
eigentlich lebendigen Naturerfahrungen auf die




bloBen Schemata des verfiigenden Zugriffs."
Then, more specifically:
'So spricht denn auch die vierte Strophe der Chiron-
Ode nicht mehr wie die zweite allgemein und ohne
Namen von1Krautern1 , sondern in auffallend defini-
torischen ^amenfulle von Krokus und Thymian und Korn
The stanza in question runs as follows (with addi¬
tional lines to complete the sense):
Ich wars wohl. Und von hrokus und Thymian
Cnd horn gab mir die Erde den ersten StrauI3.
Und bei der Sterne Klihle lernt ich,
Aber das Nennbare nur, Und bei mir
Das wilde Feld entzaubernd, das traurge, zog
Der Halbgott, Zeys knecht, ein, der gerade Mann..
[&r.St.A. 2/1 , p. 567]
The "Halbgott" is Herakles, As Schmidt puts it:
Der Einzug des Kerakles signalisiert die Trennung,
ja die Zerfallenheit des ursprunglich—einigen
Seins und zugleich den Beginn des heroisch-muhe—
vollen Integrationsprozesses, tin dessen Ende das
Sein sich wiederum als ein Ganzes, aber in der
Form des Bewifi tseins findet .
This general idea is, of course, nothing new in
Holderlin's work. Schmidt himself quotes a reference to
it in "Hyperion":
Nun sprach ich ninimer zu der Blume, du bist
meine Schwester! und zu den Quellen, wir sind
Eines Geschlechts! ich gab nun treulich, wie ein
Echo, jedem Dinge seinen." Namen.' —
|Gr.St.A.Ill, P,427J
The concept of the "Ur-Teilung" goes back at least
as far as "Urteil und Sein"(1795)* The only new element
that Schmidt would seem to be trying to bring out in
"Chiron" is the "Gift" between the "Tatsphare" and the
"Logossphare" and Chiron's inability "die Synthese...
1 8
wirklich zu gestalten".
As far as the mythology is concerned, the "Gift" is
a reference to the blood of the dead Hydra on Herakles'
arrow, with which Chiron was wounded accidentally and
incurably - not even death can release him from his tor-
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merit, because he is immortal. Holderlin synbolises in
Herakles the agent of the "Ur—Teilung',' the "Auflclarer"
who "zog... ein..., Das Wilde Feld entzaubernd". [fir.St.
A.2/l, p. 56r| lie unintentionally wounded Chiron in the
process, and the latter is awaiting Herakles' return to
find out if he can give up his immortality in return for
the freeing of Prometheus, whose redemption can only oc¬
cur if a god gives up his immortality for him.
According to Schmidt's interpretation, the "Gift" sym-
1 9bolxses the "Dissoziierung" between Herakles and Chiron,
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the hero and the poet. It is therefore necessary for
him to take the "uns" in "Weil Gift ist zwischen uns" as
being Herakles and Chiron. But this is surely stretching
a point: the last mention of Herakles was four lines pre¬
viously, On the other hand, "frische Erd und Wolken der
Liebe" are mentioned in the previous line. It is more
natural to take them as being Chiron's partners in the
"uns". They symbolise the powers of Nature, the "Licht"
in the first stanza, from which the world and Chiron have
been alienated by the activities of the "Aufklarer" Hera¬
kles. The phrase "Weil Gift ist zwischen uns" is a simple
indication of the reason for poetic activity as such: it
is the only means whereby the original union destroyed
by the "Ur—Teilung" can be re—established, at a conscious
level - by "mein Gedanke". There is no indication here
that Chiron - or Holderlin - feels that he has failed, or
is failing, in this task. It is, however, an onerous
task, hence the need for "ein/Freundlicher lietter",
Chiron himself is thus the only one who can reestab¬
lish the lost harmony with Nature, at a higher level.
Herakles, who did not intend to wound him in the first
place, and who can be equated, symbolically, with his
fellow - "Aufklarer" Prometheus, has realised the enor¬
mity of his error and the fact that he and Prometheus
are ultimately helpless without Chiron, whose eternal
bliss as one of the immortals he, Herakles, has ended.
2 1
Chiron's task is not, as Schmidt suggests, the "Ver-
sohnung von Gedanke und Tat", but the "Versohnung" of
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mankind with the "Licht" from which it has alienated it¬
self by means of its heroic "Tat", and which it. can
only come back to by means of Chiron's "Gedanke". The
heroic "Tat" of Prometheus and Herakles was a necessary
sta^e. The next stage is in the hands of Chiron.
Chiron, however, cannot consciously achieve this syn-—
thesis. Schmidt tries to suggest that the "Donnerer"
in stanza seven of "Chiron", which is the key stanza by
virtue of its solitary, central position, is a negative
symbol, unlike its counterpart in "der Blinde Sanger".
In the latter poem, as Schmidt would concede, the "Don¬
nerer" and his "Stimme" are positive symbols for the in¬
spiration or inner illumination for which the blind bard
has been waiting in order to re-establish the lost har¬
mony with Nature. In "Chiron", however, he claims, the
energy of the "Gewitter" leads up to "grenzenloses
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Wuchern". He takes his evidence for this from stanzas
eight and nine, ignoring stanza seven itself completely.
He offers no explanation for the fact that the advent of
the "Donnerer" in stanza seven leads to the state of af¬
fairs that "der Boden/Reiniget sich, unu die Qual Echo
wird" , If we follow him to stanza eight, we find hiin
stressing the negative function of the "uppiges Kraut",
relating it to the "iippig neidiges/Unkraut " of "Wenn
aber die Himmlischen...". We can agree with Schmidt that
this symbol is in itself negative, but that is not all
that needs to be said: the symbol's function within the
poem is, after all, of decisive importance. Schmidt would
have us believe that it is a plastic representation of
the "Gefahr des Ubermafies", He would seem to imply that
its presence in stanza eight is a direct consequence of
the advent of the "Donnerer" in stanza seven, and the
"gewaltig Feuer" of stanza eight is also a negative, not
to say catastrophic consequence of the same event, which
he equates with "die Beriihrung mit der Sphare des Ele-
mentaren".
This interpretation seems to ignore the positive terms
"Retter", "Befreier" and even "totend" — death or the
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renunciation of his immortality represents for Cliiron an
end to his suffering. The first two lines of the stanza
are reminiscent of Christ's activities in Hell after his
crucifixion:
Den Retter hor ich dann in der hacht, ich hor
Ihn totend, den Befreier...
fGr.St.A.2/1 fp.57V]
The apocalyptic vision of the rest of the stanza,
which is taken by Schmidt to represent the negative con¬
sequences of the "Donnerer"'s arrival, can surely just
as adequately be explained as a depiction of the nega¬
tive state of affairs which the "Donnerer" and his "Feuer"
are meant to purge:
... und drunten voll
Von iippgem Kraut, als in Gesichten,
Schau ich die Erd, ein gewaltig^ Feuer;
fGr.St.A.2/1 , p. 57*«J
When we turn to stanza nine, we find that Schmidt pro¬
vides a precise paraphrase. The stanza runs:
Die Tage aber wechseln, wenn einer dann
Zusiehet denen, lieblich und bos, ein Schmerz,
Wenn einer zweigestalt ist, und es
Kennet keiii einziger nicht das Beste;
[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.57T]
Schmidt paraphrases it as follows: "Die Tage aber
wechseln. Wenn einer dann denen zusieht, wie sie bald
lieblich, bald bos sind (das Pradikat fehlt), dann ist
(wieder fehlt das Pradikat) es ein Schmerz, wenn einer
zweigestaltig ist, d.h. wenn er unter dem Eindruck solch
zwiespaltigen Geschehens nicht weiB, wie er sich ent-
scheiden soil"He elucidates his interpretation fur¬
ther: "Zwar erscheint die Nacht, die eine innere Nacht
war, durch die Beruhrung mit der Elementarsphare iiber-
iranden, Doch ist es nicht einfach Tag. Vielmehr gibt es
P7
nun Tage ganz verschiedener Art: die Tage 'wechseln
Again, we can agree with Schmidt that Holderlin is
depicting a negative state of affairs. Once more, Schmidt
sees this as being a direct consequence of the inter¬
vention of or contact with the "Elementarsphare". There
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are, however, some points he seems not to explain.
Firstly, if stanza nine is simply a continuation of stan¬
za eight's description of the negative consequences of
the "Donnerer"'s arrival, and there is no break or cae¬
sura in the sense, why does Holderlin employ the word
"aber": "Die Tage aber wechseln. . . ""2 Either Schmidt is
wrong about stanza eight or he is wrong about stanza
nine — they cannot both have the same import.
Again, Schmidt's paraphrase has a full stop after
"wechseln", which the poem does not. He gives no justi¬
fication for this. The effect of this change is to se¬
parate the verb from its adverbs: "lieblich und bos".
Hence his need to invent a "Pradikat". He then fails to
make a proper caesura between the two halves of the stan¬
za: "ein Schmerz" is surely the start of a completely new
section. He takes "einer" in line three to be a person,
like the "einer" in line one. This would seem, however, t
to make "kein einziger" in line four redundant. If "einer
is a person, then what follows would surely be something
like "... und er/Kennet nicht das Heste". The "einer"
must stand for "ein Tag", which is "zweigestalt", ie. an
age of mediocrity, bines one and two thus refer to the
variation in the character and quality of the "Tage",
the next two lines to the specific situation-which ob—
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tains when an age is "zweigestalt". The "aber" is there
to indicate that the ideal state of affairs brought
about by the purgative activities of the "Donnerer" (in
world history and in an individual) cannot last. The
Absolute has to be stormed anew every time. This is the
same situation as that described by Holderlin in the
first stanza of the last triad of "der Rhein":
Dann feiern das Brautfest Menschen und Gotter,
Es feiern die Lebenden all,
Und ausgeglichen
1st eine Iveile das Schicksal.
Und die Fliichtlinge suchen die Iierberg,
Urid suBen Schlummer die Tapfern,
Die Liebenden aber
Sind, was sie waren, sie sind
Zu Iiause, wo die Dlume sich freuet
- 169 -
Unschadlicher Glut und die finsteren Baume
Der Geist umsauselt, aber die Unversohnten
Sind umgewandelt und eilen
Die Hande sich ehe zu reichen,
Bevor das freundliche Licht
Hinuntergeht und die Nar.ht kommt.
The event described in the last two lines of this
stanza is the same as that described in stanza nine of
"Chiron", especially the first two lines.
Thus, it would seem that Schmidt's interpretation of
"Chiron" is less than adequate, in common with the inter¬
pretations of others who feel it necessary to make ex¬
cuses for Holderlin's ideas and convince us that he
realised in the end that the ideas of the 'real' philo¬
sophers, in particular Hegel, were of greater import and
intellectual value. I hope this thesis has gone some way
towards showing convincingly that, if Holderlin, at any
stage in his career, were to consider that his ideas were
inferior to those of any contemporary philosopher, this
philosopher would most certainly not be Ilegel, or, to be
more precise: the 'mature' Hegel of the 'Phenomenology',
etc..
If we turn now to Schmidlin's interpretation, ^9 if"
such it can be termed (it is more of a general discussion
of the significance of the Chiron myth for Holderlin), we
find that it is considerably nearer the reality of the
situation, if only in the respect that Schinidlin's main
concern is to demonstrate the close relationship between
the work of Holderlin and that of Schelling, rather than
Hegelo I have referred to Schmidlin's ideas earlier in
this chapter. In the context of the present discussion,
I should like to confine myself to an outline of his
interpretation of the Chiron myth's significance for
Hblderlin, and of how it differs from Schmidt's ideas on
the subject.
In line with his general concentration on the rela—
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tionship between Holderlin and Schelling, Schmidlin deals
'50
with Chiron more as a "Lehrer der Naturwissenschaft"
than as simply a poet: "Ein ' ursprlinglicher 1 Lehrer nam-
lich ist der Dichter fur den Naturphilosophen, indem er
dessen naturphilosophischen Standpunkt aus dem Ursprung
erst ermoglicht, ihn in den ' Gesichtspunlct 1 vorsetzt,
aus dem sich 'die Natur am besten einsehn laBt'".^^
Without going into Schelling's ideas at this point, we
can simply note that Schmidlin sees the Chiron myth as
being central to Holderlin's later poetry, seeing it as
peart of the wider Prometheus myth, and relating it to
the Heralcles and Christ myths. There is no suggestion of
any change of course in the ode "Chiron". On the con¬
trary, this myth complex is seen by Schmidlin as being
the main means whereby Holderlin fulfilled his "mytho-
52
logische Aufgabe" from the turn of the century onwards. ^
Schmidt also deals with Chiron as an "Erzieher", 53
but simply in his traditional rSle as a "Heldenerzieher".
He sees this aspect coming out chiefly in the last stanza
of "Chiron". He takes it as further confirmation of the
rejection of the Dionysian element by the late Holderlin:
"Denn die Ode flihrt ja von einem ursprtinglichen, harmo—
nischen Naturzustand... zu einer — allerdings ungemein
sublim, iveil als hochste Bewufltseinsleistung verstandenen
- 'ortlichen' Fixierung und sogar 1stadtischen' Zivili-
sierung, wie die antithetische Pointierung durch den als
•unstadtisch' bezeichneten Ursprungszustand der 'Vater1
zeigt." 54-
Quite apart from the fact that the "Knabe" in the last
stanza of 'Chiron'55 would seem to be encouraged simply
to go to meet the returning Herakles — I can see no sug¬
gestion that he is being told to set up a free market
economy or anything of the sort-— we can note the simi¬
larity with Schmidlin's position, that the centaur is
seen as an "Erzieher". The difference between Schmidt and
Schmidlin lies in the question of the matter of this
"Erziehung". Schmidlin sees "die Naturwissenschaft" as
the main subject Chiron is qualified to teach. In this,
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he has the direct support of an unequivocal statement
tently):
"Centauren sind deswegen auch ursprlinglich Leh-
rer der Naturwissenschaft, veil sich aus jenem
Gesichtspuncte die Natur am besten einsehn laBt."
If we are correct in equating the centaur with the
poet, this statement would mean that the latter, by vir¬
tue of his special gift for "Selbstvertiefung", can
reveal, in his moments of inspiration, the profoundest
truths about Nature. Schmidlin tries to lend specific
content to Holderlin's "Lehre" by claiming a "Chironic"
meaning for Holderlin's journeys in the last years before
his ultimate madness, and for the madness itself. What¬
ever the truth may be regarding the symbolism of the
journeys, there is some considerable evidence for Holder-
lin having regarded his madness as being symbolic. Quite
apart from the matter of the "divine fury" of the poets
in Plato, it is interesting to note that in Holderlin's
later works there consistently appears a poet figure —
Empedokles, Chiron, etc. - who ultimately commits an
act of self—sacrifice for others which is at the same
time a release for him from some torment. In most cases,
this act involves death, but in Holderlin's own case, it
is, of course, the sacrifice of his sanity. It is sig¬
nificant in this context that death for Holderlin was
something positive, as in the second last stanza of
"der Hhein":
If Holderlin's case is to be taken as directly paral¬
lel to those of his poet-heroes, madness must also be
36
taken as something ultimately positive.
Again, there is the matter of Holderlin's journey to
and return from Bordeaux, which, following Schmidlin, we
by Holderlin (something Schmidt seems to lack consis-
... bis in den Tod
Kann aber ein Mensch auch
Im Gedachtnis doch das Beste behalten
Und dann erlebt er do« -ho .
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might regard as a trip away from Holderlin's own geogra¬
phical "Ursprung" (ie. Germany). On his return to his
"Ursprung", he showed signs of madness. To put it in
abstract terms, and to follow the symbolism through to
its logical conclusion: the return to the "Ursprung",
which is equivalent to the reaching of the Absolute, is
a return to original Chaos. In a similar fashion, Empe-
dolcles re-attains his lost harmony with the powers of
Nature by throwing himself in a volcano - the inside of
the volcano is Chaos: "Uralte Verwirrung".
This may seem to some to be crass irrationalism and
"Schwarmerei". However, the concept of the Absolute as
Chaos is at the root of the Romantic world-pviev, and of
the mystical world—view in general. Jakob Bohme, such a
profound influence on Romanticism in general and Schelling
in particular (also Kant), had a similar theory, as
Nicholas Berdyaev points out: "To Boehme, chaos is the
root of nature, chaos, that is to say, freedom. The 'Un-
grund1, the will, is an irrational principle. In the
Godhead itself there is a groundless will, in other
words, an irrational principle. Darkness and freedom in
Boehme are always correlative and coinherent. Ereedorn
even is God himself and it was in the beginning of all
xn
things . "
Whether or not we accept this theory regarding the
symbolism of Holderlin's madness - and the present writer
would be inclined to accept it - it would seem evident
that any theory produced, by Jochen Schmidt or others, to
the effect that Holderlin had a profound change of heart
when his madness began to make itself apparent, and be¬
came a Goethean Neo-Classicist or a Hegelian, is without
support from the texts of his poems, or from any other
source. In fact, if we grant him the honour of taking
his ideas seriously, any such change of mind on his part
\vould have been an act of cowardice and treason against
all he had stood for throughout his career. The poet had
to renounce conscious control over his creative processes
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in the last analysis, because his work, if it was to have
any worth, had to be a revelation from the depths of his
psyche:
Nah ist
Und schwer zu fassen der Gott.
Wo aber Gefahr ist, wachst
Das Rettende auch.
[Gr.St.A.2/1,p.I65J
Finally, in our discussion of this myth complex (Chi-
ron — Herakles - Prometheus) and its; significance for
Holderlin, it will perhaps be convenient to discuss
briefly Hegel's pronouncements on the subject. His inter¬
pretation of the Prometheus myth does not seem to jar
noticeably with the Holderlinian view:
... seine Ktinste und Erfindungen, die zur Bil-
dung des Menschen gehoren, beziehen sich nur auf
die Bedlirfnisse des Menschen, sind nur ftir das
Leben tiberhaupt — es sind keine sittlichen Ge—
walten, Gesetze usf.. Diese kommen dem Zeus zu;
das Sittliche ist nicht titanisch, es gehort den
neuen Gottern an. In einer Vorstellung bei Plato,
wo er von Prometheus spricht, heiBt es, er habe
zwar das Feuer aus der Akropolis geholt, aber die
"fto » das Sittliche unter den Menschen, habe
er nicht bringen konnenjsie sei in der Burg des
Zeus aufbewahrt gewesen, Zeus habe sie sich vor-
behalten. Prometheus wird an den Kaukasus ge—
schmiedet, und ein Geier nagt bestandig an seiner
immer wachsenden Leber — ein Schmerz, der nie auf—
hort. Was Prometheus die Menschen gelehrt, sind
nur solche Geschicklichkeiten, xvelche die Be-
friedigung natiirlicher Bediirfnisse angehen. In
der bloBen Befriedigung dieser Bediirfnisse ist
nie eine Sattigung, sondern das Bedtirfnis wachst
immer fort und die Sorge ist immer neu - das ist
durch jenen Mythus angedeutet.58
Thus, Hegel, like Holderlin, stresses the ultimate
hopelessness of Prometheus' position and the fact that
he has alienated himself - and mankind - from the "ur-
sprtingliche Harmonic", although the latter does not have
the same significance for Hegel as for Holderlin. As far
as Hegel is concerned, the pre-Promethean situation of
mankind was one of superstition and a failure to realise
man's superiority over the rest of Nature, in particular
17^ -
the animal kingdom. Prometheus, he claims, lifted the
taboo which obtained among the ancient Indians and
Egyptians against slaughtering animals. Thus, the pre-
Promethean situation is very different in the two systems,
but Prometheus's own situation (and his achievement) are
similar. For Hegel, Prometheus' action and achievement
are of considerable value, an improvement, but ultimately
inadequate. For Holderlin, they are unfortunate, a dete¬
rioration, but a necessary stage on the way to a higher
state of affairs.
When we turn to Hegel's treatment of the Herakles mythj
we find that the discrepancy between his views and Hol-
derlin's becomes clearer. First he states:
Die Heroen sind... nicht unmittelbar Gotter,
sie miissen ersJn-durch Arbeit sich in das Gott-
liche setzen.
This would be impossible in Holderlin's account - no
amount of "Arbeit" would enable the hero to achieve this
without the aid of the poet figure, Chiron.
Hegel continues:
Unter den Gottern ist... Herakles...besonders
zu bemerken. Er ist der einzige Gott, der vorge-
stellt ist als Mensch, der unter die Gotter ver-
setzt wird, Er ist ein menschlich.es Individuum,
das es sich hat sauer werden lassen: er hat im
Dienste gestanden und sich durch Arbeit den Him—
mel errungen. Er ist rein geistige Individualitat
als solche, als Mensch. Diese geistige Individua—
litat des Menschen steht hoher als Zeus und
Apollo; denn die menschliche Geistiglceit ist
freie, reine, a^trakte Subjektivitat ohne Natur-
bestimmtheit.
This would have been absolute hubris to Holderlin.
Thus, Hegel's delineation of the significance of these
myths differs in important respects from Holderlin's,
perhaps most importantly in the absence of any possible
r8le for Chiron: Prometheus remains bound, Herakles
manages to reach the level of the gods on his own,
through "Arbeit". There is surely no possibility of
reading these Hegelian concepts into Holderlin's "Chiron"
or any other of his later works.
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(b) SCHELLING
The continuity dispute with regard to Schelling over
the last few decades centres around the works of two
scholars: Horst Fuhrmans and Walter Schulz. Fuhrmans is
the main proponent of the view that Schelling had a pro¬
found change of mind at some point in his career, and
that he was trying to achieve something entirely dif¬
ferent in his latter years, having left Idealism behind;
Schulz, on the other hand, claims that Schelling's work
is consistent within itself, and that his last works are
a logical consequence of the earliest writings. To a
large extent, of course, this argument takes place on
territory well outside the chronological scope of this
dissertation, in that the works of Schelling which are
the objects of the dispute were mostly written after Hol-
derlin had been effectively silenced by the onset of
madness. The discussion around Schelling does, however,
provide an interesting parallel and contrast to the cor¬
responding dispute around Holderlin's later poems, dealt
with in the first half of this chapter: a parallel in the
sense that both Holderlin and Schelling' are supposed to
have had a profound change of directional some point in
their respective careers; a contrast in that the direc¬
tion of the supposed change is very different in each
case, Holderlin's change being allegedly towards Hegelian,
rationalism, Schelling's towards mystical Christianity.
Fuhrmans puts forward his theory of non—continuity in
two main works: "Schellings letzte Philosophie"(19^0),
and "Schellings Philosophie der Weitalter"(195^)• The
remarkable thing about these two volumes is that they
contain two conflicting statements regarding the date
of Schelling's conversion from Idealism to mystical
Christianity: according to Fuhrmans' first book, Schelling
changed direction around 1827, whereas "Schellings Phi¬
losophie der Weltalter" puts the break fa.r earlier,
arotind 1801.
The argument of his first book is much concerned with
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the opposition of the two terms "positive Philosophie"
and "negative Philosophie". This distinction is central
to an understanding of Schelling's work and, in particu¬
lar, of his ferocious criticism of Hegel in his later
years. The basic difference between the two might be de¬
scribed in the following terms: negative philosophy deals
solely with abstract concepts and reasoning; positive
philosophy is concerned with empirical reality (to which
belong, in Schelling's view, such elements as revelation
and mythology). To Schelling, the main flaw in Hegel 1s
system was that it tried to achieve through negative phi¬
losophy what could only be achieved by the positive va¬
riety. He thought that Hegel had reverted to the "one¬
sided exaggeration" of Fichte,^ and had thereby aligned
himself with the rationalist tradition stemming from
Descartes, which puts trust in the unaided human reason
as the means of ascertaining the ultimate metaphysical
truth(—s) about reality. The dialectically opposed tradi¬
tion starting with Spinoza in modern times, is neglected
in the process. Holderlin and Schelling, on the other
hand, had seen the task before them as being that of
combining the two strands, the one starting from the
"Ich", the other from God (or Nature). Each element has
its rSle to play. As Hermann Zeltner puts it: "Die nega¬
tive Philosophie sucht, 1durch eine umfassende dialek—
tische Entwicklung den Begriff des gottlichen Seins' und
damit des Absoluten zu gewinnen. Hier aber hat sie der
Philosophie der Erfahrung Platz zu machen, d.h. der
undialektisch vorgehenden positiven Philosophie, 'die
Gott als Anfang hat'".^
Kant had shown that reason alone could not reach the
thing in itself, or the Absolute. God, freedom and im¬
mortality were merely postulates, ie. they could not be
proved to be necessary. One must therefore give up the
search for sure knowledge of such matters ur (and this is
the path chosen by Holderlin and Schelling) look else¬
where. Zeltner again:"Die Grundunterschiede von negativer
und positiver Philosophie sind aber nicht die von Ifesen
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und Existenz, sondern von Notwendigkeit und Nicht-Not—
3
wendigkeit, negative Philosophie vermag zu ergreifen,was
logisch gefordert und notwendig 1st..., das Nicht—Not-
wendige ist nicht nur das Zufallige, sondern 'alles Ge-
schehen aus Freiheit', und diese 'zweite Grenze aller
apriorischen Philosophie' interessiert 'Schelling im
4
Grunde allein primar'".
Fuhrmans, however, identifies the "negative Philoso¬
phie", the dialectics, with Philosophical Idealism per
se. Now, if one accepts this definition, it is easy to
see the problem in including such late works as the
"Philosophie der Mythologie"(1842) and the "Philosophie
der Offenbarung"(1841 ff.), both published posthumously,
within that definition. Zeltner describes Fuhrmans1 con¬
clusions in the following terms: "Fur ihn ist die Spat-
philosophie bestimmt durch die 'Wende zu einem christlich
orientierten Denken'; 'das philosophisch Bedeutsams1 - ist
nach ihm: 'In dieser ganzen Wende vollzieht sich gleich-
zeitig ein faktischer Bruch mit dem Idealismus, und zwar
ein notwendiger Bruch' ... Geschichte kann.. nicht mehr,
wie im Idealismus, als kontinuierlicher Aufstiog aufge-
fai3t werden, es gibt einen Bruch zwischen der vollkom—
menen Welt der Schopfung und der abgefallenen Welt,
5
ebenso wie zwischen dieser und der Welt der Erlosung."
The tripartite process described in the last clause
could serve as an adequate description of the plot of
Holderlin's "Hyperion" - published in the late 1790's!
Thus, if we are to take Fuhrmans' arguments seriously,
Schelling waited until either 1801 or 1827 to adopt a
philosophical position which his close friend and asso¬
ciate Holderlin, with whom he was in constant contact
throughout the '90's, had held and put into published
works years previously. The first volume of "Hyperion"
was published in 1797> but Holderlin still had not lost
interest in the dialectics as a thought process in 1801,
when he wrote "der Rhein" - for him at least, a rejection
of "kontinuierlicher Aufstieg" does not necessarily in-
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volve a rejection of tlae dialectics.
A far more convincing explanation for the two 'halves'
in Schelling's work is, in my view, that the dialectical
method, which Fuhrmans likes to identify with Philoso¬
phical Idealism, i«J in reality merely the method appro¬
priate to one half or element in it: the "negative Philo¬
sophic". Schelling stresses the dualism of his approach
to philosophy from the outset, in such works as the
"Philosophische Briefe iiber Dogmatismus und Kriticismus"
(1795):
Wer liber Froiheit und Nothwendiglceit nachgedacht
hat, fand von selbst, daB diese Principien im Abso—
luten vereinigt seyn mussen — Freiheit, weil das
Absolute aus unbedingter Selbstmacht, Nothwendig—
keit, weil es eben deflwegen nur den Gesetzen seines
Seyns, der innern Nothwendigkeit seines Wesens
gemaB handelt. In ihm ist kein Wille mehr, der
von einem Gesetze abweichen konnte, aber auch kein
Gesetz mehr, das es sich nicht selbst erst durch
seine Handlungen gabe, kein Gesetz, das, unabhangig
von seinen ^andlungen, Realitat hatte. Absolute
Freiheig und absolute Nothwendigkeit sind iden—
tisch.
Towards the end of the same work, Schelling addresses
himself in a critical manner to unnamed people who re¬
present the point of view normally identified with Phi¬
losophical Idealism:
Ihr, die ihr selbst an die Vernunft glaubt,
warum klagt ihr die Vernunft dariiber an, daB sie
nicht zu ihrer eignen Zerstorung arbeiten kann,
daB sie eine Idee nicht realisieren kann, deren
Wirklichlceit alles zerstoren wiirde, was ihr selbst
miihsam genug aufgebaut habt? DaB es die andern
thun, die mit der Vernunft selbst von jeher ent—
zweit sind, unci deren Interesse es ist, liber sie
Klagen zu fiihren , wundert mich nicht. Aber daB
ihr es thut, die ihr selbst die Vernunft als ein
gottliches Vermogen in uns preist! - Wie wollet
ihr denn eure Vernunft gegen die hochste Vernunft
behaupten, die fur die eingeschrankte endliche
Vernunft offenbar nur die absoluteste Passivitat
tibrig lieBe. Oder, wenn ihr die Idee eines objek-
tiven Gottes voraussetzt, wie konnt ihr von Ge¬
setzen sprochen, die die Vernunft aus sich selbst
hervorbringt, da docli Autonomie allein einem abso —
lut freien Wesen zukommen kann... Ihr klagt die
Vernunft an, daB sie von Dinger! an sich, von Ob-
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jekten einer ubersinnlichen Welt nichts wisse.
Habt ihr nie - nie auch nur dunkel - geahnt, daI3
nicht die Schwache eurer Vernunft, sondern die
absolute Freiheit in euch die intellektuale Welt
flir jede objektive Macht unzuganglich macht, dafi
nicht die Eingeschranktheit eures Wis sens, sondern
eure uneingeschrankte Freiheit, die Objekte des
Erkennens in die Schranken bloBer Erscheinungsn
gewiesen hat?
This description of the Kantian position, with its
radical criticism, reveals the essential problematics of
Schelling's philosophy right up to the end of his career.
Ultimately, neither Fichte nor Hegel was able to solve
the problem delineated by Schelling here. How can one
imagine a God who is a mere passive object perceived by
man's reason? But if one posits an active God, an all-
embracing ego of the human variety, what place is there
for the free will and reason of a mere man? Spinoza's
answer to this was simple: there is no place for them.
The German Idealists were unwilling to accept this con¬
clusion, but they still had to face the problem. Hegel
never solved it: his system, with its devolopmemt of
human reason, rising out of chaos and superstition and
ultimately out of nothing, stands only if one rejects
the possibility a priori of an active God, who, were He
to exist, would bring Hegel* s carefully constructed sys¬
tem tumbling down.
The only serious attempt to solve this dilemma of
Idealism is provided by Schelling's system, in which the
ultimate truths about reality, which Kant rightly saw
could not be ascertained by mere human logic, are found
by the "positive Philosophic" with its empirical descrip¬
tion of the contents of three sources of knowledge con¬
cerning these ultimate truths: Mythology, Revelation and
Art. These are the three sources, according to Schelling,
of the pronouncements of the active God, who is other¬
wise left out of the reckoning by the main representa¬
tives of German Idealism: Kant, Fichte and Hegel. For
Hegel, God comes at the end, not the beginning, as Walter
Schulz points out: "... wenn die Vernunft Gott nur in
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der Ungedachtheit, der Unbewegtheit ha.tte, dann konnte
ihr bewufites Ilaben, d.h. ihr Denken, nur zu einera ge-
dachten Gott fiihren, zu einem Gott, mit dem nichts anzu-
fangen 1st. Schelling nennt diesen gedachten Gott den
'Gott am Ende', d.h. den Gott, der im Widerspruch zu sich
selbst steht, well er nicht lebendiger, wirkender Geist,
sondern nur 'substantieller Geist' 1st; und als einon
solchen Gott bezeichnet er den 'absoluten Geis t'Hegels . . . "
This nefarious concept of the "Gott am Ende", then,
is the result of Hegel ignoring the warnings of Kant as
to the limits of human logic and reason. The latter has
its place, being responsible for the immense advances in
science and mathematics since ancient Greece, with the
resulting material benefits (and drawbacks) for mankind.
There is, however, a limit to its domain. Fuhrmans main¬
tains that Schelling, in his last period, saw the main
flaw of all modern systems of philosophy as being their
logical character. It is easy to see how he would gain
this impression from Schelling's polemics against the
Hegelian system on the grounds of the latter's purely
logical character, hut Schelling's earlier works are
themselves of a logical nature - his criticism of Hegel
is simply that he (Hegel) takes this logical part for the
whole of his system. Schelling's works can indeed be di¬
vided between the earlier logical works ("die negative
Philosophie") and the later empirical works ("die posi¬
tive Philosophic"), but this does not represent a break,
but simply a working-out of the dualist system foreseen
from the very outset, or at least from the point where
Schelling saw the need to go beyond Eichte.
Robert F. Brown, who describes himself as a disciple
of Fuhrmans and Tillich in the matter of Schelling inter¬
pretation, makes what appears to be an attempt to explain
the different dates given for the break in Schelling's
work by Fuhrmans in his two works when he writes: "Al¬
though the 'positive philosophy' projjer does not begin
until about 1827, Schelling's preoccupation with the
problems of Christian theism and the doctrine of crea—
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tion in the years immediately after 1806 lays the foun-
9
dation for it."
Now, Fuhrmans had seen the kernel of the matter, in
his second book, as being a change in Schelling's ideas
concerning God: from being a pantheist in his earlier
career, he gradually goes over to a theis t position.
Theism is a sufficiently vague and indefinite doctrine,^
but for the purposes of the present discussion (and I
trust I do no violence to Fuhrmans' position) one can take
it to apply to the belief in a specific separate entity
called God who is the first cause of the universe, which
emanates from Him, rather than being identical with him
as the pantheists hold.
It is easy to see how a reading of Schelling's "posi¬
tive Philosophie" would lead one to regard him as a
theist pure and simple. The revelations contained in art,
mythology etc. must emanate from a specific being or en¬
tity who reveals their contents. Ordinarily, pantheism
does not have room for such a specific and separate en¬
tity. Kant is a theist, but his restriction of the "Ich"'s
possibilities for knowledge makes a serious study of such
matters as revelation a pipe-dream. Fichte rejects Kant's
theism, and Hegel's "Geist" is scarcely a theistic con¬
cept (it is far nearer, in fact, to pantheism, being ex¬
clusively immanent in the universe). Schelling, on the
other hand, lays stress on the God in the beginning, the
first cause, the moving force. This would seem to imply
a desertion of pantheism, as Fuhrmans maintains. Brown
puts the change in Schelling's thought down to the influ¬
ence of Jakob Bohme. In doing so, he claims to be sup¬
porting the Fuhrmans account of Schelling's career, with
its posited rejection of pantheism (ie. the Spinoza.n ele¬
ment) and of the dialectics.
With Brown's arguments, however, an added complication
arises. So far, we have seem ourselves faced with two clear
alternative Schellingian Gods: God as the whole or God
as a separate prime mover (the "Gott am Ende" being rocog—
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nised as fundamentally un—Schellingian, at any stage in
his career). The first alternative can easily be de¬
monstrated never "to have been the Schellingian doctrine.
In the "Philosophische Briefe liber Dogmatismus und Kri-
ticismus" (admittedly published in 1795» before Schelling
began his series of Spinozan works on Nature), he gives
his views on the deity in some detail. Kis purpose in
writing the work is explained at the very beginning, in
the "Yorerinnerung", in these terms:
Mehrere Phanomene haben den Verfasser dieser
Briefe iiberzeugt, daB die Grenzen, welche die Kri-
tik der reinen Vernunft zwischen Dogmatisinus und
Kriticismus gezogen hat, fur viele Freunde dieser
Philosophie noch nicht scharf genug bestimmt seyen.
Trligt er sich nicht, so ist man im Begriff, aus
den Trophaen des Kriticismus ein neues System des
Dogmatismus zu erbauen, an dessen Stelle wohl jeder
aufricht^e Denker das alte Gebaude zuruckwlinschen
mochte.
Years later, he described his purpose in more precise
terms:
Die Briefe iiber Dogmatismus und Kriticismus
enthalten eine lebhafte Polemik gegen den darnals
fast allgemeingel tenden und vielfach geiniBbrauchten
sogenannten rnoralischen Beweis von der Existenz
Gottes, aus dem Gesichtspunkt des damals nicht
weniger allgemein henj'jjschenden Gegensatzes von
Subjekt und Objekt. ~
What precisely does Schelling find obnoxious in the
thought of a new system of Dogmatism? We need look no
further than the beginning of the first letter:
Ich verstehe Sie, theurer Freund! Es dlinkt
Ihnen grofier, gegen eine absolute Macht zu kampfen
und kampfend unterzugehen, als sich zum voraus
gegen alle Gefahr durch einen moralischen Gott zu
sichern. jy_lerdings ist dieser Kampf gegen das
Unerraeflliche nicht nur das Erhabenste, was der
Mensch zu denken vermag, sondern meinem Sinne nach
selbst das Princip aller Erhabenheit. Aber ich
mochte wissell,, wie Sie die Macht selbst, rnit der
sich der Mensch dem Absoluten entgegenstellt, und
das Gefuhl, das diesen Kampf begleitet, im Dog¬
matismus erklarbar fanden. Der consequente Dogma¬
tismus geht nicht auf Kampf, sondern auf Unter-
werfung, nicht auf gewaltsamen, sondern auf frei-
willigen Untergang, auf stille Hingabe meiner
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selbst ans absolute Objelct: jeder Gedanke an
Widerstand und kampfende Selbstmacht had sich
aus einem bessern^Systeme in den Dogmatismus
herubergefunden.
This work, then, is an attempt to defend the claims
of the individual "Ich" against those of an omnipotent
deity, whether of the traditional Spinozan variety or
14
stemming from Kant's practical postulates. At this
period, Schelling was still ostensibly a disciple of
Fichte, but he was already showing some very un-Fichtean
signs of sympathy for certain aspects of Spinoza's sys¬
tem, a sympathy which was soon to lead him to embark on
his study of Nature in a sense completely alien to
Fichte's ideas on the subject. When Fuhrmans and Brown
talk of Schelling as a pantheist, they are presumably
thinking of this attitude towards Nature. But even in
the period of his main works on the subject (1797-1800),
there is no sense in which Schelling can be described as
a simple Spinozan pantheist. He always maintains his
post-Kantian concern for the rights of the subject. In
fact, his very criticism of Fichte, plus his turning
towards the new philosophy of Nature, are not conditioned
by his concern to assert the rights of Spinoza's all-
powerful or all-embracing 'Deus sive natura* - but, para¬
doxically, to free the individual subject, which he saw
as being threatened by the Fichtean system just as much
as by Spinoza's.
Schelling explains clearly his attitude towards Na¬
ture at the beginning of his "Ideen zu einer Philosophie
der Natur"(1797)s
Wie eine Welt aulier uns, wie eine Natur und mit
ihr Erfahrung moglich sey, diese Frage verdanken
wir der Philosophie, Oder vielmehr mit dieser
Frage entstand Philosophie. Vorher hatten die Men—
schen im (philosophischen) Naturstande gelebt.
Damals weir der Mensch noch einig rnit sich selbst
und der ihn umgebenden Welt. In dunkeln Riickerin—
nerungen schwebt dieser Zustand auch dem verirr—
testen Denker noch vor. Viele verlieBen ihn nie-
mals und waren glucklich in sich selbst, wenn sie
nicht das leidige Beispiel verfiihrto; denn frei—
willig entlaBt die Natur keinen aus ihrer Vormund-
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schaft, und es gibt Iceine geborenen Sohne der Frei-
heit. Es ware auch nicht zu begreifen, wie der
Mensch je jenen Zustand verlassen hatte, wiiBten
wir nicht, daC sein Geist, dessen Element Freiheit
ist, sich selbst frei zu machen strebt, sich den
Fesseln der Katur und ihrer Vorsorge entwinden
und dull ungewissen Schicksal seiner eigenen Krafte
liberlassen muBte, um einst als Sieger und durch
eigenes Verdienst in jenen Zustand zuruckzukehren,
in welchem er, unwissend iiber sich ^elbst, die
Kindheit seiner Vernunft verlebte.
Thus, at the period of his greatest interest in and
concentration on Nature, Schelling still sees his main
interest, and that of philosophy, as being the freedom
of the individual. This is radically different from the
determinism of Spinoza's system, where the individual
is simply an attribute of an infinite substance, free
will and contingency mere illusions. If by pantheism
Fuhrmans understands the strictly Spinozan variety, we
must conclude that Schelling never supported it.
There is no denying that Schelling admired certain
elements in Spinoza's system and appropriated them to
incorporate into his own. Later in the same work, he
states:
Der erste, der Geist und Materie mit vollem Be-
wufltsein als Eines, Gedanke und Ausdehnung nur als
Modifikationen desselben Princips ansah, war Spi¬
noza. Sein System war der erste kiihne Entwurf einer
schopferischen Einbildungskraft, der in der Idee
des Unendlichen, rein als solchen, unrnittelbar
das Endl^ghe begriff und dieses nur in jenem er—
kannte.
Thus the element in Spinoza's system which appealed
to Schelling was not its determinism but its attempt to
combine and unify the subject and the object split up in
the "Ur-Teilung", to use Holderlin's terminology. This is
a reference to Spinoza's theory of the parallel modifi¬
cations of different attributes of one infinite substance
As Copleston puts it, Spinoza held "that the infinite
divine substance is indivisible, unique and eternal and
that in God existence and essence are one and the same."^
This is the positive aspect for Schelling, then:
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Spinoza, wie es scheint, sehr frtihzeitig be—
klimmert liber den Zusammenhang rnisrer Xdeen mit den
Dingen auBer uns, lconnte die Trennung nicht er-
tragen, die man zwischen beiden gestiftet hatte.
Er sah ein, daB in unserer Natur Ideales und
Reales^Gedanke und Gegenstand) innigst vereinigt
s ind .
However, at the same time, he never lost sight of the
main drawback to Spinoza's solution', the swamping of the
individual "Ich":
Anstatt aber in die Tiefen seines SelbstbewuBt-
seins hinabzusteigen und von dort aus dem Entstehen
zweier Welten in uns — der idealen und realen —
zuzusehen, liberflog er sich selbst; anstatt aus
unsrer Natur zu erklaren, wie Endliches und Unend-
liches, urspriinglich in uns vereinigt, wechsel—
seitig aus einander hervorgehen, vorlor er sich so-
gleich in der Idee eines Unendlichen auBer uns...
Denn weil es in seinem System vom Unendlichen
zum Endlichen keinen Uebergang gab, so war ihm ein
Anfang des Werdens so unbegreiflich, als ein An—
fang des Seyns.
Thus, to Schelling, the passive "Naturzustand" is some¬
thing which obtains at the outset of human history. Like
Hegel, he approves of the rise of human reason above this
primitive condition. The crucial difference lies in the
ultimate destination: Hegel likes to see reason rising
ever higher and further away from its roots in Nature,
whereas Schelling sees reason's destiny as a re turn to
20
its roots, "als Sieger... zuriickzukehren; .
Now, R.F. Brora maintains that this element in Schel¬
ling 's thought is a direct result of the influence of the
mystical doctrines of Jakob Bohme, which he sees as
coming into play during "the transitional years of 1804-
1808".21
There is no doubt that Schelling was interested in the
works of Bohme. Nor is there any doubt that Bohme's
ideas concerning the self-revelation of the deity bear a
striking resemblance to the Schellingian dialectical pro¬
cess as described above. The only point on which doubt
might be cast is the question of the extent to which
Schelling was directly influenced by Bohme to change his
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mind on these matters. It would seem clear to the present
writer that this cannot be the case. We have already seen
that, far from espousing straightforward pantheism in the
1790's, Schelling had already, in the period of his
writings on Nature, adopted a system of dialectics com¬
patible with Bohme1s ideas — several years previous to
the time Brown sees as the start of the Bohme influence.
The dialectical theory of history, the interest in the
pronouncements of the active God, the return to the "Un¬
sprung" - all this can be found in Holderlin's work. Why-
then look elsewhere for the roots of Schelling's "posi¬
tive Philosophie"? Of course, Bohme may well have been
an inspiration to them both, in the 1790's. But, even if
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this could be proved, it would in no way support Brown's
claim that Bohme is the cause for & ' split in the middle
of Schelling's work, and his supposed rejection of
Idealism after he had written his "negative Philosophie".
It is quite possible (or even probable) that Schelling
adopted details from Bohme to fill out the body of his
later works, but it seems clear that there is no sense
in which Bohme can be said to have changed Schelling's
position radically. His interest in Bohme can be ex¬
plained quite satisfactorily by the fact that he found
in the mystic's works ideas very similar to those he and
Holderlin had already worked out in the 1790's. This is
not to say, of course, that Schelling never changed his
views on anything at any time in his career. In particu¬
lar, his works before 1797 are immature, in the sense
that certain elements had not yet been thought through
properly. However, it is nearer to the facts of the case,
in my view, to see his subsequent development as organic
and necessary, rather than haphazard.
Thus, in conclusion, we can say with some assurance
that Schulz's view of Schelling's work is nearer the
truth than Puhrmans', if only for the reason that there
would appear to be very little of substance in Schel¬
ling' s last works which is not foreshadowed in the works
Friedrich Holderlin produced in the 1790's and the early
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years of the new century. In particular, the career of
Holderlin's Hyperion in the novel is a direct parallel
to Schelling's philosophy of history and his views on
the arousal, development and ultimate goal of human con¬
sciousness .
Fuhrmans and his followers are, I would maintain,
mistaken if they wish to describe Schelling in the lcite
1790's as a simple pantheist, for the reasons stated
above. They are equally mistaken if they see him in his
later years as a simple Christian theist, or irrational
mystic. The "Philosojjhy of Revelation" and similar works
are not written simply on the basis of some new—found
religious faith: they are a logical consequence of his
early work. The God who reveals himself is not merely
the postulate of religious dogma — he is proved to be
necessary by the negative philosophy. Herein lies the
ultimate "Verdienst" of the negative philosophy. As
Schulz puts it: "DaB man Gott nur als einen denken kann,
entspringt also nach Schelling nicht einer bestimmten
religionsgeschichtlichen These, sondern 1st eine philo—
sophische Einsicht, denn Gott 1st der Inbegriff der Mog—
lichkeiten, das Seiende selbst, das ni.cht zweimal vor—
25
kommen kann".
This can be termed Theism in the sense outlined above
— reason claiming that God must be there as a first
cause. Schelling simply accepted the logical consequences
e
of the theistic position, and proceded, in his "positive
Philosophic", to an empirical investigation of the acti¬
vities of this God. Schulz continues: "Aber das ist nur
negative Philosophie, denn jener Begriff Gottes, das
Seiende zu sein, ist eben nur ein Vorbegriff: 'die Ma¬
teria der Gottheit, aber nicht die Gottheit selbst' (12,25 \
Die negative Philosophie bringt es nur zum theistischen
Begriff, in dem die Personlichlcoit nicht begriffen werden
24
kann..."
The difference might be clarified in the following
terms: the theistic position achieved by the negative
philosophy might be compared with the position of a child
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of an unmarried mother who knows he must have had a
father, but has never met him and has no knowledge of
his physical gjpearance, character, etc.; the position
ultimately achieved by the positive philosophy, however,
is the more satisfactory one of the child of a normal
family who sees his father every day and knows him inti¬
mately. The second child's knowledge is not based on
logic or reason, but on empirical contact. This empirical
contact is what Schelling believed he had found in the
contents of the unconscious (of the poet, of mankind).
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CHAPTER SEVEN : "CONCLUSION"
In this final chapter, I should like to draw the
threads of my argument together, and in particular sketch
out a comparative evaluation of the two major views of
man, human history and the universe which were developed
in the wake of the revolution in German thought brought
about by the works and influence of Kant. In order to
achieve this, I shall attempt a comparative study (in
brief) of two central works: Holderlin's "Hyperion" and
Hegel's 11 Phanomenologie des Geistes". The former is Hol¬
derlin's first mature public statement of his philoso¬
phical position. We have seen in a previous chapter how
he came to develop this position in the pre-Frankfurt
period. By the time he moved to that town in the last
days of 1795» his ideas had come through their growing
pains to something approaching their definitive form.
Much has been said in the course of this thesis about
"influences" of one type or another. What I hope I have
made clear is my conviction that, in the first half of
the decade, Ilolderlin was searching for a system which
would synthesise the best elements in the work of the
thinkers he admired most: Empedokles, Plato, Spinoza,
Kant, Fichte. In a way, even these thinkers cannot be
seen as "influences" in any complete sense, since Holder—
lin's philosophical efforts are largely an attempt, in
my view, to build a philosophical defence or explanation
of his own spontaneous artistic intuition, which he
trusted far more than any abstract philosophical con¬
struction or dogma. He was interested in philosophers
whose ideas were in harmony with this intuition or vision.
When we see him in Frankfurt, he has ceased his search.
His system is complete. Any future "influences" will have
to fit into his system, rather than him adapting his
system to suit them. The same applies with regard to
Schelling as of 1797> in my view. Let us now consider Holderlin' £
conclusions and his position in 1796. This was the year
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not only of the development of his relationship with Dio-
tima, but also of his travels with her and Heinse, The
latter had long been an enthusiastic admirer of Spinoza,
and I feel it can be safely assumed that the two dis¬
cussed his work eagerly.
In the first half of the year, Holderlin may have
carried on with what is known as the "vorletzte Pas-
sung" of his novel. This version, begun around August or
September of the previous year, is noteworthy for a
full philosophical statement, in the "Vorrede", of the
theory of the "exzentrische Bahn":
Wir durchlaufen alle eine exzentrische Bahn,
und es ist kein anderer Weg moglich von der Kind-
heit zur Vollendung.
Die selige Einigkeit, das Sein, im einzigen
Sinne des Ports, ist fur uns verloren und wir
muBten es verlieren, wenn wir es erstreben, er—
ringen sollten. Wir reiBen uns los vom friedlichen
der Welt, um es herzustellen, durch
uns Selbst. Wir sind zerfallen mit der Natur, und
was einst, wie man glauben kann, Eins war, wider-
streitet sich jetzt, und Herrschaft und knecht—
schaft wechselt auf beiden Seiten. Oft ist uns,
als ware die Welt Alles und wir Nichts, oft aber
auch, als waren wir Alles und die Welt nichts.
Auch Hyperion teilte sich unter diese beiden Ex¬
treme .
Jenen ewigen Widerstreit zwischen unserem
Selbst und der Welt zu endigen, den Frieden alles
Friedens, der hoher ist, denn alle Vernunft, den
wiederzubringen, uns mit der Natur zu vereinigen
zu Einem unendlichen Ganzen, das ist das Ziel all
unseres Strebens, wir mogen uns daruber verstehen
oder nicht.
This goal cannot be reached, however, by a process of
increasing our knowledge or by our action alone. We would
also have no idea of this goal as such, the possibility
of its attainment would never occur to us, if it were
not already "vorhanden _ als Schonheit; es wartet, um
mit Hyperion zu reden, ein neues Reich auf uns, wo die
Schonheit Konigin ist."
Holderlin concludes with his famous apostrophe:
Ich glaube, wir werden am Ende alle sagen:
heiliger Plato, vergib' man bp t sr.hwp-r an dir
gestindigt.
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If one compares this with the Hegelian situation in
the "FJienomenology" , one finds the following contrasts:
1) The lost "selige Einiglceit" does not exist for
Hegel, who starts his work with a section on "Be-
wufltsein", something which is absent from Holder¬
lin' s original "Sein", Even if we look at the
"Logic", all we find there is a seed with potential
for growth towards an Absolute which, although al¬
ready present as a possibility/necessity for the
future, is in no way comparable to the Holderlinian
« lost unity. Hegel's Absolute is there to be deve¬
loped not to be re-discovered. Where Holderlin says
"Was einst... Eins war, widerstreitet sich jetzt",
Hegel says that the "Streit" is an original prob¬
lem (original sin) which can only be solved after
the whole dialectical procedure has run its course.
2) "Herrschaft und Knechtschaft" is one of the most
prominent concepts in the "Phenomenology": after
going through "BewuBtsein" in the simple form of
"sinnliche GewiBheit", Hegel decides that this form
of knowledge is turned back on itself and becomes
"SelbstbewuBtsein", the first form of which is "Be—
gierde", This involves the self attempting to over¬
come or absorb another self. The basic Idealist
tendency, already present in Fichte and Schiller,
for the "Ich" to expand at the cost of the"Nicht—
Ich" is here seen in terms of different "Ich"'s.
The problem remains the same.
3) The solution to this problem envisaged by Holderlin,
is very different from that described in the "Pheno¬
menology", where eventually a state of harmony is
established whereby the finite subject attains "uni¬
versal self-consciousness", which involves an
awareness of selfhood in oneself and in other (pre¬
viously hostile) selves, and of the force of the
infinite "Geist" which is present in each one and
binds them together. At this stage a solution is
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also found for the problem of "das ungluckliche Be-
wufitsein", a state of mind which involves awareness
of the dichotomy between the self as it _is and as it
should be - the "Herrschaft^ICnechtschaft" problem
internalised. This solution lies in the supposition
that the true or ideal self is latent in the
actual self. Nowhere is there any return to the
"Ursprung", which, for Hegel, is simply the .
starting-point. Also, the divided self in "das un-
gliickliche BewuBtsein" is very different from the
divisions Holderlin posited, between Conscious and
Unconscious, "Ich" and "Nicht-Ich". Holderlin's
view is nearer to that of modern psychology and
psychoanalysis, more particularly to that of C.G.
Jung: as for Jung, the Unconscious has for him a
metaphysical importance which it does not have for
Kant, Fichte, Hegel or Freud. Holderlin's and
Schelling's ideas on the Unconscious are in fact
extremely 'modern1, if only in the sense that their
approach is empirical rather than rationalist.
In brief, then, whereas Hegel sees "Herrschaft"
and "Knechtschaft" as a natural state of original
sin, alienation and universal mutual animosity
which can only be overcome by the advance of Reason,
Holderlin sees it as the condition of man after the
fall. after the decline from the original state of
harmony or the Rule of Love, which latter state can
be restored not by the advance of Reason, but by
the re-introduction of Love as the ruling principle,
by the bringing together in harmony of previously
disparate and hostile elements in the self, in
society.
During the second half of 1796, Holderlin was engaged
in preparing the final version of his novel, which de¬
finitive version we shall now proceed "to examine. For
convenience's sake, the two volumes will be considered
together. For this, we have the authority of Iloluerlin
- 193 -
himself. In a letter to Schiller dated 20th June 1797>
he states:
Ich fuhle, dafi es unlclug war, den ersten Band
ohne den zweiten auszustellen, weil jener gar zu
wenig selbs ts tand:' " m ' " 1 n ist,
The delay between the publication of the first volume
and that of the second can be put down to the publisher,
Cotta.
This final version of "Hyperion" does not retain the
explanation of the "exzentrische Bahn" in the "Vorrede",
Instead, we find a cursory reference to "die Auflosung
der Dissonanzen in einem gewissen Charakier", plus a
plea for the reader to employ all his faculties in appre¬
ciating the work — neither the mind nor the senses are
capable separately of achieving the desired degree of ap¬
preciation, but only in consort. Needless to say, within
the context of an academic thesis, we must to some extent
ignore this admonition, and concentrate (in the present
case) on the philosophical content of the work, rather
than any purely aesthetic or subjective emotional con¬
siderations .
At the start of the first book, Hyperion has returned
home: "Der liebe Vaterlandsboden gibt mir wieder Freude
This gives him cause for brief exaltation, until he
comes down to earth:
■Aber was soli mir das? Das Geschrei des Jakals,
der unter den Steinhaufen des Altertums sein
wildes Grablied singt, schrockt ja aus meine^
Traumen mich auf.
Wohl dem Maime, dem ein bluhend Vaterland das
Herz erfreut und starkt! Mir ist, als wiird ich in
den Sumpf geworfen, als schliige man den Sargdeckel
liber mir zu, wenn einer an das meinige mich malint,
und wenn mich einer einen Griechen nennt, so wird
mir immer, als schnurt' er ir.it dem Halsband eines
Hundes mir die Kef * —
Thus, we find that it is not his own personal fate
which distresses him above all else, but the fate of his
und Leid."
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country. He recalls the complacent advice of "die weisen
Herren, die unter euch Deutschen so gerne spuken, die
Elenden..to act rather than lament -
0 hatt ich doch nie gehandelt! um wie manche
Hoffnung war ich reicher! —
Ja, vergiB nur, daB es Menschen gibt, darbendes
angefochtenes, tausendfach geargertes Herz! und
kehre wieder dahin, wo du ausgingst, in die Arme
der Natur, der wandellosen. stillen und schonen.
As we shall learn in the course of the narrative,
Hyperion has tried his hand as a revolutionary leader,
only to be betrayed by the men he is trying to lead to
freedom. Embittered by his experience, he has left the
world of men and practical affairs behind. In the second
letter, he gives us a fuller description of his new aim
or ideal:
'Eines zu sein mit Allern, das ist Leben der Gott
heit, das ist der Himmel des Menschen. Eines zu
sein mit Allem, was lebt, in seliger Selbstverges-
senheit wiederzukehren ins All der Natur, das ist
der Gipfel der Gedanken und Freuden, das ist die
heilige Bergeshohe, der Ort der ewigen fiuhe, wo
der Mittag seine Schwiile und der Donner seine
Stimme verliert und das kochende Meer der Woge
des Kornfelds gleicht.
Eines zu sein mit Allem, was lebt! Mit diesem
Vorte legt die Tugend den zlirnenden Harnisch, der
Geist des Menschen den Zepter weg, und alle Ge¬
danken schwinden vor dem Bilde der ewigeinigen
Welt, wie die gegeln des ringenden Klinstiers vor
seiner Urania, und das eherne Schiclcsal entsagt
der Herrschaft, und aus dem Uunde der Vesen
schwindet der Tod, und Unzertrennlichkeit und
ewige Jugend beseliget, verschonert die Welt.
Auf dieser Hohe steh ich oft, mein Bellarmin!
Aber ein Moment di ~ rf t rnich herab.
There follows a passage reminiscent of Faust's first
speech in Goethe's play ("Habe nun, ach! Philosophie..."
His pursuit of "die Wissenschaft" has had the effect
that he has attained the following condition:
Ich. . . habe grtindlich mich unterscheiden ge-
lernt von dem, was mich umgibt, bin nur vereinzelt
in der schonen Welt, bin so ausgeworfen aus dem
Garten der Natur, wo ich wuchs und bliihte. und
vertrockene an der Mittagssonne.
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When Hyperion posits a situation where virtue lays
down its "zlirnenden Ilarnisch" , this can be taken as the
expression of the desire to free man from the restraints
of Kant's Moral Law - restraints made necessary by the
Fall. When he envisages "Geist" laying down its sceptre,
we can see an acceptance of the Kantian view that reason
alone cannot take one to the Absolute. We note the appeal
to the Dionysian principle in art as being capable of
wider application in human affairs. In this vision of the
Absolute, even "das eherne Schicksal" gives up its "Herr-
schaft" — the same "schicksal " or cLnfal)Jwhich has de¬
stroyed all the heroes from Prometheus and Achilles
through Oedipus and Empedokles, Sokrates and Christ, to
Shakespeare's tragic heroes and (subsequently) Holderlin
himself.^
One can scarcely imagine a more un-Hegelian sentiment
than the one with which Hyperion closes the second letter:
0 ein Gott 1st der Mensch, wenn er traumt, ein
Bettier, wenn er nachdenkt, und wenn die Begei-
sterung hin ist, steht er da, wie ein miflratener
Sohn, den der Vater aus dem Hause stieB, und be-
trachtet die armlichen Pfennige, die ihm das Mit-
leid auf den ¥eg gab.
However, we must be careful not to identify the
thoughts of Hyperion at the beginning of the novel too
- readily with Holderlin's own position. There are several
layers or levels of development within the novel. Hyperion
gains a deeper understanding of what he has experienced
as he writes about it for Bellarmin. We follow the deve¬
lopment of the action as Hyperion relates it, and also
the development of his understanding of the action in his
past. Our understanding is thus another level of deve¬
lopment, ointwith the novel but intimately connected with
it.
Hyperion's expressed wish that he had never acted,
that he had never occupied himself with "die Wissenschaft','
should not be taken at face value. It merely indicates
that, like Oedipus, he has found the path to superior
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■wisdom painful and strewn with, suffering. The actual
journey on the path became unavoidable once the original
separation took place. At the beginning of the third let¬
ter, Hyperion expresses nostalgic regret for the state
of innocence and harmony peculiar to the child, when "es
ist noch mit sich selber nicht zerfallen". It is only
by a painful and long procedure that Hyperion (and man¬
kind in general) can recover the benefits of this state,
at a higher level of consciousness. Let us follow^
Hyperion on this journey.
Towards the end of the third letter, the full force
of Holderlin's study of and enthusiasm for Spinoza comes
out in the following passage: —
•0 du, zu dem ich rief, als warst du liber den
Sternen, den ich Schopfer des Ilimmels nannte und
der Erde, freundlich Idol meiner Kindheit, du
wirst nicht zurnen, da!3 ich deiner vergafl! -
Varum ist die Welt nicht durftig genug, um aufier
ihr noch Einen zu suchen?
0 wenn sie eines Vaters Tochter ist, die herr-
liche Natur, ist das Ilerz der Tochter nicht sein
Herz? Ihr Innerstes,
This is not, however, straightforward pantheism.
However closely God and Nature are interrelated, they are
not identified one with the other.
Then, in the fourth letter, Hyperion meets his Adamas:
Er hatt' an seinem Stoffe, der sogenannten
kultivierten Velt lange 'genug Geduld und hunst
gelibt, aber sein Stoff war Stein und Iiolz gewesen
und geblieben ,nahm wohl zur Not die edle Menschen-
form von allien an, aber um dies wars meinern Adamas
nicht zu tun; er wollte Menschen, und, um diese
zu schaffen, hatt er seine Kunst zu arm gefunden.
Sie waren einmal da gewesen, die er suchte, die
zu schaffen seine Kunst zu arm war, das erkannt
er deutlich. Wo sie da gewesen, wulit er auch. Da
wollt er hin und unter dern Scliutt nach ihrem
Genius fragen, mit dieseni sich die einsamen Tage
zu verkiirzen. Er kam nach Griechenland. So fand
ich ihn.
Here we reach what I consider to be the central point
of the novel: the lost "Sittlichkeit" of the Greeks and
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I-Iolderlin' s hopes ancl efforts for its re-creation in
Germany. Here, too, we have a point of comparison with
Hegel's "Phenomenology". If we compare now the "Kunst-
religion" section of the latter, which deals specifically
with Greek "Sittlichkeit", with equivalent pronouncements
in "Hyperion", we shall perhaps reach some more general
conclusions regarding the authors of the two works and
their theories.
Some readers may have been surprised by my reluctance
in a previous chapter to impute any Kantian leanings or
intentions to Hegel at the time of his writing "das
I4.
Leben Jesu". It is widely held that Hegel's "theolo-
gische Jugendschriften" as a whole can be seen as a
Kantian enterprise in harmony with the letter's demands,
in his book "Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blofien
Vernunft", that Christianity be brought into line with
his own theories concerning "praktische Vernunft". I,
on the other hand, tend to agree with scholars such as
5
J.¥. Schnjidt-JaTjing in regarding Hegel's work at this
as being
stage . . far too rationalist in character to be in
any real sense Kantian. However, I see in this phenomenon
no sign of sympathy for Fichte or Spinoza on Hegel's part,
but rather an overwhelming enthusiasm for Plato, plus an
admiration for a quality in ancient Greek life which he
thought was lacking in modern Germany. This quality he
termed "Sittlichkeit".
In his "Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der Weltge-
schichte", Hegel talks of the age of Greek "Sittlichkeit"
as the "Junglingsalter" of mankind. His discussion of
the subject in these "Vorlesungen11 will serve as a con¬
venient prelude to the more opaque equivalent in the
"Phenomenology":
Charakteristisch an Qer griechischon ¥elt_j
ist, dafi hier eine Menge von Staaten sich hervortun.
Es ist das Reich der schonen Freiheit; die unmittel-
bare Sittlichkeit ist es, in der sich hier die
Individuality, t entwickelt. Das Prinzip der Indivi-
dualitat geht hier auf, die subjektive Freiheit,
aber eingebettet in die substantiellc Finheit.
Das Sittliche ist wie in isien Prinzip, aber es
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ist die Sittlichkeit, welche der Individualitat
eingepragt ist und somit das freie Wollen der
Individuen bedeutet,.. das Reich der Freiheit
ist vorhanden, nicht der ungebundenen, natlirlichen,
sondern der sittlichen Freiheit, die einen all—
gemeinen Zweclc hat... Aber es ist nur das Reich
der schonon Freiheit, die mit dem substantiellen
Zweck in nattirlicher, unbefangener Einheit ist.
Es ist die Vereinigung des Sittlichen und des
subjektiven V/illens so, dah die Idee mit einer
plastischen Gestalt vereinigt ist: sie ist noch
nicht abstrakt fur sich auf der einen Seite,
sondern unmittelbar mit dem Wirlclichen verbunden,
wie in einem schonen Kunstwerke das Sinnliche
das Geprage und den nusdruck des Geistigen trligt.
Es ist die gnbefangene Sittlichkeit, noch nicht
Moralitat.
Thus, Greek "Sittlichkeit" is an advance over the
oriental infancy stage, but too involved with "das
Wirkliche" and "das Sinnliche". It is still a stage of
immaturity. Hegel does not regard it as desirable to try
to recapture it:
Man findet in neuerer Zeit groBe, tiefe Manner,
wie z.B. Rousseau, die das Bessere rlickwarts
suchen. Das ist aber ein Irrtum. Wir werden uns
zwar ewig von Griechenland angezogen fiihlen; aber
die hochste Befriedigung finden wir da nicht,
denn es fehlt dieser Schonheit die Uahrheit.
Here, in direct opposition to the tenets of the "Sys-
temprogramm", Hegel discusses Truth as something higher
than Beauty, as something which is free from contamination
by any suggestion of sensuality. "Das Schone" (ie. the
direct German translation of -fo KoL\oV) is defined as
"die Idee nur in sinnlicher Anschauung oder Vorstellung".
"Das Wahre", on the other hand, belongs to "eine inner—
g
liche, ubersinnliche Welt".
Hegel ascribes the break from the stage of naive
" Sittlichkeit" to the (in his view) higher stage to the
influence of Sokrates:
In Sokrates dagegen erscheint das Allgemeine,
das Denken, als letzter Zweck, daB sich der Mensch
als allgemeiner, als denkender zu finden und daB
er zu erkennen habe, nicht was der Besonderhoit
nutzlich, sondern was rocht und gut sei. Die
Griechen wuBten wohi, was sittlich war in jeder
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Beziehung; aber daB der Mensch dies in sich suchen
und aus sich finden mlisse, das ist der Standpunkt
des Solcrates. Er hat so die freie Unabhangiglceit
des Gedankens in sich ausgesprochen.
The split between the sensual world and the higher
world of Thought I take to be a reference to the "Ideen-
lehre" developed in Plato's dialogues and put into the
mouth of Sokrates. I tend to share the doubts expressed
by Schleiermacher and certain modern scholars^ in
ascribing a belief in or teaching of "die Ideenlehre" to
Sokrates. However this may be, it is open to doubt
whe ther:
a) the "Ideenlehre" necessarily involves a rejection
of the "Sinnenwelt" and
b) any such rejection should be regarded as an intel¬
lectual advance, as Hegel suggests.
Paul Natorp, when he wrote his great study of "Platos
Ideenlehre" at the turn of the century, was very much
aware of this problem, as is shown by the following ex¬
cerpts from his chapter on the "Phaedo":
Wir werden es gerade aus dem Phaedo vernehmen,
daB sogar nur voin Sinnlichen aus, wiewohl nicht
aus ihm, die reinen Begriffe zu gewinnen, daB
also die Sinne zur ErkenntY^s allerdings 'zu
Hilfe zu nehmen1 sind ...
InJ^enJstreng dialektischen Partien... ver—
rat sich so wenig eine Verachtung der Sinnenwelt,
daB vielmehr eben in ihnen das erste logische
Fundament gelegt wird zu einer Wissenschaft vom
Werden, die es im Phaedrus und Theaetet noch gar-
nicht gab; daB das Veranderliche als zweite Art
des Seins neben dem Unwandelbare^(den Ideen)
seine gesicherte Stelle findet.
: So ist nun zwischen den beiden 'auBersten
Enden1 der Erkenntnis (wie Kant sagt), Sinnlich-
keit und Verstand, eine Verbindung, ein positiver
Zusammenhang wenigstens angebahnt. Die strenge
Verschiedenheit beider wird festgehalten: Der
Begriff ist 'neben' oder 'auBer1 dem Sinnlichen,
als ein Aa.deres (7^-A); aber 'aus1 aller Verwirrung
des Sinnlichen heraus, nur aus ihr, erkennen wir
das reine, gedankliche Sein...
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This aspect of Plato's work escaped Hegel's attention.
It is, however, (i would maintain) precisely the aspect
which appealed to Holderlin. In fact, the difference be¬
tween the systems of Holderlin and Hegel can be related
to and perhaps even adequately explained by their dif¬
ferences in understanding Plato's work, plus their dif¬
ferent estimates of the worth of the two main parts of
his work; the (earlier) period when Plato was attempting,
much in the manner of Empedolcles, to achieve a balance
and harmony between the various faculties or parts of
man, and the (later) period when he was concerned with
establishing the supremacy of Reason over the others.
To Holderlin, Reason or the i of\ fe KTIK/*] was a
means to an end, not an end in itself. It takes the phi¬
losopher to the , which is not some logical "Begriff"
in a super-sensual rational vacuum, but a truth or body
of truths buried in the unconscious of mankind and re—
7 /
coverable by virtue of ot'kod|uLV/v|a"i^. The unconscious is the
immortal part of man, the part which contains the ulti¬
mate truths the philosophers seek - NOT the Reason.
Without the Reason, there would be no way for man to gain
conscious knowledge of these truths, but without the Un¬
conscious there would be no object worthy of Reason's
s trivings.
This is all very far from Hegel's conception of things
in the "Kunstreligion" section of the "Phenomenology",
which starts with the following paragraph:
Der Geist hat seine Gestalt, in welcher er fur
sein Bewufltsein ist, in die Forrm des BewuBtseins
selbst erhoben, und bringt eine solche sich
hervor. Der Werkmeister hat das synthetische
Arbeiten, das Yermischen der fremdartigen Formen
des Gedankens und des Natiirlichen aufgegeben;
indem die Gestalt die Form der selbstbewuBten
Tatiglcai^gewonnen, ist er geistiger Arbeiter ge-
worden.
Thus, the giving up of the synthesising effort is
1 5here seen as an advance. The concept of the "Werk—
meister" requires explanation. In the section of the
"Phenomenology" immediately preceding this, Hegel had
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dealt with the levels of human consciousness which he
saw as being lower than and anterior to Greek "Sittlich-
keit" . He starts by dealing with "die nattirliche Religion',1
the lowest type, which is subdivided into three parts:
"das Lichtwesen", "die Pflanze und das Tier", "der Werk-
meister", The criteria for division is the ob.ject of
worship, as follows;
a) "£as L(ichtwesen^_, the object of worship in Zoro-
astrian religion, is a formless spirit, worshipped
at the level of sense-certainty (fitting in with
Hegel's account of "BewuBtsein" at the beginning of
the "Phenomenology"). According to Hegel, con¬
sciousness cannot rest content with an object so
formless, but must go on to particularise.
b) "Die, Pflanze und cjass Tier^, refers to Indian reli¬
gion, as Hegel understood it.^ Here the religious
objects are mainly aggressive animals, symbolising
national spirits. The warring variety of this type
of religious expression is also inadequate.
c) "J}or Rejrkmeis^er" refers to Egyptian religion. Here,
Spirit becomes an Artificer, constructing the
pyramids in an instinctive manner. Its instinctive
nature is its flaw.
This brings us to the "Kunstreligion" section. Here,
in Greek religion and art, man for the first time reaches
full consciousness of his superior position in the scheme
of things:
Fragen wir danach, welches der wirkliche Geist
ist, der in der Kunstreligion das BewuBtsein
seines absoluten Wissens hat, so ergibt sich, daB
es der sittliche oder der wahre Geist ist... Er
ist das freie Voile, worin die Sitte die Substanz
aller ausmacht, deren Wirlclichkeit und Dasein
alle und jeder Einzelne als seinen Willen und
Tat weiB. 7
Here, art comes into its own. The gods are seen in
human form, for the first time. They are represented in
sculpture, where, again for the first time, a unity of
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form and content is achieved (also a unity of the divine
and the human). This is, in Hegel's view, an advance of
the highest importance in the history of human conscious¬
ness .
3.1
Classic^art is, according to Hegel, the ultimate or
highest art form, because of this unity of form and
content. During this peak, while the unity lasts, three
varieties or subspecies are discerned by Hegel:
a) "_Das_ abstrakte Kunstwerk". largely concerned with
the Oracle and the Hymn.
b) "Dajs lebendige_ Kuns twerk" , which deals with the
worship of heroes.
c) "Da^, ^eisti^e_Kunstwerk^, which deals with Epic,
Tragedy and Comedy.
Of these three, "das geistige kunstwerk" is the
highest type, because it is more coherent than the
oracle, less emotional and narrow than the Hymn, and
sees the heroes from a higher, objective intellectual
position.
Fe have dealt with Hegel's theory of tragedy in our
chapter on Sophokles, so I shall simply note here that
the Comic starts at the level of consciousness which ob¬
tains at the end of the tragic phase. In Bernard Bosan-
quet's words: "Comedy starts from the absolute reconci¬
liation which is the close of tragedy, the absolute self-
1 8
certainty and cheerfulness which nothing can disturb."
It is at this point that we see the beginnings of
what Hegel describes as the "Verderben" of Greek "Sitt-
lichkeit", involving the activities of the Sophists,
Sokrates and Plato:
Ein neues Tribunal fur das, was recht sei, ist
hiermit aufgestellt; man zog die Gegenstande vor
ein inneres Tribunal. Jetzt hat Plato, der Schiller
von Sokrates, den Homer und Hesiod, die Urheber
der religiosen Vorstellungsart der Griechen, aus
seinem Staate verbannt wissen wollen; denn er
verlangte eine hohere, dcm Gedanken zusagende
Vorstellung von dem, was als Gott verehrt werden
soil. y
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Once this new advance has destroyed the naive harmony
of Greek "Sittlichkeit", it cannot be reintegrated.
"Geist" moves on, ever higher, and leaves behind the
shattered pieces.
It was, however, precisely such a reintegration which
was Hyperion's aim in Holderlin's novel. In the fifteenth
letter of Volume One, Book Two, Hyperion expresses these
hopes (after discussing the friendship of Harmodius and
Aristogiton) in the following terms:
Das ist auch meine Hoffnung, meine Lust in ein-
samen Stunden, daB solche grofie Tone und groCere
einst wiederlcehren mlissen in der Symphonie des
Veltlaufs. Die Liebe gebar Jahrtausende voll le-
bendiger Menschen; die Freundschaft wird sie
wiedergebaren. Von Kinderharmonie sind einst die
Volker ausgegangen, die Harmonie der Geister wird
der Anfang einer neuen Weltgeschichte sein. Von
Pflanzenglticlc begannen die Menschen und wuchsen
auf, und wuchsen bis sie reiften; von nun an garten
sie unaufhorlich fort, von innen und aufien, bis
jetzt das Menschengeschlecht, unendlich aufgelost,
wie ein Chaos daliogt, daB alle,die noch fiihlen
und sehen, Schwindel ergreift; aber die Schonheit
fliichtet aus dem Leben der Menschen sich herauf in
den Geist; Ideal wird, was Natur war, und wenn von
unten gleich der Baum verdorrt ist und verwittert,
ein frischer Gipfel ist noch hervorgegangen aus ihm,
und griint im Somienglanze, wie einst der Stamm in
den Tagen der Jugend; Jatur war.
This is the essence of Hyperion's tragic position, as
Diotima points out to him in the next letter:
Du wolltest keine Menschen, glaube mir, du
wolltest eine Welt. Den Verlust von alien goldenen
Jahrhunderten... den Geist von alien Geistern
beflrer Zeit, die Kraft von alien j.raften der
Ileroen, die sollte dir ein Einzelner, ein Mensch
ersetzen!...
Darum, weil du alles hast und nichts, weil das
Phantom der goldenen Tage, die da kommen sollen,
dein gehcirt, und doch nicht da ist, weil du ein
Burger bist in den Kegionen der Gerochtigkeit
und Schonheit, ein Gott bist unter Gottern in
den schonen Traumen, die am Tage dich besclileichon,
und wenn du aufwachst, auf neugriechiacliem Boden
s tehst...
Ich fiirchte filr dich, du haltst das Schicksal
dieser Zeiten schwerl: nii«
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Volume One closes with the description of the visit
to Athens, and of" the thoughts this visit provokes in the
hero. He explains the great flowering of Athenian culture
in the following fashion:
Ungestorter in jedem Betracht, von gewaltsamem
EinfluB freier, als irgend ein Volk der Erde, er-
wuchs das Volk der Athener. Kein Eroberer sclrwacht
sie, kein Kriegsgluck berauscht sie, kein frernder
Gotterdienst betaubt sie, keine eilfertige Weis—
heit treibt sie zu unzeitiger keife. _
[Gr.St.A.3,PP.77-8j
This last letter develops into the equivalent of
Hegel's "Kunstreligion" section:
So war der Athener ein Mensch... Schon kara er
aus den Handen der Natur, schon, an Leib und Seele,
wie man zu sagen pflegt.
Das erste Kind der menschlichen, der gottlichen
Schonheit ist die Kuns t. In ihr verjtingt und wieder—
holt der gottliche Mensch sich selbst. Er will sich
selber fulilen, darum stellt er seine Schonheit
gegentiber sich. So gab der Monsch sich seine
Gottor. Denn im Anfang war der Mensch und seine
Gotter Eins, da, sich selber unbekannt, die ewige
Schonheit war. — Xch spreche Mysterien, aber sie
sind. -
Das erste Kind der gottlichen Schonheit ist die
Kuns t. So war es bei den Athenern. Der Schonheit
zweite Tochter ist Religion. Religion ist Liebe
der Schonheit. Der Weise liebt sie selbst, die
Unendliche, die Allumfassende; das Volk liebt
ihre Kinder, die Gotter, die in mannigfaltigen Ge¬
stagen ihm erscheinen. Auch so wars bei den
Athenern.
jGr.St.A.3,PP.79-8oTj
A discussion of the Egyptian mentality brings the com¬
parison with the "Phenomenology" >nearer. Precisely how
different this version of the principles of Greek "Sitt—
lichkeit" is from Hegel's, becomes clear in the following
passage:
Sie waren sogar. . . ohne Diclitung nie ein philo¬
sophise]!. Volk gewesen!
Was hat die Philosophie, erwidort' er, was hat
die kalte Erhabenheit dieser Wissenschaft init Dich-
tung zu tun?
Die Dichtung, sagt ich, meiner Seiche gewiB,
ist der Anfang und das Ende dieser Wissenschaft.
Wie Minerva aus ^upiters Haupt, entspringt sie
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aus der Dichtung eines unendlichen gottlichen
Seins, Und so lauft am End auch wieder in ihr das
Unvereinbare in der geheimnisvollen Quelle der
Dichtung zusammen. .
|Gr. S t. A . 3 , P. 81 J
To Holderlin, then, the great flowering of Greek cul¬
ture is explained in terms of of freedom and
of the fact that, unlike the Egyptians, they were allowed
to develop and mature in a natural, free fashion. This is
very different from Hegel's view of the Greeks separating
themselves from Nature — here, their culture is the na¬
tural flowering of Nature.
The Greek artist sees the essence of beauty in Nature
20
and in man, and objectifies it.
Das grofle Wort, das tv ^v<sC(^>€po'V ...
des Heraklit, das konnte nur em Grieche finden,
denn es ist das Wesen der Schonheit, und ehe das
gefunden war, gabs keine Philosophie.
Ntm konnte man bestimmen, das Ganze war da.
Die Blume war gereift; man konnte nun zergliedern.
Der Moment der Schonheit war nun kund geworden
unter den Menschen, war da im Leben und Geiste,
das Unendlichoinige war.
[Gr.St.A.3, p.827[
The essence of beauty is to bind together. In Plato's
(earlier) works, beauty is a quality of which men and
objects partake in varying degrees, rather than something
outside and above them. The Greek "Gipfel der Zeit" saw
Nature reaching its peak, the peak it was teleologically
programmed to reach: .
... es war ein gottlich Leben und der Mensch
war da der Mittelpunkt der Natur... Die Natur
war Priesterin und der Mensch ihr Gott..
[Gr.St.A.3, P. 84?)
This relationship between man and Nature is in com¬
plete contrast to that described by Hegel in the "Pheno¬
menology". Hegel's ideal of the philosopher rejecting
beauty, das"Sinnliche" and Nature in favour of a higher,
a-sensual "Begriff" is, I would maintain, incompatible
with Hyperion's vision:
- 206 -
Aus bloBem Verstande lcommt keine Philosophie,
denn Philosophie 1st raehr, denri nur die beschriinkte
Erkenntnis des Vorliandnen,
Aus blofler Vernunft koramt keine Philosophie,
denn Philosophie ist rnehr, denn blinde Fordorung
eines nie zu endigenden Fortschritts in Vereini-
gung und Unterscheidung eines moglichen Stoffs.
Leuchtet aber das gottliche €.v <S\.etJb^Qcy 4<fUT-u3 »
das Ideal der Schonheit den strebenden Vernunft,
so fodert sie nicht blind, und weiB, wozu sie
fodert. p- -m
IGr.S t.A.3,p.83J
This "Ideal" can be provided for philosophy only by
the artist.
The first volume of "Hyperion" ends on an optimistic
note of hope for the renewal of this lost state of har¬
mony:
Es wird nur Eine Schonheit sein; und Menschheit
und Natur wird sich vereinen in Eine allumfassende
Gottheit.
[Gr.St.A.3,p.9o7]
In the second volume, with the plunder of Misistra,
all Hyperion's hopes come to nought, Alabanda and ho
eventually part. He receives a last letter from the
dying Dio tima:
•Entsetze dich nicht! Es luutert sich alles
Natiirliche, und uberall windet die Bliite des
Lebens freier und freier vom grobern Stoffe sich
1 os. |— —1
JGr.St.A.3,p.1^4J
S
The letter end^ with this optimistic prophecy:
Trauernder Jungling! bald, bald wirst du gluck—
licher sein. Dir ist dein Lorbeer nicht gereift
und deine Myrten verbltihten, denn Priester sollst
du sein der gottlichen Natur, und die dichterischen
Tage keimen dir schon. .— __
(Gr.St.A.3,P.149J
One notes the parallel and contrast: in ancient
Greece, Nature had been the "Priesterin", man the god
she worshipped; now the poet Hyperion is to bo the
priest, Nature the goddess he worships. The "exzentrische
Bahn" has run its course.
At this point of desperation in his life, the figure
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of Empedokles occurs to him;
'Und nun sage rair, wo ist noch eine Zuflucht?
- Gestern war ich auf dem Aetna droben. Da fiel
der grofie Sizilianer mir ein, der einst... sich
da hinabwarf in die herrlichen Flammen,..
0-r.St.A.3,p. 1 51T]
The thought comes to him that he might follow the
Sicilian's example and kill himself, but;
'... man muB sich hoher achten, denn ich mich
achte, um so ungerufen der Natur ans Herz zu
fliegen. . . • __
[Gr.St.A.3,PP.151-2J
There follows his tirade against the Germans because
they are not "Menschen", lacking the wholeness which
would make them worthy of the name. Each individual has
his which makes him unique and divides him off
from his fellows;
... ist das nicht, wie ein Schlachtfeld, wo
Hande und Arme und alle Glieder zersttickelt
untereinander liegen, indessen das vergoBne
Lebensblut im Sande zerrinnt? __
0r.St.A.3,p.153TJ
But this tragic work, this tale of lost hopes, does
not end on a tragic note. In his despair he tried to gain
consolation by coming closer to Nature, to a child-like
state, until one day;
Diotima, rief ich, wo bist du, o wo bist du?
Und mir war, als hort ich Diotimas Stimrne, die
Stimme, die mich einst erheitert in den Tagen der
Freude —
Bei den Meinen, rief sie, bin ich, bei den
Deinen, die der irre Menschengeis t miGlcennt!
jGr.St,A.3»P.158TJ
This provokes a great revelation in Hyperion, a vision
of the oneness of everything;
... denn alle wuchsen wir aus dem goldnen Samkorn
herauf!
|Gr .St.A.3,P.159J
In this final vision, all the dissonances are recon¬
ciled;
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Geschiehet doch alles aus Lust, und endet doch
alles mit Frieden.
Wie der Zwist der Liebenden, sind die Disso-
nanzen der Welt. Yersohnung ist mitten im Streit
und alles Getrennte findet sich wieder,
Es scheiden und lcehren im Herzen die Adern und
einiges, ewiges, gliihendes Leben ist Allec
[Gr.St.A.3,PP.159-60
This mystic vision is the conclusion of the work, the
which is the end product of the dialectical pro¬
gress of events .2\t is a vision to which Ilolderlin re¬
mained true for the rest of his career. His mission he
saw as one of making people, in particular the Germans,
aware of the state of harmony from which they had fallen,
and of the possibility of recapturing it. This possibi¬
lity lay not in the slavish obedience to any Moral Law,
but in an ecstatic acceptance of and re-union with the
"Seele" of the world, with beauty. The "Ideeil der Schon—
heit", presented to us by the poet, represents the end
and purpose of all human striving and all human existence.
This "Ideal" grex\r out of Nature with Greece. It grew
naturally by virtue of the teleological structure of
Nature and the "bont6 naturelle"of man. It died when the
wholeness of this vision, its harmony and naturalness
were destroyed by the division of man's faculties we
have seen in works such as Plato's "Republic", where
faith is lost in the "bont£ naturelle"which made all this
possible, where Reason enthrones itself above -fo VC-*i\o'y »
forgetting its humble r8le as a T^r^V-vj and putting itself
forward as an end in itself. In religious terms, this
can be equated with the Fall. The result is the state of
alienation described by Holderlin in the seventh stanza
of "Brot und Wein":
"Aber Freund! wir kommen zu spat! Zwar leben die
Gotter,
Aber iiber dem Haupt droben in anderer Welt,
Endlos wirken sie da und scheinens wenig zu
achten,
Ob wir leben, so sehr schonen die Himinlischen
uns .




Nur zu Zeiten ertragt gottliche Fiille der Mensch.
j*Gr.St.A. 2/1 , p.93Tj
Thus, we can summarise the difference between Holder-
lin's view of Greek "Sittlichkeit" and Hegel's in the
following terms:
a) Holderlin saw the flowering of Greek culture as a
natural outgrowth of Nature, made possible by the
freedom allowed to the Greeks to develop naturally.
Hegel saw this flowering as the result of a split
or separation from the original, natural state.
b) Holderlin saw the "Gipfel" of this period as a
consummation or peak of Nature, a state of uncon¬
scious harmony.
Hegel saw it as an advance over the natural state,
and as an immature level of consciousness in which
the divine spark of reason had not yet freed itself
from the shackles of "das Sinnlicho".
c) Holderlin saw the end of this period as an almost
entirely negative, if necessary, destruction of the
harmonic state, to be followed after the death of
Christ by "das tausendjahrige Wetter",
Hegel saw its end as the entirely laudable maturing
of Reason in its consciousness of its own super¬
iority and independence.
These differences, or related and similar ones, occur
again in the two thinkers' respective attitudes towards
the cultural flowering of their own time, the German
"Gipfel der Zeit". Holderlin (and Schelling) saw the Ab¬
solute as something which had to be experienced by man
as a whole being (as "Mensch",in the Holderlinian sense);
Hegel saw it as a "Begriff".
That Hegel was well aware of this difference of posi¬
tion is clear from several utterances in the introduction
to the "I'henomenology" and in the body of the work itself,
in particular in the "schone Seele" section. In the "Vor—
rede", we have the following statements:
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Indem die wahre Gestalt der Wahrheit in die
Wissenschaftlichlceit gesetzt wird, — oder was
dasselbe ist, indem die Wahrheit behaujatet wird,
an dem Begriffe allein das Element ihrer Existenz
zu haben,-so aveiB ich, daB dies im Widerspruch mit
einer Vorstellung und deren Folgen zu stehen
scheint, welche eine so groBe AnmaBung als Aus—
breitung in der Uberzeugung des Zeitalters hat...
Das Absolute soli nicht begriffen, sonder gefuhlt
and angeschaut, nicht sein Begriff, sondern sein
Gefuhl und Anschauung spllen das Wort fuhren und
ausgesprochen werden.22
... nicht der Begriff, sondern die Ekstase, nicht
die kalt fortschreitende Notwendigkeit der Sache,
sondern die garende Begeisterung soil die Haltung
land fortleitendp Ausbreitung des Keichtums der
Substanz sein.23
Whether Hegel at any one point is thinking in particu-
lar of Jacobi's intuitionism, Schiller, Holderlin, Schel-
ling, the Schlegels or any of the other leading thinkers
of his day, the general tone is clear: his advantage over
them lies in the cold progress of his logical process,
which leads him to the following cold, logical conclusion:
Das Wahre ist das Ganze. Das Ganze aber ist nur
das durch seine Entwicklung sich vollendende Wesen.
Es ist von dem Absoluten zu sagen, daB es wesent-
lich Resultat, daB es erst am Ende das ist, was es
in Wahrheit ist, und hierin eben besteht seine
Natur, Wirkliches, Subjekt, oder sich selbst Werden
zu s eyn .
Thus, we have Hegel's great act of faith in the idea
of human progress. In this system, all change must be
progress, because it involves movement towards the end,
and the end is the Absolute. What place human freedom,
is obscure, to say the least. The Absolute involves a
solution to the "Herrschaft"/"Rnechtschaft" problem, to
be sure, but the solution does not really deserve the
name of freedom. As Nicholas Berdyaev points out:
When Hegel says that the truth of necessity is
freedom he denies the primary nature of freedom
and entirely subordinates it to necessity, .-end in
no degree does it help when iiegel asserts that the
finite condition of the world is consciousness of
so prized by Kant, can have in this apotheosis of
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freedom of the spirit, and the ultimate aim is the
actualization of freedom. Freedom is represented
as the outcome of a necessary world process — as
ai gift of necessity. But then, it has to be said
that in Hegel even God is an outcome of the wprld
process; he becomes within the world—order. 2
In other words, riegel had reverted to something sus¬
piciously similar to the dogmatic rationalism of pre—
Kantian days. Like Ficlite, he objected to the limits im¬
posed upon human knowledge by Kant; like Fichte, he had
little regard for Nature or anything outside the human
"Ich"; unlike Fichte, he found himself able to ignore
Nature or the "Nicht-Ich" once it had served its ori¬
ginal purpose as a base for his pyramid. Inside the human
psyche, this "Nicht-Ich" may be equated with the Uncon¬
scious. Hegel's general attitude towards the "Nicht-Ich"
(in Nature, in man) led him to reject the work of the
Romantics, whose discovery and investigation of the
Unconscious was of no interest to him, being empirical
rather than rationalist in approach. Emanuel Iiirsch has
26
shown convincingly that the section of the Phenomeno¬
logy entitled "Der seiner selbst gewisse Geist, die
Moralitat" is best understood as an attack by Hegel on
that section of his contemporaries who can be grouped
together loosely tinder the heading "Kant and the Roman—
27'
tics".. Iiirsch sees the subsections "die moralische
We1tanschauung" and "die Verstellung" as a discussion of
Kant's "praktische Philosophie". Hegel himself pointed
out a parallel between this section and that on "Stoi-
zismus, Slceptizismus und das ungliickliche Bewufltsein" ,
the precise parallels being:
a) Stoicism/Kant
b) Scepticism/"Gewissen"
c) "das ungliickliche BewuBtsein"/"die schone Seele"
As the section on "das ungliickliche BewuBtsein" deals
28
with the Middle Ages, Hirsch argues, Hegel is thereby
stressing the correspondence between the Middle Ages and
Romanticism.
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Hirsch goes '> on to draw attention to references he
finds in Hegel's text to Jacobi, Fichte, Novalis and
Friedrich Schlegel, before Coming •- • to Friedrich Hblder¬
lin.^9 Hirsch sees a reference to the latter in the sec¬
tion on the "schone Seele, die ein hartes Ilerz ist und
30
durch ihre Unvorsohntheit der Zerrlittung anheim fallt".
He argues:
Man kann fllovali^ schwerlich vorwerfen, daB
er einen Gegensatz unversohnt, Gemeinschaft ver-
sagend, festgehalten habe, Dagegen ist solche
Beurteilung nicht vollig undenkbar gegentiber Hoi—
derlin. Hblderlin hat die Art der zarten, wirk—
lichlceitslosen schonen Seele und die eines die
Welt im BewuBtsein eigener Hoheit und Gottlichkeit
zuriickstoflenden Geistes zugleich an sich getragen.
Weni etwa am Hyperion trotz seines Urteils tiber
die Deutschen und trotz seiner stolzen Einsamkeit
der zweite Zug nicht deutlich genug ausgepragt
ist, der mag an den Empedokles sich erinnern. Man
kann wohl sagen, daB diese Art mit an seinem
ScBicksal gevoben hat. So bleibt mir nicht andres
iibrig, als in der Verriicktheit, die nur noch die
geistlose Einheit des Seins hervorbringt, eine^
Anspielung auf Holderlins Untergang zu sehen.
Hirsch contents himself with a simple description of
what he sees as Hegel's point, and an attempt to use
this interpretation to cast light on Hegel's development
from the Frankfurt fragments towards the "Phenomenology".
He makes no attempt to discuss Hegel's views on their
own merit,^ even if his tone (in the above passage,
for example) seems to imply approval of Hegel's position.
If one accepts Hirsch's interpretation of Hegel's
intentions, the following points would seem apposite:
a) To suggest that Hblderlin rejected the world in
the consciousness of his own "Hoheit" is to ig¬
nore the fact that he saw it as his life's task
mediate between the gods or to and the
world and hold them together.
b) Hyperion's judgment on the Germans is only a
judgment of them at one specific point in time.
He rebukes them for not espousing the "whole—man"
principle, for being separate "Ich"'s with their
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separate specialities - not for being inherently
inferior. His hope is that they may change.
c) Hyperion's "stolze Einsamkeit" is not of his own
choosing. He wanted and tried to involve himself
in the world and its affairs. The world rejected
him.
d) It is out of harmony with all we know of Holderlin's
biography to suggest that his ultimate madness was
due to any self-imposed isolation. The latter was
perhaps a result of his refusal to compromise in
the matter of what he saw as his life's mission.
However, it can scarcely be regarded as his fault
if other people, such as Hegel, did not understand
what he was trying to achieve. The neglect of men
he respected, the death of Diotima - these and
other factors have to be taken into account when
one discusses the causes of Holderlin's madness.
We have also seen in a previous chapter how prob¬
able it is that his madness had, in his own eyes
at least, a symbolic significance. The correspon¬
dence of madness with such concepts as death, ori¬
ginal chaos and self-sacrifice deserves attention.
To Holderlin, as to any man of a predominantly
religious world view, death did not mean annihila¬
tion, but union with God, an entry into paradise.
I feel it is probably the case that he saw his
madness in a similar light: it had the negative
aspect that, like death, it shut him off from his
fellows and put an end to his active participation
in the world's affairs, and also to the workings
of one of the finest philosophical minds of the
age; however, it was also a merciful release for
him from all his troubles and the strains of his
work, and an ultimate return to his "Ursprung".
The great difference between the "Weitanscliauungen"
of Holderlin and Hegel is seen most clearly perhaps in
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their respective attitudes towards the beginning and the
end. Quite apart from any reference to "bont& naturelle"
and original sin, there is a vast difference between the
two men's attitudes towards the beginning of the universe
and of man. With Ilegel, we simply have a seed which con¬
tains within itself the possibilities (or rather neces¬
sity) of future development and flowering. There is no
theistic concept of a Prime Cause - of the two, Hegel is
the pantheist, not Holderlin. The process simply begins.
There is nothing outside of "das Ganze" that might cause
its coming-into-being or that might influence it once it
is there. Similarly, a human being, for Hegel, comes into
being, blossoms and dies. There is nothing before birth
or after death. Hegel's Absolute is a peak of conscious¬
ness . Death ends this. With Holderlin., on the other hand,
death is seen in a more religious light. For him, the
death of the body is not the end, but a glorious be¬
ginning:
In this respect, his theism and his belief in a "Jen-
seits", Holderlin is in harmony with Plato and Kant,
while Hegel seems nearer to a pantheistic materialism
such as the "Linkshegelianer" were indeed to develop
out of his system.
The ideas of Holderlin and Schelling, then, are best
seen, in my view, as the logical final outcome of the
philosophical movement founded by Kant. Like Kant, they
rejected dogmatic rationalism in favour of an assertion
of human freedom and of a theistic belief in God. As we
have seen, this belief was based on religious experience
or artistic, intuition'in Holderlin's case, more 'than on
Kant's moral argument or Plato's cosmological argument
("of. "Phaedrus" 14-5 c-e; "Laws", nook 10), whereas dcnexl—
Lag devoted himself to a more strictly philosophical wora-
... bis in den Tod
Kann aber ein Mensch auch
Im Gedachtnis doch das Beste behalten
Und danii erlebt er das Hochste.
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ing out of the theme in the negative philosophy- Much
of their philosophical efforts were directed, towards
solving the perennial philosophical problem of balanc¬
ing Freedom and Necessity.. I. would maintain that Jac—
obi"s^ accusation that Schelling,:s system involved an
acceptance of Spinazan determinism is unjustified, be¬
cause there, is, na suggestion in it that Gad (far less
Nature) is omnipotent — the theodicy problem likewise
does not exist for the same reason... Hblderlin"'s and
Schelling"'s system preserves a place for. contingency,
which is the. proper, sphere, of action for human free¬
dom- Such questions become an acute embarrassment only
for theists who- base their, beliefs, on some form of the
teleological or ontological argument.. ^
In conclusion, I should like to suggest that a phil¬
osophical system which combines freedom and religious
belief, a belief in man with a belief in God, plus ad¬
mirable explanations of and. solutions for such matters
as. the problem of evil and man's relationship to Nature,
is deserving of far more serious attention than it has
received as yet in the philosophical world-
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APPENDIX A : Footnotes
Chapter On_e
q
The spelling of all quotations from Holderlin has been
modernised in accordance with the practice of the "Kleine
Stuttgarter Ausgabe", in the hone that non-Germanists (in
particular English-speaking philosophers) will find it eas¬
ier to understand them.
p
For further," more detailed orientation,see the relevant
entries in Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon and
Ebeling's Lexicon Homericum.
x
■^cf. Chapter Two, where the "Teiresias element" is dealt
with at length.
^For a general discussion of the Stoics' ideas on the
"summum bonum", see F.H. Sandbach, The Stoics (London,1975)5
Max Pohlenz, Die Stoa - Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung,
4th edtn., 2 vols. (Gottingen, 1970). '
^The Odes of Pindar (Harmondsworth, 1969), xii.
^Munich, 1962; see, in particular, the two sections:
'Aus Pindars Gedankenwelt' and 'Die "Machte" bei Pindar',
PP. 537-57.
^'op. cit., xvi-xvii.
^hat wealth in itself is a qualification for Pindar in
this regard need not be seen as an indication that he supp¬
orted any concept of plutocracy. Although a political con¬
servative, his concern with ethical values would most assur¬
edly not have allowed him to support any exploitation of the
poor by the rich. Wealth is a positive attribute, in the
sense that it is patently preferable to poverty, and in that
it enables a man to be active as a "Mazen". Any negative
tendencies to abuse the power that wealth brings could be
countered by "the power of the word", as wielded by the
poet. This is a situation (and a power complex) which was
operative in Celtic society well into the modern age. It
is interesting to note that Hdlderlin stresses the ethical
element in Pindar's approach when he translates •cckoO'ToS
(literally: 'luxuriant wealth') as ' edle Vielheit'
QGr'.StrA.5, 82 3 • probably feared that a modern
German reader would misunderstand Pindar's attitude towards
wealth.
^Ethics, V, 42.
iQlhe Isthmian Odes of Pindar (London, 1892), ix.
^K. Rosenkranz, G.W.F.Hegels Leben, 459.
^2op. cit., 538-39.
13h. Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 5th edtn.,
vol. I (Berlin, 1934), 169.
14
Diels, op. cit., 162.
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^Diels, op. cit., 149.
"^op. cit., 539-40.
1?cf. pp. 60-61 below.
Chapter_ Two_
A survey of the work on Sophokles published between
1939 and 1962 is given by H. Friis Johansen in Lustrum 7,
94ff«. This includes comments in English on 844 works.
An interesting anthology of articles on Sophokles in Ger¬
man, with original publication dates ranging from 1946 to
1967, is published by the 'wissenschaftliche Buchgesell-
schaft', Darmstadt, under the editorship of Hans Diller.
^This view is expressed in the Poetics. It might be
argued that u. refers simply to an error of judg¬
ment (cf. Sir David Ross, Aristotle, 287). However, Ar¬
istotle specifically states (Poetics, 1452/34) that, in
tragedy, "a good man must not be seen passing from happi¬
ness to misery". Therefore, the hero of a tragedy (the
character who suffers) must have some defect of charact¬
er, if the play is to meet Aristotle's requirements. It
will be convenient in the present context to use the
traditional term for this defect:
^A good example is provided by J. Dover Wilson's in¬
troduction to his edition of Hamlet (Cambridge-, 1934):
The traditional view, coming down from the middle
ages, and held by most unthinking persons, was that
ghosts were the spirits of the departed who were
permitted to return from Purgatory to communicate
with living men and women. But Protestants had . .
ceased to believe in Purgatory, and they could hard¬
ly suppose that souls in bliss in Heaven would will¬
ingly return to earth or that souls might be releas¬
ed from Hell to do so. Many of them, therefore, came
to the conclusion that ghosts could not possibly be
dead, and must be spirits of another sort. They might
conceivably be angels, but in most instances they were
undoubtedly devils who 'assumed'...the forms of the
departed for their own evil purposes.... Hamlet, the
student of Wittenberg, is chiefly swayed by Protestant
prepossessions.... A little history, of the right
kind, throws a flood of new light over the events of
the first act and, moreover, greatly assists the work¬
ing of the plot, since it makes it natural for Hamlet
to hesitate and assume his 'antic disposition', while
it explains his need for the Gonzago play to test the
Ghost's story.
n Q71 edtn., 1-liii]
4
The references to lines in Oedipus Tyrannos and
Antigone are to the Jebb edition of the original
Greek - not to Holderlin's translation.
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Another 'flaw1 one might feel tempted to attribute
to Oedipus is that he is an upstart destroying the trad¬
itional order and a 'tyrant' in the modern English sense.
This interpretation has its difficalties, in that:
1) Oedipus does not set out consciously to attack
the royal house of Thebes and usurp power.
2) Once in power, he strives in a determined mann¬
er to benefit his people and lift the curse from the
city. ,
3) The ancient Greek term f-up«LWoC, did not have
the exclusively negative connotations of the modern
English 'tyrant*. It simply meant that the person
concerned was an absolute ruler, not fettered by a
constitution, and had probably taken power by force.
4) The Greek word did not apply to hereditary
monarchs, so, in the technical sense, Oedipus was
not in fact a rvp^-v^o^ , since he was the rightful
successor to his father, even if he himself was un¬
aware of this! The title of the play could thus be
taken as being ironic.
For the various meanings of -r-upu.wdc, , see the re¬
levant entry in Liddell and Scott.




%ottheit und Mensch in der Tragodie des Sochokies
(Darmstadt, 1963), 46ff.. Schadewaldt•s article (one of
three, the others being written by Hans Diller and Albin
Lesky) is entitled 'Sophokles und das Leid'.
1QThis evaluation of Euripides was by no means unknown
in Holderlin's day, as Ernst Behler points out in his in¬
troduction to Friedrich Schlegel's 'Studium-Aufsatz':
Im Bereich der Literatur, Philosophie und auch im
politischen Denken fiihrt die Frage, wann die Moderne
dann begonnen habe, zu einem erstaunlich friihen Datum.
Schlegel ist dieser Frage nicht ausgewichen und hat
bei der griechischen Tragodie, wie spater Nietzsche,
in Euripides den Ansatz zur Moderne und die Auflosung
des Mythos durch Rationalismus und Skepsis erblickt.
- Fr. Schlegel, tlber das Studium der griechisch-







^cf. Chapter One above.
1
'
Dichtung und Philosorhie des friihen Griechentums,
^52-53.
^5pieiSj 0p# cit., vol. I, 173.
A
°Diels, op. cit., vol. I, 168.
^^'Diels, op. cit., vol. I, 172.
^®Diels, op. cit., vol. I, 170.
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yIt. is interesting to note, that Holderlin gives;
this Heraklaitan idea, an extra Fichtean dimension by
changing the. original Passive form of the verb
opt&vev) in Elato's "Symposium" (187a) into an Active,
form (cf- G-. Jamme,. Ein ungelehrtes; Buch'.. 153)-
^Diels,, op.cit., vol. I, 153*
PI
Whether this echo is a direct influence or not" is
lagely irrelevant.. It; is true to say that the "Eines—
werdeii"/"Scheiden" dualism was a popular idea in the
"GoethezeitGoethe ' s 'diastole.' and "systole.' ,. Schell—
ing's notion of the unification of freedom and necessity
in the Absolute,, etc.- However, it is significant that
Holderlin applies this idea.specifically to Sophokles,
thereby (perhaps unconsciously) supporting the theory
that Sophokles was a disciple of Herakleitos: it can
hardly be coincidence that Holderlin,, the Presokratic
scholar, saw. this Herakleitan doctrine exemplified in
Sophokles'" work.
^op. cit.., 48.
^This phrase.- is one. of the dubious elements in his
translation: "Mit nichten kommt esi." would translate.
ovKow well enough, but Sophokles. more probably intend¬
ed <?-6kouv, which would- give, an almost exactly opposite
sense:. "Then, seeing that they (^ — 'those things') will
come...", (cf. Jebb edtn., 45)
2^G.W.F. Hegel, Phil, der Religion II/1 , 155..
J.E. Hegel.,, ibidem.
^ G-WL-E. Hegel., ibidem.
^G.W-.E. Hegel,, op-c.it-,. 155-56.
^®G.W..F. Hegel.,, o.p-cit-, 156.
^^G-W-E- Hegel., ibidem.
30v Hegel.'s translation would, seem to be nearer the
Greek "sense- Holderlin' s "Selbs.terkennen" appears to
be the result of him taking ("self—resolved,
self—chosen");1 in a Passive sense., parallel to the fam¬
ous. Delphic exhortation: <3-6.u>*r©v. His unorthodox
rendering is not of central importance here, however,
since it is Hegel, not Holderlin, who seems to base his.
interpretation of the. play on this passage-
^G-W-E- Hegel,., op.cit-, 155*
^G.W.F- Hegel, ibidem.
55ghe use of the terms 'win" and "lose' is further
evidence that Holderlin saw. Kreon as the only guilty
party. Kreon 'loses', Antigone (ironic as this may
seem) 'wins'-
^G.W.E- Hegel, op..cit., 156.




88y This is expressed well in the poem "One Foot in
Eden" by Edwin Muir, the Orcadian poet who had a great
interest in and admiration for Holderlin:
"What had Eden ever to say
Of hope and faith and. piuy and love.
Until, was buried, all its day
And memory found its. treasure trove?"'
Collected Poems- ,. London, 1963,. 227.
^Schriften von 1794-1798- 262..
Chapter Thre£
"Floruit" is used here in the customary ancient
manner, to mean that the man concerned was approximate¬
ly forty years old.
2See J- Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy. 198, where
he concludes"All,. therefore,, we can be said to know
is, that his grandfather was still alive in 496 B.C-;
that he himself was active at Akragas after 472, the
date of Theron's. death; and. that he died later than 444."
^Empedokles and.. Holderlin. Frankfurt a- M..,, 1965,
5-17-
4
Brucker, in particular, was a. standard undergrad¬
uates' textbook of the day. The main value of these,
volumes to Holderlin weuld be to give him access to. the
fragments. Needless to say, as. a major European philo¬
sopher in his. o.wn right, he would not be dependent on
Brucker (or anyone else) for his interpretation of the
Presokratics. For a. discussion of G.udworth and Brucker
in particular, sea U- Holscher, op.nit.., 13—14- In gen¬
eral, the value, of Holscherns book lias in the fact that
it shows, clearly how. much of the Presokratic texts Hold—
erlin was in a. position to. know and study- His study
is marred, however, by its uncritical acceptance, of the
theory that Empedokles' two "Lehrgedichtei are incompat¬
ible (see, especially, p.24),.by its excessive scepticism
regarding Holderlin "s, understanding of the- Greek, texts
(p-16) and. its.; related assumption that the biographical
element is what interested Holderlin above, all else
C.p-15) - If is to be. hoped that the present; chapter of .
this thesis, will go some, way towards countering this,
general, scepticism-
^Kirk. and. Raven describe, the scholars.' dilemma
thus.::
"While some scholars,, including both Zeller and
Burnet, are content to conclude that Empedokles
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held- simultaneously beliefs that are not only in¬
compatible. but actually contradictory, others, have
argued that the. two- poems must belong to separate
stages of Empedokles:' lifel"
The Presooratic Philosophers, 322-23.
^''Empedokles is in fact drawing, and literally-
believing in, the; analogy between the universe as a
whole and man- Love and Strife, are. nob:,, therefore,
mere, mechanical forces disguised under mythical, or
allegorical names- Empedokles believes,, as the. an¬
alogy shows, that sexual love and cosmic love are one
and the same self-existent external force, which acts
upon the person or thing that loves-" — op.cit., 330*
^'op -c.it., 34-8 -
O
Kirk and Raven make an interesting point: here:
"at the same time.,, apparently,, this, did not preclude
the particular fall, of the individual soul"- -op.cit-.,,
351 - In other words, the individual can be, independent
of his epoch.
^U,-. Ho.ls.cher • (op-ciip.-, 28—29)/ argues that the
"Eeriodenlehra"- must be. restricted to. the individual,
organism- This would seem. to> ignore or implicitly re¬
ject. the., relevance of the microcosm/macrocosm element.
Since. Holscher produces no. arguments to. support this,
rejection, one must approach his ideas, on the. subject
with extreme, caution.
1Qcf. Kirk-and Raven,. 331-32.
11'
The question of what happens to the individual
soul, when this ultimate, end occurs is an interesting
one. in the. thought of. both Empedokles and Holderlin-
Presumably it will, be subsumed in the divine, soul or
mind and lose its. individuality.
12cf. D- Henrich, Hegel- im Kontext. Frankfurt a- M.,
1967i Chapter. Qne (["Hegel, und. Hblderlin"))-
^Darmstadt reprint, 210—11-
1/i
Diels, op-cit:-,. Vol- I,. 350-
15^It. is to be noted that Spmosa. also rejected the.
idea of. the survival of. the mind — cf. F- Copleston,
A History of Philosophy, Vol- 4-, New York,. 1963» 251*
"^The: Greeks and the Irrational, Berkeley, 1951»
153-
^Kirk and Raven refer, to: the interesting possibil¬
ity of a Homeric influence on Empedokles' ideas on the.
subject, referring to Homer's distinction between the
©u|^o$ or conscious soul, and the AsvYA or life-soul —
cf. op-cit., 360.
^Diels,. op.cit., Vol. I, 313.
^®Biels, op.cit:-, Vol- I, 313-14--
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This-, is., what W..B* Teats, was. thinking of when he
wrote the first stanza, of. his- poem "The. Gyres":.
"The Gyres! the GyresL Old Rocky Face, look forth:
Things thought too long can be no longer thought,
For beauty dies of beauty, worth of worth,
And ancient lineaments, are blotted, out.
Irrational streams, of blood, are staining earth;
Empedokles has thrown all things about;
Hector is dead and.there is a light in Troy;
We that look on but laugh in tragic joy."'
Collected. P.oems, London, 2nd edtn.,
-1950, 337.
See also A Vision, London, 1937, 67 ff.-t- "the;
Great Wheel".. Here, Teats makes, the astute point::. mL
had never put the conflict of the dialectical life-
process in logical form, never, thought with. Hegel that,
the two ends of the see-saw are one another's, negation,
nor that the- spring vegetables; were refuted when over."'
(pp.. 72-73)..;
Aristotle also saw. Love and Strife; as; having moral,
implications, in Empedokles, - cf. Kirk and Raven, op..cit-,.
330-31.
21Aetiua 11,6,3 (Diels., op*cit.*, Vol- I„ 292)*
PP .. .
Although Holderlxn will have come across "either'
or. "Ather'* elsewhere, (eg., in Eindar, Goethe's "Ganymed"1,.
Heinse's. Ardinghello.) it. is most, prominent in the work,
of Empedokles* ,.
25cf. "Katha Upanishad", Part Four:: "Who sees the ;
many and not the ONE, wanders on from death to death"'.,
(tr.. J.- Mascaro.; The. Upanishada*. Harmondsworth, 1965,;
63))-
24 .
This same point of view, is expressed in the. "Katha.
Upanishad" in these terms.: "Know the. Atman as; lord of a
chariot; and. the body as the. chariot itself* Know, that
reason is the charioteer1.; and. the mind indeed, is. the
reins*
The horses, they/ say,- are the. senses; and their paths
are the; objects of sense.. When the soul becomes one with
the mind and the senses he* is called "one who has joys
and sorrows..-".":
(tr.. J* Mascara:,, op.cit.,- 60);
It is remarkable* to what a great extent the. Indian
tradition on the one hand and the dualistic European
tradition(Judaeo>-Ghristian and Greek strands- coalescing
in Romanticism), on the other concur with' one another on
the great Truths. This became clear to Fr. Schlegel. in
1802 when he began learning Sanskrit from Alexander
Hamilton in Paris.* He. and his brother (who:- translated
the Bhagavad Gita into Latin) subsequently did much to
spread enthusiasm for ancient Indian culture and religion
in Germany* The Sanskrit classics were very much in
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harmony with the Romantic "Weltanschauung", As: Juan
Mascarc. points out in his introduction to the Bhagavad
Gita (Harmondsworth, 1962, 10):
Sanskrit literature is.r on the, whole, a romantic
literature interwoven with idealism and practical-
wisdom, and with a passionate longing for spiritual
vision,
^The chronological gap between the death of. Sokrates
and the appearance, of these ideas in the ''Republic;' can
be explained by the faat thate Elato. did not approach the
theme of political philosophy in a serious way until this,
later date. When he did turn his-, thoughts, seriously to • '&
the, subject,, he would, be confronted, with the. problems
for the. first time. He. then found, it impossible too bring
together in harmony his. earlier "democratic" ideas and
his; newly elaborated, political theories,
^Diels., op-cit-,. V.ol, I,. 311—12,
27cf., Kirk. and. Raven,. op-cit-,. 324,
QQ
In his. study De Baudelaire au Surr&alisme. (Paris,,
1969) Marcel. Raymond describes this procedure (as Baud¬
elaire. saw it); in the fallowing termsr
•?Et voici comment cette liberty (de. paste)) se
donnera carrierer cl'est le. rSle de 1' imagination...-
d' attribuer aux. images et aux symboles une place et
une valeur relatives — relatives a 1'esprit humainy
relatives a l^oeuvre--, (He.) poets va creer un ordre.
qui sera,..,1'expression infaillibls de son ame- Et;
cette expression — bien que les klaments dont elle
se compose paraissent se. rapporter. aux choses; de la-
nature — n"en sera moins, essentiellement surnaturelle,
Car 1'ame,, de par. son origine et sa destinle,. ne
trouve sa vraie. patrie que dans 1* au-dela spirituel
an. plonge. la nature- La mission de la po&sie est:
d'ouvrir une fen&tre sur cet autre monde,,,r> (pp,22—
23))
The symbols receive their values from the imaginat¬
ion, which is consciously employed by the poet,, in that
he consciously decides to sit down and write a poemr but
the result is not within the. conscious; control of the
poet, because the. imagination does; its work and supplies
the. poem's, contents and significance from the Collective
Unconscious;, in Jungian terminology — ie. through ana¬
mnesis -
^^Early Greek Philosophy,. 202-03.
^®cf- Burnet, op.cit.,. 199.
31
The last three lines are of particular interest in
that they indicate the km element in Holderlin's
view of poetic creation. The "Geist" of the poet pro¬
duces^ its revelations through its contact with "der Ge.ist
der Welt" — cf. Baudelaire's view, note 28 above.
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^ Holderlin'-s. discussion of the subject in his phil¬
osophical persona in the "Grund. zura Empedokles", with
his. stress on the elements- of "Opfer",; "Versohnung" and
the reconciling of extremes., is. of direct interest ! and
value, here.. However, in consideration of the role as¬
cribed to the. unconscious, in his aesthetics and metaphys¬
ics, it is possible and legitimate in my view to search
for deeper meanings and symbols in his work. It is
precisely in this area that the advances in the empirical
study of the. contents of the unconscious since Holderlinns:
day can further our knowledge, and.understanding of his
works.
53Cf._ the discussion of the subject in Rudolf Unger,.
Herder. Novalis und Kleist. Studien iiber die Entwicklung
des Toaesproblems. in Denken und Dichten vom Sturm und
Drang zur Romantik,. Frankfurt a.-M., 1922; also Walter
Rehm, Orpheus. Per Dichter und.die Tot en., Selbstdeut—
ung und Totenkult bei Novalis -• Holderlin — Rilke,
Dusseldorf, 1950.-
3^0.. Brentano, Werke, Vol.. 1i, 46..
^^Kurt Leonhard, a.German Dante scholar,, has suggested
that Dante' s> concept of "amore'", which stands in the.
tradition stretching from Empedokles"(j)uXto6 and Plato's
to Holderlin "s.; "Metaprinzip",. is of a similar Freud¬
ian nature:;
Am auffallendsten ist natiirlich die Einheit dea
Liebestriebes im Guten wie. im Bosen,, als nahrende. und
tragende Wurzel aller anderen Triebe.: in den Qrdnungs—
systemen der drei Jenseitsreiche Dantea sind alle Tug—
enden und; Laster nichts anderes; ala Erachednungsformen
der Liebe, dea; Amor, des Eros- oder,. urn Freuda durchaus.
hierher passendea Wort zu gebrauchen:: Lib i d © in
ihren vielfaltigen Brechungen, Verirrungen,. Verdrang—
ungen,. Auswuchsen und Abschwachungen zwischen Selbst—
tauschung und Selbsterkenntnis .(Dante,. Reinbekr,
1970, 116)-
56
Within the. context of Holderlin "a' poems: and the.
political situation of his day, the anticipation of the.
end of hostilities between France and the- rest of Europe
was the great hope, for a "Gipfel der Zeit"in political-
terms.. The.- Treaty of Lunevilla in particular plays a
large role, in his. poems of the period.. At least, this
event (which occurred early in 18Q1)) is adduced by many
commentators as the motive force.., or at least partly so,
behind "Friedensfeier" and the. reference, to. "des heiligen
Friedens Bogen"1 in the fifth stanza of "Heimkunft."► For
an interesting detailed discussion of "Friedensfeier" and
the various interpretations, of the. poem,, see G> Schneider-
Herrmann, Holderlins; ''Friedensfeier' und der griechischa
Genius, Zurich, 1959.
57^'The question of the. desirability of the intoxicating
effects of works.- of art, especially on naive spirits,, is
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central-, to the. whole issue- of Romantic art,. It is- an
obvious fact that art has this, effect on people., perhaps
especially music, Beethoven's, famous words: "Von Hertzen
— Moga es- wieder-- zu Hertzen gehen'1,. referring to his
"Missa. Solemnis:", ara typical of tha Romantic view.* This
view, is based, on the. belief in the- therapeutic effect, of
tha releasa or "Erschiitterung" occasioned by tha work,
Tha intention is of central importance., just as; it: is in
oratory:: in terms: of emotional, power, there is; not much
to choose between a. Martin Luther. King and an Adolf
Hitler, which shows perfectly how; neutral, "das. Damonischa"
is..
^8cf, Burnet, op.cit., 179, for a description of
Earmenidesideas,-
^cf, Holscher., ap.cit,,9, where tha figure of the.
Egyptian is traced, to. a textbook Holderlin used for his.
"Magisterarbeit"..
4Q
This is the one major.- point which dissuades me from
accepting a. straight Manes/Hegel correspondence, Hegeli
had; at no point been Holderlin's: teacher — tha opposite
was; the case, for - a. long time.- If Holderlin once had a
teacher whom he had outgrown, only two possibilities
strike, me as being likely:: Schiller or Fichte, There
is also) a third, anachronistic possibility:: that Manes
is in fact Empedoklea, whose, works and life, had been an
example for Holderlin,
LlA
Ha has. left Frankfurt and Diotima behind,, and brought
his philosophical studies to their final culmination in
tha "Homburger Aufsatze", His. state, of mind during this
period is clear from tha following sentiments extracted
from a letter, to Susatte. Gontard from tha summer of 1799=
"Taglich muB. ich die verschwundene- Gottheit wieder
rufen, Wenn ich an groBe Manner- denke,,,„ wie. sia,
ein heilig Feuer, um sich griffen, und alles Todte,
Holzerne., das; Stroh der Welt in Flamme verwandeGten,
die. mit ihnen aufflog zum Himmel,, und dann an mich,,
wie ich oft, ein glimmend. Lampchen, umhergeha,, und
be.tteln mochte um einen Tropfen 0l_,. um eine Weile.
noch die Nacht hindurch zu scheinen — siehaL da geht
ein wunderbarer Schauer. mir durch alle. Glieder, und
leise ruf' ich mir das Schreckenswort zu: lebendig
Todter L',!"
In many ways, Holderlin's. Homburg period was one of
transition between Holderlin the bold young innovator
full of hope- for the future, and Holderlin the mature poat
creating masterpieces for eternity, tottering on the. brink
of madness and cut off from all but one or two of his
contemporaries., I would suggest that the play he wrote
during this transitional period shows that he was aware,
however dimly, of what lay ahead of him. For a more de¬
tailed discussion of this period, see Werner Kirchner,
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Holderlin. Aufsatze zu seiner Homburger Zeit, Gotting-
en, 1967; Jamme and 0,. Poggeler (eds.), Homburg vor
der Hohe in der deutschen Geistesgeschichte: StudierT"
zum Freundeskreis um Hegel und Holderlin, Stuttgart,
T^_
Chapter Four
^The; Philosophy of Plato, 2nd edtn.,, Oxford, 1969i-
45.
^Plato, Meno 86a..
^Platon, Darmstadt, 1966, 184.
4cf. Platons Ideenlehre, Darmstadt,, 1975* 4-66..
^op.cit., 187~
6cf. J. Kemp, The Philosophy of Kant, 60.
^The attitude of the rationalist is seen from the
following passage from U. Schultz::
"Kant, hat sich nicht gescheut, zuzugescenen, uaB
er durch Rousseau von der Arroganz der Vernunft, die
fast alle zeitgenossischen Philosophen befallen hatte,
befreit worden war...
Damit tritt fur ihn, wie .fur Rousseau, der Mensch
in seiner natiirlichen Haltung, bar aller spitzfindigen
Versraxiaestatigkeiten, in den kittelpunkt des Interess-
es. Er ward zum HaBstab, an den sich das Leben wie das
philosophische Lehren zu halten hat..."
O
F.M. Cornford makes this clear in his edition of
the Theaitetus as follows: "Knowledge is produced by in¬
struction"^ always accompanied by a true account of its
grounds (iV? Xoyo$), unshakeable by persuasion, and
possessed by gods and only a few among men. True belief
is produced by persuasion, not based on rational grounds
can be changed by persuasion, and is possessed
by all mankind." - Plato's Theory of Knowledge, London,
1970* 141. Holderlin, of course, saw 'himself as one of
the "few among men".
9 -r^The fact that 1 begin this quotation with the line',
"Des gemeinsamen Geistes Gedanken sind..."
is in no way intended as an implicit rejection of\. the.
parallel, structure, of the passage: the most satisfact¬
ory reading of the. stanza, w.ould seem to result from
reading a comma after "...unter den Volkern", and tha
"Wattera, die..-.." as in apposition to "Gedanken".
op.cit., 190.
11
The "Sehnsucht ins Ungebundene" is far from being
a negative characteristic in itself. It only becomes
- d.<Z( ~
dangerous when hemmed in by excessive repression. The
mind, as the conscious, directing element in the psyche,
must take account of these aspirations of the unconscious
elements, and direct or channel them towards good rather
than evil.
y\ p
Kants Brkenntnispsychologie, 64. The various
"Arten des UnbewuBten which are dealt with by Kant are
enumerated on pp. 55-64 of Satura's study. He lists them
as: "die Gedachtnislatenz", "die unterschwelligen Empfind-
ungen", "die unbewuBte psychische Tatigkeit", "die meta-





"Das Gesetz dieses Gesanges ist, daB die zwei ersten
Partien der Form nach durch ProgreB und RegreB entgegen-
gesetzt, aber dem Stoff nach gleich, die zwei folgenden
der Form nach gleich, dem Stoff nach entgegengesetzt sind,




^^F.W.J.v. Schelling, Schriften von 17Q9-1801. 628.
.
'As we have seen, Ottomar Wichmann sees the origins
of Plato's theory of anamnesis as lying in the Pythagor¬
ean doctrines of the transmigration of souls and "p r a -
stabilierte Harmon ire".
y\ Q
In the last analysis, we may have to understand the
"Wechsel der Tone" as a very personal method developed by
Holderlin to induce his visions, rather than as a dogmat¬
ic principle or 'sine qua non' for all poets. Holderlin
can be counted among the poets mentidfed by Kurt Leonhard,
"die durch genaue Kenntnis der SchriAen und Predigten
eben jener 'echten' Mystiker sowie durch ihr Talent und
Handwerk dazu imstande sind, mystische Erlebnisse nicht
etwa nur zu imitieren, vorzutauschen, nachzuahmen, sondern
sie mit Hilfe 'sprachlicher Fiktionen' bei sich selbst und
bei ihren Lesern hervorzurufen, zu erzeugen, durch suggest¬
ive Darstellung herzustellen". - Dante, 160.
19yTh"at Holderlin also took inspiration from the Pre-
sokratics, in particular from Herakleitos and Pindar, can¬
not be excluded. However, the dialectical process as des¬
cribed in Plato's dialogues is the most obvious and the
most carefully elaborated precedent.
Beissner QGr.t>t.A.2/2,, 860. 3. explains this line
simply as a reference to Philoktetes 'living in the mem¬
ory' because of his services to Hercules. It is difficult
to see, however, how 'memory' could have the deeper, meta¬
physical meaning for the Platonist Holderlin elsewhere in
his work and only here be used in the prosaic, everyday
sense. The connection with Herkules (which is admittedly
supported by the reference to him in the stanza preceding
this line) need not exclude the possibility of a deeper
— C.C-0 —
meaning for 1Gedachtnis1: Philoktetes" act in helping
Herkules can just as easily be taken as an example of him




cf. Dieter Henrich's essay: 'Der Begriff der Schon-
heit in Schillers Asthetik' in • Zeitschrift fur rhilosoph-
ische Forschung . Vol. XI, 527 ff«. Here Henrich makes
the following point: "...Schiller fand schon bei der ersten
Lektiire (der Kritik der Urteilskraft) nur die Ausfiihrungen
Kants bemerkenswert..., von denen es ihm schien, aaB sie
eine Verbindung des Asthetischen mit dem Sittlichen ent-
halten oder moglich machen" (p.534). Where Kant himself
(and Fichte after him) connected morality with practical
reason, Schiller (and Holderlin after him) tried to conn¬
ect it more with aesthetics. This is a more Platonist
attitude, in that Plato saw a close affinity between mor¬
al good and beauty. Physical beauty in the world, by this
view, is a reminder from God of what we have to aim for in
our actions. The artist distils this beauty and accentu-
ates it, thereby intensifying the effect. The moral force
of the work of art is something which concerned many art¬
ists of the period, from Goethe and Schiller to Holderlin
and Beethoven.
2^I. Kant, Schriften,6, 44—46.
24
I. Kant, Schriften,5, 326.
^Hannelore Hegel makes an interesting point in
this connection: "Sinclairs Kritik an Pichte ist deshalb
beachtenswert, weil er sie - mit Ausnahme der Holderlins
- fruher und in engerer Beziehung zu dessen Philosophie
als die aller iibrigen Kritiker entwickelt hat. AuBerdem
ist sie bedeutsam, weil sie sich unter anderem auf einen
Punkt richtet, in dem Fichte seibst spater unabhangig von
Sinclair zu der gleichen Einsicht wie dieser kam, aaB nam-
lich die Absolutheit des Ich aufgegeben werden musse und
es nur aus einem xhm vorausgesetzren, aber durch Reiiexio^.
nicht begreifbaren Grund zu verstehen sei." - Isaak von
Sinclair zwischen Fichte, Holderlin und Hegel, Frankfurt
a. M., 1971, 239.
For an interesting discussion of Fichte's ideas on
God, see F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy 7/1, 100-
20. Also: E. Hirsch, Fichtes Religionsphilosophie and
Christentum und Geschichte in Fichtes Philosophie;
F. Gogarten, Fichte als religioser Denker; W. Rxtzel,
Fichtes Religionsphilosophxe; W. ^chulz, Fichte. Kierke¬
gaard.
£hapt_er Five
cf. John Kemp, The Philosophy of Kant, 68:
Just as the problem presented by the place of
the concept of morality in that of the highest
good could be solved only by postulating immort¬
ality, so, Kant thinks, that presented by the re¬
quirement that happiness should be attained in
proportion to virtue can be solved only by post¬
ulating the existence of God. A man is not the
cause of nature and his will is therefore unable
to ensure that nature metes out the happiness which
through his virtue he deserves, or the unhappiness
which he might deserve through vice. But the exist¬
ence of a connexion between virtue and deserved happ¬
iness is postulated as necessary by the moral law
and its requirement that we should seek to further
the highest good; it follows that the moral law also
postulates the existence of a supreme cause of nat¬
ure which can bring about the required correspond¬
ence of virtue and morality.. which would otherwise
not exist, ie. it is morally necessary to assume
the existence of God.
p
Here I purposely put Kant's ideas on the subject
in the worst possible light, since this is (I believe)
the light in which many of his contemporaries saw them.
Whether they attacked Kant from a religious point of
view(Jacobi, Jean Paul) or supported Kant's general sys¬
tem without taking his Moral Argument or his theism ser¬
iously (Fichte in his early period, Schelling in his
Fichtean period), the most prominent of his contemporaries
and successors had this in common: they did not see Kant's
ideas on God as being either central to his system or in
general very convincing. Indeed, one is tempted to see
the basic driving force in Kant's early philosophising as
being a reaction against an element he had in common with
Holderlin: his Pietist upbringing (in Franz Albert Schulz'
school in Konigsberg). His two-pronged attack, in such
early works as Versuch iiber die Krankheiten des Kopfes
(1764-) and Traume eines Geistersehers, erlautert durch
Traume der Hetaphysik (1766), against Hwedenborgian
"Hchwarmerei" (very similar to Schelling's attack on
Schleiermacher and Novalis in Widerporsten ) and meta¬
physical rationalism (which, after all, had as its aim a
defence of the religious world view), could be seen as a
typical Enlightenment attack on religion per se, combined
as it was with a Rousseauan affirmation of life and "Dies-
seitigkeit" reminiscent of Nietzsche's philosophy. This
is not to say, of course, that Kant was an atheist, any
more than Rousseau was - Copleston makes the controversial
point that "in the long run Rousseau's sentimental deism
perhaps worked more in favour of the restoration of Cath¬
olicism than against it" (A History of Philosophy 6/1, 96).
And Kant's Moral Argument is altogether sterner and more
rigorous than Rousseau's 'sentiment interieur'. However,
the fact remains that the Moral Argument is not an a priori
proof (unlike the Ontological Argument). God is, for
Kant, a Postulate of Practical Reason - a presupposition
or assumption. This aspect of his thought was developed
in what one might regard as a consequential manner by the
- -
Neo-Kantian Hans Vaihinger, in his Philosophie des Als-
Ob (1911) , in which he treats Kant's Postulates simply
as useful fictions.
^3ean Paul, Werke, Vol.2, 266-67.
^F. Nietzsche, Werke 6/2, 19.
^Hans-Georg Gadamer gives the following definition:
"Synthetische Urteile (im Unterschied zu den ana-
lytischen Urteilen) : Urteile, in denen im Pradikat
gedacht wird, was im Subjekt noch nicht enthalten
ist. So erweitern die synthetischen Urteile die
Erkenntnis. Alle empirische Erkenntnis ist syn-
thetisch, indem in ihr ein Mannigfaltiges von Wahr-
nehmungen oder Vorstellungen zu einer Einheit ver-
bunden wird. Synthetische Urteile a priori sind
solche erweiternden Erkenntnisse, die aller Erfahr-
ung als eine notwendige Bedingung vorangehen und
die dadurch zustandekommen, daB das in ihnen zu
Verbindende ein a priori Gegebenes ist."
(Immanuel Kant, Frankfurt a. M., 1960, 215)
The novel aspect of Kant's enterprise is well brought
out by Uwe Schultz in the following passage: "Methodisch
kann das Verfahren des Dogmatikers so prazisiert werden:
analytische Urteile a priori; das des Skeptikers: synthet¬
ische Urteile a posteriori zu vollziehen. Kants Bemiihen
wendet sich nun einer Unmoglichkeit - so muBte es seiner
Zeit erscheinen - zu, namlich synthetische Urteile a priori
zu leisten... A priori sollen seine Urteile sein, urn als
wirkliche Erkenntnis Allgemeingiiltigkeit und Notwendigkeit
beanspruchen zu konnen; synthetisch aber, urn liber das ana¬
lytische Glasperlenspiel mit reinen Begriffen hinauszugel-
angen." (Immanuel Kant, 9^)
®F. Nietzsche, Werke 6/2, 18.
^See A History of Philosophy 7/1» 132: "...both
the philosophy of Spinoza and the transcendental ideal¬
ism of Fichte are one-sided exaggerations. For Spinoza
is depicted as absolutizing the object and Fichte as ab¬
solutizing the subject. And the implication is that the
Absolute must transcend the distinction between subject¬
ivity and objectivity and be subject and object in ident¬
ity."
O
"Das Ich setzt sich als bestimmt durch das Nicht-
heiBt demnach, das Ich weiB sich als begrenzt durch das\lch
GewuBte... Es ist einmal das absolute Ich, welches es \
seinem Wesen nach ist, zum anderen ist es bestimmt, d.h.
begrenzt und bedingt, also gerade nicht absolut." - Wil-
helm G. Jacobs, in his introduction to the GrundriB des
Eigentiimlichen der Wissenschaftslehre, p.XIII0
^G.W.F. Hegel, Vorl. ii. die Gesch. d. Phil., Ill,
399.
10
I. Kant, Schriften,5< 168.
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^cf. J. Kemp, op.cit., 109: "As to serious works
of art, Kant's -point seems to be that, however impressed
we may be by them it is in principle less remarkable that
the product of the mental processes of one man should
appeal to the minds of other men than that the products
of nature (whose origin, whatever it may be, is not hum¬
an) should have this affinity and appeal. The suggestion
is that, if nature has not been created,' in part at least,
for our aesthetic delight, we may at least regard it as
if it had been so created; and this is remarkable, where¬
as the production by a man of a poem or a symphony for
our pleasure is not. We expect to see order ana purpos-
iveness in a work of art, as in many other products of
human agency; but to discover them in a non-human aspect
of the world is far more impressive and wonderful."
^Dieter Henrich, 'Der Begriff der Schonheit in
Schillers Asthetik', Zeitschrift fur philosophische
Forschung XI, 1957 (This quotation from p.528). As a
detailed examination of Schiller's reading of and addit¬
ions to Kant this article is of considerable interest.
1?cf. D. Henrich, Hegel im Kontext, 15. The Theo-
sophie was, of course, an early 1pre-Kantian1 work by
Schiller. It nevertheless played an important part in
the development of the 'Liebe'/'Selbstheit' thematics, as
Henrich points out.
1 P
D. Henrich: "Anders als Hemsterhuis deutete er
Liebe als ein Sichausdehnen des endlichen Selbst, das
nach aller Vollkommenheit strebt, uber die ganze Welt."
(Hegel im Kontext, 15).
__
^Jenenser Realohilosophie I+II, ed. J. Hoffmeister,
Leipzig, 1931-32.
20
Needless to say, in the case of unpublished works,
the dates are approximate. This applies particularly to
Hegel's Theologische Jugendschriften.
21
There is evidence enough that Holderlin was a
keen student of Kantian philosophy at the Stift, inspired
by Kantian lecturers like Diez and Flatt, and was report¬
edly more enthusiastic about Kant at this stage than was
Hegel. However, this is reflected in his letters only
indirectly. For details of the friends' studies and int¬
erests at Tubingen, see Harris, Hegel's Development,
Section II; C. Jamme, 'Ein unp^elehrtes Buch', 33-54-.
22
The significance of Holderlin's early enthusiasm
for Schiller's work lies, of course, in the fact that it
would lead him to read Schiller's first Kantian public¬
ations as soon as they appeared, and they would then lead
him on to a closer personal study of Kant's work.
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Uber die Moglichkeit einer Form der Philosophie
iiberhauptl (Schriften von 1794-1798, 1-28.)
24 .
This characteristic of the artistic temperament
is stressed by J.W.N. Sullivan in his study Beethoven -
His Spiritual Development; "In this sketcn of Beethoven's
spiritual development we nave regarded him chiefly as an
explorer. What we may call nis emotional nature was sens¬
itive, discriminating, ana profouna, and his circumstances
brought him an intimate acquaintance with the chief char¬
acteristics of life... There was nothing in this man,
either natural or acquired, to blunt his perceptions.
And he was not merely sensitive, he was not merely a ref¬
lecting mirror. His experiences took root and grew. An
inner life of quite extraordinary intensity was in process
of development till the very end. Other artists, of those
few whose spirits were both sensitive and free, seem to
have passed through similar stages of development..."
(pp.125-26).
This can be compared and contrasted with Kant's pre¬
occupations as he wrote the first 'Kritik': "Methodisch
wird demonstriert, wie es nicht die Gegenstande der An-
schauung oder des Verstandes sind, nach denen sich die
Erkenntnis richtet, sondern daB die Erkenntnis als Tatig-
keit der Verbindung von Anschauung und Begriff in der
Reihe der Bedingungen vor den wahrgenommenen und erkannten
Gegenstanden liegt. Durch diese kopernikanische Wende
wird erreicht, daB die Struktur des erkennenden Subjekts
a priori die Struktur der erkannten Gegenstande bestimmt."
- U. Schultz, Immanuel Kant, 99. To be sure, Kant has
room in his system for the concept of 'Rezeptivitat',
which H.-G. Gadamer defines as the "Beschaffenheit des
menschlichen Gemiits, sich gegen gegebene Objekte leidend
zu verhalten, bzw. eine Empfanglichkeit gegen Jene zu
zeigen." (Immanue1 Kant, 215)- However, his main concern
is with the ordering of the given data. He stresses the
thought element in sense-experience.
25
cf. H.S. Harris's discussion of Schelling's cor¬
respondence with Hegel (op.cit., 186 ff.).
■jf.
"Seine Auseinandersetzung der Wechselbestimmung
des Ich und Nicht-Ich (nach seiner Sprache) ist gewiB
merkwiirdig, auch die Idee des Strebens..." {Gr.St.A.6/1,
P.15$.
^I. Kant, Schriften,5, 344-45.
^1. Kant, Schriften,5, 409.
29 '
In. his Versuch. einer" Kritik. aller Offenbarung
(1792), Fichte had defended'the primacy of Kant's auto-
nomy of the practical reason over any system of ethics
based on the authority of divine revelation (after the
manner of Moses' Ten Commandments). He did not reject
the concept of revelation altogether, but his criterion
for Judging whether any specific revelation was genuine
and valid or not was whether it was in harmony with the
- 233 -
Kantian Moral Law.
C. Jamme ('nin ungelehrtes Buch',288) states that Hold-
erlin at this time rejected the concept of revelation al¬
together (unlike Fichte). However, it is difficult to see
how Holderlin, with his intellectual roots in Pietism,
Kantian anti-rationalism and Platonism, would be likely
to take up this extreme position at any point in nis car¬
eer, especially whun one considers bow important revelat¬
ion was to become for him in his later work:
Ein Weiser mag mir manches erhellen; wo aber
Ein Gott noch auch erscheint,
Das ist doch andere Klarheit.
[Gr.St.A.3,p. 53371
30
cf. Gerhard Schulz, Novalis, p. 54-• How much Hol¬
derlin und Novalis would have had in common and agreed
upon in this discussion becomes plain when one considers
the following (in my view accurate) description of Nova¬
lis ' attitude towards Fichte's system:
Es ist das allzu abstrakte in Kants und Fichtes
Philosophie, das Hardenberg entgegen ist, die Ne-
gierung der Natur, die Irrealitat des Nicht-Ichs.
Er sucht das Nicht-Ich weiter zu fassen und fragt
nach seiner 'unabhangigen Sfare' und: 'hat Fichte
nicht zu willkiirlich alles ins Ich hineingelegt?'
'Der Mensch ist so gut Nicht-Ich, als Ich'... Das
gleichzeitige Studium Spinozas ermoglicht ihm ein
anderes Verhaltnis zur Natur. Er sucht beider We-
ge zugleich zu gehen und zu einem dritten hoheren
zu verbinden. Uber dem Problem des Ichs und dem
der Natur erhebt sich das Problem Gottes als der
hoheren Einheit. 'Spinoza stieg bis zur Natur -
Fichte bis zum Ich, ich bis zur These Gott'. Idea-
lismus und Realismus sollen sich nicht ausschlie-
Ben, sondern vereinigt werden.
Paul Kluckhohn in his intoduction to Novalis' Schriften,
Band I. (Quotation from p.11).
31
The fact that Holderlm was preoccupied with this
question as early as 1795 casts severe doubt on the pro¬
position put forward by Charles Taylor: "Hegel seems to
have been slower in taking this point, that separation
was essential for freedom, than other thinkers of his
generation. This is perhaps because he did not feel the
impact of Fichte and the 'Wissenschaftslehre' in the
middle 1790's with anything like the force that Schelling,
or the Romantic thinkers, or even Holderlin did; perhaps
because he was far from its epicentre, serving as a pre¬
ceptor in Berne. But having got the point, Hegel thought
it through more consistently, rigorously and thoroughly
than anyone else in his generation, and this...is what
ultimately separated him from the Romantics." (Hegel, 58)
It is difficult to understand the force of the "even"
before Holderlins name. It is also difficult to under¬
stand how Taylor could read Hyperion without seeing in it
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a statement that "the realization of man as a spiritual
being, hence a free rational being, requires that he
break out of the original unity of the tribe" (ibidem).
Has he read tiber Religion ?
The actual difference between Hegel and the Roman¬
tics does not lie in their respective depths of reali¬
zation of the problem, but in their respective solutions
to this problem.
cf. Harris, op.cit., 515.
-^1. Kant, Schxd-ften,5, 402.
^Novalis, Schriften,1, 11.
^F.W.J.v. Schelling, Scliriften von 1794-1798, 246.
^Holderlin-Jahrbuch 1978-9, 83.
37^'From the first section of Volksreligion und Chri-
stentum, probably written in July and August 1793, and
known as "the Tubingen Fragment " [ This quotation from H.
Nohl, Hegels theologische Jugendschriften, 5.J
^^The first two paragraphs of Das"~Leben Jesu, writ¬
ten 1795, therefore contemporary with Holderlin's Uber
Urtheil und Seyn and Schelling's Philosophische Briefe.
£Nohl, op.cit.,75'J
^1. Kant, Schriften,4,' 19.
40
G.W.F. Hegel, Vorl. u. die Geschichte d. Phil. II,
39-40.
41
Both of them seem to have taken the second part































"Em Ruckblxck auf das fruhere Werk zeigt, daB es
sich zunachst nur um die letzte Steigerung eines von An-
fang an maBgebenden Drangs zur Entindividualisierung









Schmidt's suggestion that Holderlin at this late
stage in his career had realised that poetry was alien¬
ated from "die Tatsphare", and ultimately inferior to re¬
ligion and philosophy, would seem to ignore the existence
of earlier works such as An Eduard, dedicated to his re¬
volutionary friend Sinclair, which commences:
Euch alten Freunde droben, unsterbliches
Gestirn, euch frag ich, Helden! woher es ist,
DaB ich so untertan ihm bin, und
So der Gewaltige sein mich nennet.
[Gr.St.A.2/1, P.39.J
and ends:
Es regnet sein Sturm die Schwingen dir auf,
dich ruft,
Dich nimmt der Herr der Helden hinauf; o nimm
Mich du! mit dir! und bringe sie dem
Lachelnden Gotte, die leichte Beute!
^Gr.St.A.2/1, p. 40.J
This poem, or the first version of it, was completed
in 1801. Similarly, in a letter to his brother, dated 1st
January 1799, Holderlin writes: "Wenn das Reich der Fin-
sternis mit Gewalt einbrechen will, so werfen wir die Fe-
der unter den Tisch und gehen in Gottes Namen dahin, wo
die Not am groBten ist, und wir am notigsten sind." [*Gr.
St.A.6/1, p. 307J
All that is implied by this is that specific politi¬
cal situations where there is a chance of the Absolute
being realised temporarily in historical terms or where
the opposite is possible ("Wenn das Reich der Finsternis
mit Gewalt einbrechen will..."), heroes are needed more
than poets. The poet's work is, however, far more impor¬
tant sub specie aeternitatis - who would remember Sin¬
















The centaur is, of course, also 1zweigestalt1.
However, in the context of 'changing days' and 'no-one
knowing the best (= the Absolute)', the stanza must surely
be taken as a reference to Holderlin's philosophy of hi¬
story. The close connection between 'lieblich und bos'
in line 2 and 'zweigestalt' in line 3 makes it unlikely
that they refer to two different entities. -A day which
is 'zweigestalt' is one which is in transit between the
two states: 'lieblich' and 'bos'. The only possibility
of referring 'zweigestalt' here to Chiron would be to
take it as a secondary meaning, and relate the epithet







35-^Nimm nun em RoB, und harnische dich und nimm
Den leichten Speer, o Knabe! Die Wahrsagung
ZerreiBt nicht, und umsonst nicht wartet,
Bis sie erscheinet, Herakles Riickkehr.
£Gr.St.A.2/1, P.57J
^One can compare William Blake's anecdote in his
Notes on Spurzheim^s 'Observations on the Deranged Mani¬
festations of the Mind, or Insanity':
Cowper came to me and said: '0 that I were in¬
sane always. I will never rest. Can you not make
me truly insane? I will never rest till I am so.
0 that in the bosom of God I was hid. You retain
health and yet are as mad as any of us all - over
us all - mad as a refuge from unbelief - from Bacon,
Newton and Locke.' (Complete Writings, ed. Sir
Geoffrey Keynes, 772.9
Thus, we see a connection between the divine fury of
the poet and insanity, which can be seen as a permanent
version of the "Ekstase" of the creative process. Death
would then be seen as an even more permanent version of
the same, in line with W.B. Yeat's statement: "And all
dead men are drunk." (Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats, 360.)
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^The Extentialist Tradition, ed. N. Langiulli, 377.
58G.W.F. Hegel, Phil, der Religion 2/1, 132.
^G.W.F. Hegel, ibidem.
40G.W.F. Hegel, op.cit., 133.
b) Schelling
^cf. Chapter 5» Note 7»
^Schelling-Forschung seit 195^-1 74-.
3
^Here, Zeltner xs paraphrasing a contentxon of




8F.W.J.v. Schelling, Schriften von 1794—1798, 210—
11.-
^F.W.J.v. Schelling, op.cit., 220.
O
Die Vollendung des Deutschen Idealismus in der
Spatphilosophxe Schellings, 57.
^The Later Philosophy of Schelling, 17.
^W.R. Matthews tries to define it as closely as
possible in the following terms: "The central question of
constructive philosophy does not present itself to (the
post-Kantian Theist) in the form: given the idea of God
as a belief, to find some rational proof of His existen¬
ce. Rather the problem presents itself as analogous to
the scientific problem: given the universe as disclosed
in experience, to find the most reasonable account of it.
Several hypotheses present themselves for consideration,
among them theism. The question before the mind of the
philosopher, therefore, is to decide which of the pos¬
sible hypotheses squares most adequately with the whole
experience of the universe which is open to us. The Theist
maintains that his hypothesis is the most rational in
this sense." - 'Theism', Encycloqaedia Britannica, 1962,
Vol.22, 50.
11




^F.W.J.v. Schellxng, op.cit., 164.
14
Copleston summarxses the matter concisely:
... both dogmatism and criticism point to the
theoretical annihilation of the finite self or sub-
■ ject: Spinoza reduces the finite self to the abso¬
lute Object: Fichte reduces it to the absolute Sub¬
ject, or, more precisely (since the absolute ego
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is not properly a subject), to infinite activity or stri¬
ving. In both cases the self is swamped, so to speak, in
the Absolute." - op.cit., 130.
"^F.W.J.v. Schelling, op.cit., 336-37.
^
F.W.J.v. Schelling, op.cit., 344.
^A History of Philosophy, Vol.4, 222.
^F.W.J.v. Schelling, op.cit., 359.
19
yF.W.J.v. Schelling, op.cit., 360.
20




A mediation of Bohme's ideas through the works of
Friedrich Christoph Oetinger would be the most likely
possibility here "(cf. W.A. Schulze, 'Der EinfluB Bohmes
und Oetingers auf Schelling', Blatter fur Wurtembergische
Kirchengeschichte (1957)? 171-80; K. Leese, Von Jakob







G.A. Kelly makes an interesting point in this con¬
nection:
Die Probleme der griechischen Antike stehen
immer im Hintergrund und treten oft an die Ober-
flache: Hegel arbeitet an ihnen und sucht sie
ebenso zu iiberwinden wie unter einem fremden Him-
melsstrich zu verewigen. Die platonische Paral-
lele zwischen den Kampfen im Staat und den Kampfen
in der Seele ist nie weit entfernt. Ich wage zu
behaupten, daB die groBen Gestalten des Aristote-
les, Platon und Sophokles jeweil uber den Abschnit-
ten zum BewuBtsein, SelbstbewuBtsein und Geist ste¬
hen. Das Problem von Herrschaft und Knechtschaft
ist in seiner Anlage wssentlich platonisch, weil
es dabei urn die urspriingliche Kluft in der Ge-
schichte der Gesellschaft sowohl als der Geschich-
te des Ich geht. Die zwei anfanglichen Ich, deren
Kampf zu Herrschaft und Knechtschaft fiihrt, sind
auch in einen Kampf mit sich selbst verstrickt.
(Materialien zu Kegels'Phanomenologie des Geistes',
ed. H.E. Eulda and D. Henrich, 197.)
'The last sentence reminds us that the original sin
upon which Hegel bases his system not only involves the
positing of an endemic mutual animosity between men in the
natural state (reminiscent of the situation posited in
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Plato's Reoublic), but also implies an original split in
the individual self, much in the manner envisaged by Sieg-
mund Freud.
2
This is Venus Urania, who appears here and else¬
where in Holderlin's work as a Muse figure who helps the
struggling man or artist out of his state of darkness and
confusion.
5 ...
^Here we may have an indication of the reason for
Holderlin's dissatisfaction with the first version of his
own tragedy Empedokles: "das eherne Schicksal" plays too
prominent a role, and Empedokles' suicide is more an at¬
tempt to redeem himself rather than the more general self-
sacrifice for the good of mankind.
^For an extreme statement of the "Kantian" position,
see Hans-Otto Rebstock, Hegels Auffassung des Mythos in
seinen Friihschriften. Lack of space prevents me from
going into this question more closely. For a general dis¬
cussion, see Bernhard Dinkel, Per ,jung.e Hegel und die Auf-
hebunp; des sub.jektiven Idealismus, 153-59»
^Pie Bedeutung der Person Jesu im Denken des ,-jungen
Hegel, Diss. (Gottingen, 1924).
^G.W.F. Hegel, Vorl. u. die Phil, der Weltgeschich-
te I, 249.
^G.W.F. Hegel, op.cit., II-IV, 640.
^G.tf.F. Hegel, ibidem.
9G.V/.F. Hegel, op.cit., II-IV, 643-44.
10
eg. Gottfried Martin:"Es ist unbestreitbar, daB
in den fruhen Platonischen Dialogen, die als Berichte iiber
sokratische Gesprache verstanden werden konnen, wie im
'Laches', 'Lysis' oder 'Charmides', die Ideenlehre nicht
vorkommt. In anderen Dialogen, wie etwa dem 'Menon', sind
gewisse Vorahnungen der Ideenlehre anzutreffen. Voll aus-
gestaltet aber ist sie erst im 'Phaidon' und in der 'Poli-
teia', also in Dialogen, die nach der Grundung der Akade-
mie, etwa von 387 bis 380, entstanden sind. Damit kame
man zu einem merkwurdigen Ergebnis. Platon ware als un-
gefahr Zwanzigjahriger (407) zu Sokrates gekommen, hatte
bei ihm die Ideenlehre kennengelernt, um sie dann 20 Jah-
re lang zu verschweigen. Ein solcher Verlauf scheint mir





G.v'/.F. Hegel, Phan. des Geistes. 376.
15 . .At this point, Hegel is discussing the "Trennung"
of mankind from nature, rather than that of man's reason
from his other faculties at the end of the Greek period.
However, for our present purposes, these may be regarded
as parallel situations: the mind is to the rest of man
- 24-0 -
what man is to the rest of nature.
^
In actual fact, his account would seem to apply
only to the very oldest Vedas or to South Indian religion
- most definitely not to the Upanishads or the Bhagavad
Gita.
^G.W.I1. Hegel, Phan. des Geistes, 376.
History of Aesthetic, 360.
19
yG.W.F. Hegel, Vorl. u. die Phil, der • Weltgesch.
II—IV, 64-4-4-5 .
20
cf. Chapter One, concerning Pindar's attitude to¬
wards "Werte".
This evaluation of the final vision is sometimes
denied. For example, Christoph Jamme maintains: "Durch
die Methode der Riickschau ergibt sich der Eindruck univer-
saler Vermitteltheit statt Unmittelbarkeit.... Die Kreis-
struktur unterstreicht diesen Eindruck: die ersten Briefe
konnen als Fortsetzung der letzten verstanden werden."
('Ein ungelehrtes Buch', 324-25). Jamme overlooks the
temporal/temporary nature of the "Ekstase" - the meeting
between man and the Absolute occurs, as an event, and then
the vision (necessarily) disappears. A permanent "Ekstase"
is only possible in madness or death.
22
G.W.F. Hegel, Phan. des Geistes, 12.
2^G.W.F. Hegel, op.cit., 13.
24
G.W.F. Hegel, op.cit., 19.
25
-fLangiulli, op.cit., 372.
In his article 'Die Beisetzung der Romantiker in
Hegel's Phanomenologie' (in Materialien zu Hegels 'Phano-
menologie des Geistes', ed. H.F. Fulda and D. Henrich,
245-75.).
27'As I have tried to show m this thesis, Kant's
philosophical system and that of Holderlin and Schelling
have far more in common with each other than either of
them has with that of Hegel. In his Essay on Eschatolog-
ical Metaphysics (translated by R.M. French as The Begin-'
ning and the End, New York, 1952), Nicholas Berdyaev shows
that Jakob Bonnie was a fundamental influence on Kant.
Ernst Gassirer saw the productive imagination, relating all
thinking to intuition, as central to Kant's work, as his
means of breaking through to the 'mundus intelligibilis'.
Unlike many Kant scholars who have tended and' still tend
to see the third "Kritik" as an almost superfluous late
appendage within the context of Kant's work, Cassirer
lays particular stress on this work.





52 "Dabei mag die verlockende Frage, wieweit Hegel
der Romantik als Gesamterscheinung gerecht geworden sei,
ruhig ausgeschaltet bleiben" (op.cit., 265).
55
"^One must be careful to differentiate between the
system of Holderlin and Schelling on the one hand and the
"Sturm und Drang" anti-rationalism of men like Hamann,
Herder and Jacobi on the other. Hamann (in his Metakritik
of Kant's first Kritik) and Herder (in his Kalligone, a
criticism of the third Kritik) saw themselves as direct
opponents of Kant on many points. Jacobi objected to the
postulates of practical reason, the categorical imperative
and other elements in Kant's system. Hamann, interestingly
enough, attacked Kant on the grounds that his separation
of the various human faculties was an abstract dividing
up of what was and should remain one whole. Holderlin,
on the other hand, saw it necessary to make distinctions
between man's various faculties in order to determine each
one's role in the smooth running of the whole. Kant's
determining of the limits of reason was a necessary pre¬
liminary to the Romantics' concentration on the other fa¬
culties. The parts could then be welded together. Hol¬
derlin and Schelling saw themselves as supplementing
Kant, not as opposing him. Indeed, it has been argued
(by Kurt Schilling, in his book Natur und Wahrheit; that
Schelling stays within the framework of Kant's Kritik der
Urteilskraft up to 1800.
54The attention Kant paid to the teleological struct¬
ure of nature should not be taken as evidence that he based
his theism on any form of the teleological argument.
Once he was convinced by the moral argument, he showed an
empirical interest in such matters as a logical conse¬
quence. Similarly, Schelling, once he was convinced by
the "negative Philosophie",:showed an empirical interest
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